Landers v. State

• Decision Date: 05 April 1983
• Docket Number: No. 39503,39503
• Citation: 301 S.E.2d 633,250 Ga. 808
• Parties: LANDERS et al. v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 633

301 S.E.2d 633

250 Ga. 808

LANDERS et al. v.The STATE.

No. 39503.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 5, 1983.

As Amended April 21, 1983.

William G. Posey, Douglasville, for appellants.

William A. Foster III, Dist. Atty., Dallas, for appellee.

SMITH, Justice.

We granted certiorari in order to review the Court of Appeals' decision in Landers v. State, 164 Ga.App. 657, 297 S.E.2d 748(1982).The facts are as follows: The Paulding County Sheriff's Department executed a search warrant on the home of Eddie Campbell.According to the testimony of Detective T.W. Moore, who instigated the search, the warrant authorized a search of "[A] brick dwelling with tin shingles on the roof located on Cochran Ridge Road between Fleetwood and a dirt road of Hiram, Georgia."The warrant said nothing about any other structures, people, or vehicles on the premises, although Detective Moore testified that the judge who issued the warrant "told me I could search anything on that property."

Upon arrival at the Campbell residence, the officers were confronted with numerous vehicles both on the Campbell property and on property adjacent thereto.There were numerous people milling about the Campbell house and yard.Many of them fled upon discovering the presence of the officers.A search was made of the Campbell residence, all persons present, and the vehicles on and off the Campbell property.According to police testimony, some drugs were found in the Campbell home.The record is unclear as to whether the search for drugs in the Campbell house was prior to, simultaneous with, or after the search of the vehicles.

No contraband was found on the person of either appellant.However, a search of appellants' van, located on the driveway leading to a vacant lot adjacent to the Campbell property, revealed bags of marijuana and some pills.Appellants were arrested and convicted on three counts of violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act.

John and Jeannie Landers appeal, arguing that the evidence seized from their van should have been suppressed by the trial judge.We agree and reverse their conviction, which was based solely on the tainted evidence.

The Court of Appeals, relying on Bellamy v. State, 134 Ga.App. 340, 214 S.E.2d 383(1975), concluded that "common sense dictates that the appellants' van could readily be identified with the Campbell residence and its curtilage so as to make it subject to a search under the warrant."164 Ga.App. at 659, 297 S.E.2d 748.We do not agree.

General warrants, which do not sufficiently specify the place or person to be searched, are forbidden by our Constitution.Art. 1, § 1, p 10 of the 1976 Georgia Constitution provides that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, particularly describing the place, or places, to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."(Emphasis supplied.)See alsoOCGA § 17-5-21(Code Ann. § 27-303).A warrant which authorizes the search of a particular dwelling extends by implication to areas within the curtilage of the dwelling."Curtilage" has been defined as "the yards and grounds of a particular address, its gardens, barns, [and] buildings."Norman v. State, 134 Ga.App. 767, 768, 216 S.E.2d 644(1975).In Bellamy v. State, supra, the Court of Appeals held that a truck parked in the driveway of a residence could lawfully be searched under a warrant authorizing a search of the residence and its curtilage.

We think the Bellamy court was correct in its conclusion that a driveway is properly considered within the curtilage of the dwelling it services, at least where the driveway is located on the dwelling owner's property.But "curtilage" does not include neighboring or nearby property which is beyond the property lines of the dwelling specified in the warrant.The Landers' van was parked in the driveway of a vacant lot adjoining the Campbell residence.¹Under these circumstances, we hold that the search of the van was not conducted within the dwelling described in the warrant or its curtilage, and was therefore unauthorized.SeeLaFave, Search and Seizures§ 4.10(1978).

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except GREGORY, J., concurs specially.

MARSHALL, P.J., dissents.

GREGORY, Justice, concurring specially.

While I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case, I believe that the validity of a search ought not to depend entirely upon property lines.While it was not shown in this case, there could be circumstances where a driveway was located on adjoining property, but used by the residents in question, thereby becoming part of the curtilage for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

MARSHALL, Presiding Justice, dissenting.

Under the authority of Bellamy v. State134 Ga.App. 340, 214 S.E.2d 383(1975), supra, a police officer executing a warrant to search a certain specified residence is authorized to search vehicles located within the curtilege of...