Landers v. National Railroad Passengers Corporation
| Decision Date | 27 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-2037,86-2037 |
| Parties | Paul G. LANDERS, Petitioner v. NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGERS CORPORATION et al |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Petitioner, a passenger engineer employed by respondent railroad corporation (Amtrak), belongs to the United Transportation Union (UTU) rather than to respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE), the union that represents Amtrak engineers for collective-bargaining purposes. Petitioner's request that the UTU be allowed to represent him at a company-level disciplinary hearing was denied on the ground that, under the BLE-Amtrak collective-bargaining agreement, only the BLE could undertake such representation. Petitioner represented himself at the hearing and received a 30-day suspension for violating company work rules, which he did not appeal to the National Railroad Adjustment Board. He then filed suit in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Amtrak and the BLE on the ground that their refusal to allow his representation by the UTU at the hearing violated his rights under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The court dismissed the complaint after a bench trial, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: The RLA does not entitle a railroad employee to be represented at company-level grievance or disciplinary proceedings by a union other than his collective-bargaining representative. Petitioner's contention that a right to such representation is implicit in § 2, Eleventh (c), of the RLA, which permits a union-shop requirement to be satisfied by membership in any national union organized in accordance with the Act, is without merit, since that provision was enacted for the single, narrow purpose of preventing compulsory dual unionism or the necessity of an employee's changing unions upon a change in crafts, Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Rychlik, 352 U.S. 480, 77 S.Ct. 421, 1 L.Ed.2d 480 (1957) which purpose has been satisfied here since petitioner has not been required to join the BLE. Nor does any other RLA provision expressly address the question of minority union representation at company-level proceedings; in fact, § 3, First (i), provides merely that such proceedings shall be handled in "the usual manner." That Congress, in § 3, First (j), expressly allowed employees the representative of their choice at the Adjustment Board level, but did not do so with regard to the earlier, company-level phase, is persuasive evidence that Congress did not believe that minority union participation at the company level was necessary to accomplish the RLA's purposes. Petitioner will not suffer appreciable prejudice because of the UTU's inability to represent him at proceedings conducted on company property, since it may be assumed that he will be adequately protected under the BLE's duty of fair representation, and since the UTU may represent him before the Adjustment Board if the company proceedings do not resolve the dispute. Pp. 655-659.
814 F.2d 41 (CA 1 1987), affirmed.
Paul G. Landers, pro se.
Harold A. Ross, Cleveland, Ohio, for respondent.
This case presents the question whether a railroad engineer is entitled under the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. (part 2) 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., to be represented at company-level grievance or disciplinary proceedings by a union other than his collective-bargaining representative.
Petitioner is employed as a passenger engineer by respondent National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak).1 Amtrak engineers are represented for purposes of collective bargaining by respondent Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE). Petitioner does not belong to the BLE. Instead, he is a member and officer of the rival United Trans- portation Union (UTU), which represents certain other crafts of Amtrak employees.
In February 1984, petitioner was charged with a violation of company work rules. An internal disciplinary hearing was convened pursuant to the BLE-Amtrak collective-bargaining agreement. Petitioner's request that the UTU be allowed to represent him at the disciplinary hearing was denied on the ground that the collective-bargaining agreement provided that only the BLE could represent engineers at company-level hearings.2 Petitioner represented himself at the hearing. He received a 30-day suspension, which he has now served. He did not appeal his suspension to the National Railroad Adjustment Board.
Petitioner then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against both Amtrak and the BLE. He contended that his rights under the Railway Labor Act had been violated because UTU had not been allowed to represent him at the disciplinary hearing.
The District Court dismissed petitioner's complaint following a bench trial, and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. 814 F.2d 41 (1987). The Court of Appeals concluded that neither the language nor the legislative history of the Railway Labor Act supported petitioner's contention that railroad operating employees have a statutory right to be represented by the union of their choice at company-level grievance and disciplinary proceedings. The court rejected as unpersuasive the contrary decision of the Fifth Circuit in Taylor v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 794 F.2d 1082, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1018, 107 S.Ct. 670, 93 L.Ed.2d 721 (1986).
We granted certiorari, 484 U.S. 962, 108 S.Ct. 449, 98 L.Ed.2d 389 (1987), to resolve the conflict between two Courts of Appeals over this question of federal railway labor law. We now affirm.
Petitioner contends that § 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, provides railroad operating employees with a right to be represented by a "minority" union (i.e., a union other than their collective-bargaining representative) at company-level grievance or disciplinary proceedings.
Section 2, Eleventh (a), permits a railroad and a union "duly designated and authorized to represent [its] employees" to enter into a union-shop agreement requiring "as a condition of continued employment, that . . . all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class." An employee engaged in "engine, train, yard, or hostling service" may satisfy the requirement of membership in a labor organization, however, by "hold[ing] or acquir[ing] membership in any one of the labor organizations, national in scope, organized in accordance with this chapter and admitting to membership employees of a craft or class in any of said services." § 2, Eleventh (c). It is not disputed in this action that § 2, Eleventh (c), permits petitioner to satisfy the union-shop provision of the BLE-Amtrak collective-bargaining agreement by holding membership in the UTU.
Neither § 2, Eleventh, nor any other provision of the Railway Labor Act expressly addresses what role, if any, a minority union is entitled to play in company-level grievance and disciplinary proceedings. For example, § 3, First (i), of the Act provides merely that disputes "growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions . . . shall be handled in the usual manner up to and including the chief operating officer of the carrier designated to handle such disputes." 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (i). In contrast, § 3, First (j), specifies that, once such disputes reach the Adjustment Board level, "[p]arties may be heard either in per- son, by counsel, or by other representatives, as they may respectively elect." 45 U.S.C. § 153, First (j).
We are unwilling to read into the Railway Labor Act a right to minority union participation in company-level grievance and disciplinary proceedings that Congress declined to put there. That Congress expressly provided railroad employees with the right to the representative of their choice in Adjustment Board proceedings, but did not do so with regard to any earlier phase of the dispute resolution process, is persuasive evidence that Congress did not believe that the participation of minority unions or other outsiders in company-level proceedings was necessary to accomplish the purposes of the Act.3
Indeed, the statutory purpose of "provid[ing]...
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