Landers v. Jefferson County, Ky., 87-6204
| Decision Date | 22 March 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-6204,87-6204 |
| Citation | 842 F.2d 332 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Robert L. LANDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY, KENTUCKY; Kathy Payton; Jefferson County Police Department, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Before MILBURN and BOGGS, Circuit Judges, and ALDRICH, District Judge. *
This pro se plaintiff appeals two orders of the district court which dismissed his civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Plaintiff now moves for the appointment of counsel. Defendants also move for the imposition of sanctions against plaintiff. Upon review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed.R.App.P. 34(a).
In 1978 plaintiff was arrested and convicted on various state criminal charges, but later obtained his release from custody by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254. Consequently, he filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 in the district court in which he characterized various acts by defendants during the course of the criminal proceedings as violative of his civil rights. The district court, however, concluded that plaintiff's claims were without merit and in two separate orders entered April 7, 1987, and October 23, 1987, directed the dismissal of his cause of action. Plaintiff thereafter filed this appeal.
Examination of the order of April 7, 1987, indicates that the district court based its decision to dismiss the complaint as to defendants Cooper and the Commonwealth of Kentucky upon the conclusion that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A district court may properly take such an action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) if it, assuming the truth of all the allegations appearing in the complaint, can conclude that plaintiff could still prove no set of facts which would entitle him to recover. Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155 (6th Cir.1983); Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983).
Application of that standard to the present appeal demonstrates that the dismissal of plaintiff's claims against defendant Commonwealth of Kentucky was justified as that party is shielded from liability by operation of sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment. Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2941 (1987). Likewise, as defendant Cooper was named as a party on the basis of acts which he had taken as the prosecutor in plaintiff's criminal trial, he enjoys absolute immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
The district court's order of October 23, 1987, which granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants, was also warranted under the circumstances. A district court may properly grant a motion for summary judgment if it, drawing all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, can conclude that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Both those conditions are present in this case.
Review of the record indicates that plaintiff's remaining claims are grounded upon his belief that defendant Payton, an employee of Jefferson County, Kentucky, secured his arrest...
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