Land v. State, S92A1307

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Citation: 426 S.E.2d 370,262 Ga. 898
• Docket Number: No. S92A1307,S92A1307
• Parties: LAND v. The STATE.
• Decision Date: 25 February 1993

Page 370

426 S.E.2d 370 262 Ga. 898 LAND
v.
The STATE. No. S92A1307. Supreme Court of Georgia. Feb. 25, 1993.
Reconsideration Denied March 18, 1993.

Page 372

[262 Ga. 901] Daniel A. Summer, Summer & Summer, Gainesville, for Land.

Jerry Rylee, Sol., Hall County State Court and Graham McKinnon IV, Asst. Sol., Gainesville, for the State.

[262 Ga. 898] BENHAM, Justice.

Appellant was convicted of inciting to riot (OCGA § 16-11-31(a)), and now challenges that conviction and the constitutionality of the statute. ¹

The State presented evidence that appellant, dressed in the ceremonial garb and pointed hood of a knight of the Ku Klux Klan, stood in the middle of a public street in front of an apartment building housing Hispanic residents, pointing his finger at the Hispanics gathered there. Hall County law enforcement officers responding to a "fight in progress" call saw appellant's lips moving while he was gesticulating[262 Ga. 899] at the Hispanics, but no witness heard what appellant said. The responding officers, well-trained in crowd control techniques, testified that the Hispanic group was agitated by appellant, and described the scene as "extremely tense." The officers readily admitted they would not have been able to handle the situation had it escalated. Fifteen to twenty minutes after the initial officer's arrival on the scene, appellant was arrested and charged with inciting to riot.

1. Appellant contends OCGA § 16-11-31(a) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He cites as evidence of vagueness the lack of definition of certain statutory terms ("act," "conduct," "urge," "counsel," "advise") and the failure to define what the time, place, and circumstances are that produce a clear and present danger of a riot.

[T]o withstand a vagueness challenge, "all that is required is that the language '[convey] sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.' "

Satterfield v. State, 260 Ga. 427, 395 S.E.2d 816 (1990). The General Assembly need not define every word it uses in a statute, as a cardinal rule of statutory construction is "the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words, except words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter...." OCGA § 1-3-1(b). OCGA § 16-11-31 meets appellant's vagueness challenge since, when read as a whole, it "provide[s] fair warning to persons of ordinary intelligence as to what it prohibits so that they may act accordingly." Id., at 428, 395 S.E.2d 816; Bell v. State, 252 Ga. 267, 271, 313 S.E.2d 678 (1984). See also State v. Dargatz, 228 Kan. 322, 614 P.2d

Page 373

430 (1980); Chapman v. State, 257 Ark. 415, 516 S.W.2d 598 (1974); People v. Davis, 68 Cal.2d 481, 67 Cal.Rptr. 547, 439 P.2d 651 (1968).

The legislature's inclusion of the word "urge" in the statute allays appellant's concern that the statute is vague because it fails to distinguish between inciting one's supporters to riot and inciting one's opponents to riot. "Stimulate," "goad," and "provoke" are all synonyms of "urge." Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) (1971). Thus, the statute is the product of a legislative intent to cover intentional inciteful acts or conduct aimed at one's opponents as well as one's supporters.

Appellant suggests that the statute is overbroad in that it proscribes both illegal and legal conduct. ² Appellant fails to note that it is not the result that causes the crime, but the doing of an act with [262 Ga. 900] intent to achieve a...