Land v. Midwest Office Technology, Inc.
| Citation | 114 F.Supp.2d 1121 |
| Decision Date | 07 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-4115-SAC.,96-4115-SAC. |
| Parties | Sylvia Patricia LAND, Plaintiff, v. MIDWEST OFFICE TECHNOLOGY, INC., d/b/a Metro-Plex Information Systems, David Egly, and Kenneth Illig, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Cheryl D. Myers, Michael B. Myers, Myers & Myers, Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff.
Julia Riggle McKee, C. Brooks Wood, Cheryl Bloethe Linder, Morrison & Hecker L.L.P., Kansas City, MO, for Defendants.
This employment discrimination action comes before the court on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dk. 120). This case arises out of following claims: (1) sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of the Kansas Act Against Discrimination, K.S.A. 44-1009 ("KAAD"), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ("Title VII"); (2) employment discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the KAAD and Title VII; (3) retaliation in violation of the KAAD and Title VII; (4) outrage; (5) negligent infliction of mental distress; (6) retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim; (7) constructive discharge; and (8) breach of contract. The court has considered the briefs of counsel, the uncontroverted facts and applicable law, and is now prepared to rule.
The following facts are either uncontroverted or, if controverted, construed in a light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party. Immaterial facts and factual averments not properly supported by the record are omitted. Plaintiff Sylvia Patricia Land began working at the predecessor company to Metro-Plex Information Systems ("Metro-Plex") in Topeka, Kansas, on or about Sept. 9, 1985. (Dk. 133, Land depo. p. 4). Metro-Plex is in the business of selling and servicing copy machines (Dk.133, Exh. 1) and is wholly owned by Kenneth Illig ("Illig"). Land had a close working relationship with Illig, who actively managed Metro-Plex until David Egly ("Egly") took over as General Manager in June or July of 1993. (Dk. 122, Illig depo., p. 54). Soon after Egly became general manager, the working environment began to deteriorate, in Land's view, as a result of Egly's offensive conduct. Land resigned her employment with Metro-Plex on July 21, 1995. (Dk. 122, Land depo, p. 269). These and other relevant material facts are set forth in more detail throughout the court's discussion.
A court grants a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will ... preclude summary judgment." Id. There are no genuine issues for trial if the record taken as a whole would not persuade a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]here are cases where the evidence is so weak that the case does not raise a genuine issue of fact." Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.1988).
The initial burden is with the movant to "point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact given the relevant substantive law." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). If this burden is met, the nonmovant must "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to elements essential to" the nonmovant's claim or position. Martin v. Nannie and Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). The nonmovant's burden is more than a simple showing of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538; it requires "`present[ing] sufficient evidence in specific, factual form for a jury to return a verdict in that party's favor.'" Thomas v. International Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991)).
The court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. A party relying on only conclusory allegations cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir.1995).
More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At the same time, a summary judgment motion does not empower a court to act as the jury and determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence, or choose between competing inferences. Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).
Summary judgments "`should seldom be used in employment discrimination cases.'" O'Shea v. Yellow Technology Services, Inc., 185 F.3d 1093, 1098 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting Smith v. St. Louis University, 109 F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997)). Because discrimination claims often turn on the employer's intent, courts ordinarily consider summary judgment inappropriate to settle an issue like intent, Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 530 (10th Cir.1994); see Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir.1994) . Even so, summary judgment is not "per se improper," Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.1992), and may be useful in weeding out claims and cases obviously lacking merit, Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 709 (10th Cir.1988), overruled on other grounds, McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 115 S.Ct. 879, 130 L.Ed.2d 852(1995).
Section 2000e-5(e) of 42 U.S.C. provides that a discrimination charge must be filed within 300 days after the alleged unlawful conduct occurs. This filing is a prerequisite to a civil suit under Title VII. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). Defendants contend that many of plaintiff's allegations are time-barred because they occurred more than 300 days before plaintiff filed her EEOC and KAAD charges on June 16, 1995.1
Plaintiff concedes that many of the alleged acts of harassment occurred outside the time limit imposed by Title VII. She also alleges, however, many incidents which clearly occurred within the 300 day time frame. Plaintiff contends that these incidents, when viewed together with those incidents that occurred outside the time limitation, represent a continuing pattern of discrimination. See Furr v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 824 F.2d 1537, 1543 (10th Cir.1987); Martin, 3 F.3d at 1415(quoting Furr, 824 F.2d at 1543). The court agrees.
Plaintiff claims that throughout her employment with Metro-Plex, Egly repeatedly made sexually explicit remarks and gestures, which she found to be offensive. Assuming for purposes of the statute of limitations issue only, that Egly's conduct constitutes sexual harassment, plaintiff's allegations would suffice to establish a continuing pattern of discrimination by Egly. Although it is undisputed that Land was aware of the alleged harassment long before she filed her administrative complaint, the court finds that, under the facts of this case, her failure to file an charge earlier does not preclude her from relying on the continuing violation doctrine to overcome the statutory time limitation. See Martin, 3 F.3d at 1415 (). Therefore, the court will consider evidence of incidents that occurred prior to the 300-day statutory time limitation.
Plaintiff can establish actionable sexual harassment under Title VII if she demonstrates she was subjected to a hostile work environment so severe or pervasive that it constructively altered the terms or conditions of her employment.2 See Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. at 2265; Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). In order to survive summary judgment, plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence to allow a rational jury to find that (1) the alleged harassing conduct was severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and (2) plaintiff subjectively perceived the environment to be abusive.3 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a); Smith v. Norwest Financial Acceptance, Inc., 129 F.3d 1408, 1412 (10th Cir.1997).
For a hostile environment claim to survive a summary judgment motion, "a plaintiff must show that a rational jury...
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