Landberg v. Newburgh Heights Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 11 June 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 1:17 CV 298 |
| Parties | KENNETH LANDBERG, Plaintiff, v. NEWBURGH HEIGHTS POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF #20).1 For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's federal age discrimination claims are granted and Plaintiff's remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff Kenneth Landberg filed this action in this Court on February 13, 2017 againstDefendants Newburgh Heights Police Department the Village of Newburgh Heights, Trevor Elkins, the Mayor of Newburgh Heights from 2012 through the present, Gabe Barone, the former Chief of Police of Newburgh Heights from 2010 through 2013 and John T. Majoy, the Chief of Police of Newburgh Heights from 2013 to the present. Counts I through IV of the Complaint allege various forms of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 and Ohio Rev. Code Chapter 4112. Counts V through VII assert state law claims of tortious interference with a business relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation per se, respectively.
Plaintiff was employed by the Village of Newburgh Heights ("Village") and the Newburgh Heights Police Department ("NHPD") as a part-time patrol officer from November 21, 2000 to April 16, 2014. (Landberg Aff. ¶¶ 3,5) Although classified and compensated as a part-time employee, Plaintiff asserts that he worked as many hours as the full-time officers and was denied the opportunity for a full-time position as a result of "NHPD's culture of ageism and discriminatory conduct that favored young officers and punished seasoned 'older' officers." (Id. at ¶5) Plaintiff states that he complained continuously from 2009 through his termination in 2014 regarding his hours being reduced in favor of younger officers and that all of the full time positions and promotions he sought were given to younger officers. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7). On or around April 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC against the Village alleging age discrimination and retaliation. (Id. at ¶ 11).
On April 16, 2014, Police Chief John Majoy brought written charges against Plaintiff. The Charges were sent to Plaintiff and faxed to his attorney. The basis of the Charges were "[a]ll of the various instances of misconduct, policy violation, incompetence, neglect of duty and/orinsubordination, when looked at together and when considering both of their significance and frequency, paint a disturbing picture of an officer who is (I) willfully insubordinate, (ii) incapable of adhering to Village policy; (iii) over-zealous in the arbitrary enforcement of laws, or, potentially worse, who looks for the opportunity to harass citizens, (iv) uninterested or incapable or carrying out his basic job duties; (v) lacking basic knowledge with respect to conducting a felony arrest; (vi) uninterested in the basic tenets of community policing, and (vii) unable to function as a Village of Newburgh Heights police officer." (ECF #20, Ex.4 at ¶ 4) The Village conducted a pre-disciplinary hearing on the Charges on April 18, 2014. Plaintiff attended with his attorney and was provided with the opportunity to respond to the Charges. Also present were Chief Majoy, Mayor Elkins and Solicitor McConville. Following the hearing, Chief Majoy suspended Plaintiff for 60 days and recommended that Plaintiff's employment with the Village be terminated. (Id. at ¶¶ 5-6) After performing his own investigation of the matter, Mayor Elkins issued a letter to Plaintiff dated April 18, 2014, notifying him that his employment with the Village was terminated immediately. (Id. at ¶ 7).
Plaintiff appealed his termination to the Clerk of Council and Mayor Elkins. The Village Council held a hearing on Plaintiff's appeal on May 20, 2014. Plaintiff was present and was represented by counsel. Witnesses were called and evidence was taken, although Plaintiff declined to testify. The Village Council issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on June 17, 2014, concluding that (Id.)
Plaintiff appealed the Village Council's decision to the Court of Common Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Case No. CV-14-827574, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2506 and 737.19(B), where it was heard by Judge Janet Burnside. Judge Burnside reviewed the record on appeal, which included the Village Council's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and issued her Judgment Entry on October 10, 2014. In her Judgment Entry, Judge Burnside noted that from March 23, 2011 to the date of his termination, Plaintiff received at least thirteen written warnings and verbal reprimands, and concluded that the Council's decision to terminate Plaintiff was supported by the evidence presented at the administrative hearing. As such, she affirmed the Council's decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. (ECF #20, Ex. 1) Plaintiff did not appeal Judge Burnside's decision. Plaintiff filed this action on February 13, 2017.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the court is satisfied "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The burden of showing the absence of any such "genuine issue" rests with the moving party:
[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). A fact is "material" only if its resolution will affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Determination of whether a factual issue is "genuine" requires consideration of the applicable evidentiary standards. The court will view the summary judgment motion in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Summary judgment should be granted if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of their case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). Accordingly, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Moreover, if the evidence presented is "merely colorable" and not "significantly probative," the court may decide the legal issue and grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). In most civil cases involving summary judgment, the court must decide "whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-moving party] is entitled to a verdict." Id. at 252.
Once the moving party has satisfied its burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the nonmover. The nonmoving party may not simply rely on its pleadings, but must "produce evidence that results in a conflict of material fact to be solved by a jury." Cox v. Kentucky Dep't of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1995). FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) states:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
The Federal Rules identify the penalty for the lack of such a response by the nonmoving party as an automatic grant of summary judgment, where otherwise appropriate. Id.
In sum, proper summary judgment analysis entails "the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial--whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's age discrimination claims are barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. Specifically, Defendants contend that the Judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in Case No. CV-14-827574, precludes Plaintiff's discrimination claims because Case No. CV-14-827574 was brought pursuant to Ohio Revised Code § 737.171 and Chapter 2506 which allowed Plaintiff a trial de novo on all questions of fact and law decided by the Village Council3. In her review of the matter, Judge Burnside determined that Plaintiff's termination was "due to the progressive nature of discipline, the sheer volume of disciplinary infractions and the serious nature of certain infractions," and thus was not for any discriminatory reason. Although an appeal of Judge Burnside's Judgment was available to Plaintiff, he chose not to pursue an appeal. Accordingly, Defendants argue that Judge...
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