Landers v. Stone

Citation496 S.W.3d 370,2016 Ark. 272
Decision Date23 June 2016
Docket NumberNo. CV–16–85,CV–16–85
Parties Michael Landers, David Guthrie, Kenneth Johnson, and J.W. Looney, Appellants v. Gail H. Stone, Executive Director of the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System; Robert Edwards, Chairman of the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System, Circuit Judge; Gayle Ford, Circuit Judge (Retired); Mark Hewett, Circuit Judge (Retired); Charles Yeargan, Circuit Judge; and Marcia Hearnsberger, Circuit Judge, Appellees
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

2016 Ark. 272
496 S.W.3d 370

Michael Landers, David Guthrie, Kenneth Johnson, and J.W. Looney, Appellants
v.
Gail H. Stone, Executive Director of the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System; Robert Edwards, Chairman of the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System, Circuit Judge; Gayle Ford, Circuit Judge (Retired); Mark Hewett, Circuit Judge (Retired); Charles Yeargan, Circuit Judge; and Marcia Hearnsberger, Circuit Judge, Appellees

No. CV–16–85

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered: June 23, 2016


Baker, Schulze & Murphy, by: J.G. “Gerry” Schulze, Little Rock, for appellants.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Colin R. Jorgensen, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice

The resolution of this appeal, involving a challenge to the constitutionality of this State's judicial-retirement statutes, confirms the future identity and character of our judiciary. By this opinion, we join the unanimous voice of the courts in this country, including the United States Supreme Court, which hold that judicial-retirement provisions are constitutional.

Appellants, Judges Michael Landers, David Guthrie, Kenneth Johnson, and J.W. Looney, appeal the order entered by the Pulaski County Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Gail Stone, Executive Director of the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System; Judge Robert Edwards, its Chairman; and Judges Gayle Ford, Mark Hewett, Charles Yeargan, and Marcia Hearnsberger, who are members of the system's board of trustees. In the order granting summary judgment, the circuit court rejected appellants' arguments contesting the forfeiture provisions found in Arkansas Code Annotated sections 24–8–215 and 24–8–710 (Repl.2014) that pertain to the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System. For reversal, appellants contend that (1) the forfeiture provisions constitute an additional qualification for holding judicial office in violation of the Arkansas Constitution; (2) the statutes violate their rights of equal protection under the law; (3) the statutes appear to provide for an unconstitutional taking without due process of law; and (4) the provisions operate to constructively discharge judges. We affirm the circuit court's decision.

I. Factual Background

The General Assembly established the Arkansas Judicial Retirement System sixty-three years ago with the passage of Act 365 of 1953, which is presently codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 24–8–201 et seq. (Repl.2014). With its enactment, the General Assembly declared that “it is the public policy of the state to provide sufficient retirement and survivors' benefits” for judges and justices “to attract and retain highly capable members of the legal profession for service in the state judiciary.” Ark. Code Ann. § 24–8–201. According to the legislative scheme, participation in the plan is mandatory, and each judge and justice covered by the plan contributes a percentage of their annual salary into the retirement system. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 24–8–207(a), 24–8–209(a) & 24–8–706(a). By and large, eligibility for the receipt of retirement benefits is based on years of service, which is set at a minimum of eight years. Ark. Code Ann. § 24–8–215(d). The controversy in this case concerns the laws providing that any judge who is vested in the judicial retirement system forfeits his or her retirement benefits if the judge runs for, is elected to, and serves in a new term of

496 S.W.3d 374

office after reaching the age of seventy. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 24–8–215(c) & 24–8–710(b).

Three of the appellants are current members of the Arkansas judiciary, while one has retired from the bench. Judge Landers is a circuit judge in the Thirteenth Judicial District, and he was reelected in 2010 for an additional six-year term that expires at the close of 2016. Judge Guthrie is currently serving as a circuit judge in the Thirteenth Judicial District, and he was reelected in 2014 to a six-year term ending in 2020. Similarly. Judge Johnson is a circuit judge who sits in the Tenth Judicial District and was reelected in 2014 for a six-year term that will expire in 2020. Judge Looney is retired from his position as a circuit judge in the Eighteenth Judicial District. Appellants joined in filing a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that sections 24–8–215(c) and 24–8–710(b) are unconstitutional and are otherwise contrary to the law. Appellants alleged that these provisions violate amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution by adding a qualification for serving as a judge. They also asserted that the statutes deny them equal protection, as well as due process of law, as a taking without just compensation. Their complaint included the additional claim that the forfeiture provisions effect a constructive discharge from employment. In the complaint, appellants Landers, Guthrie, and Johnson alleged that they wish to seek reelection when their terms expire but that they had reached the age that continued service would result in the forfeiture of their retirement benefits.1 Appellant Looney avowed that he had wanted to run for reelection but that he chose to retire “because of the chilling effect of the forfeiture statute[s].”2 As relief, appellants sought an injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the statutes.

Appellees responded to the complaint and subsequently moved for summary judgment, asserting that there were no material facts in dispute and that the contested issues involved questions of law. In their motion, they first argued that appellants did not have standing to mount a challenge to the statutes and that their claims were not ripe for review. Appellees also contended that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellants also moved for summary judgment. They agreed with appellees that summary disposition was appropriate because the issues raised in their complaint concern purely matters of law. However, appellants disagreed with appellees' assertion that they did not have standing and that their claims were not ripe for review. After a hearing, the circuit court ruled that appellants had standing to seek declaratory relief but that their claims were not well taken. Accordingly, the circuit court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.

II. Standards of Review

Generally, on appeal from a summary-judgment disposition, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion, and any doubts and inferences are resolved against the moving party. Ark. State Bd. of Election Comm'rs v. Pulaski Cty. Election Comm'n, 2014 Ark. 236, 437 S.W.3d 80. However, when the parties agree on the facts, we simply determine whether the appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Waters v. Millsap, 2015 Ark. 272, 465 S.W.3d 851.

496 S.W.3d 375

As to issues of law, our review is de novo. Washington Cty. v. Bd. of Trustees, 2016 Ark. 34, 480 S.W.3d 173.

III. Standing

In their brief, appellees continue to argue, as they did below, that appellants lack standing to challenge the statutes. Appellees contend that appellants do not have standing and that the issues are not ripe for review because the future application of the retirement provisions are contingent on an eligible circuit judge running for election, winning the election, and taking the bench for a new term after reaching the age of seventy. In making this argument, appellees rely on the principle that a declaratory judgment will not be granted unless the danger or dilemma of the plaintiff is present, not contingent on the happening of hypothetical future events; the prejudice to his position must be actual and genuine and not merely possible, speculative, contingent, or remote. See Nelson v. Ark. Rural Med. Practice Loan & Scholarship Bd., 2011 Ark. 491, 385 S.W.3d 762.

We treat the question of standing to sue as a threshold issue. Grand Valley Ridge, LLC v. Metro. Nat'l Bank, 2012 Ark. 121, 388 S.W.3d 24. However, this court has held that the issue of standing raised by an appellee is not preserved for appeal in the absence of a cross-appeal. Gallas v. Alexander, 371 Ark. 106, 263 S.W.3d 494 (2007). Here, appellees did not file a cross-appeal to contest the circuit court's adverse ruling on this point. Consequently, we decline to address this issue.

IV. Amendment 80

As their primary point on appeal, appellants contend that sections 24–8–215(c) and 24–8–710(b) violate amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution. They argue that the amendment establishes the qualifications for becoming a judge in this state and that the forfeiture provisions of the statutes add an additional age-based qualification by creating a de facto prohibition against retaining office past the age of seventy. Their argument is based on the principle that the General Assembly does not possess the authority to augment the qualifications contained in the constitution. Appellants assert that, by exacting a penalty on their constitutional eligibility to serve, the laws indirectly accomplish what the General Assembly lacks the direct authority to do.

The retirement provisions found in both section 24–8–215(c) and section 24–8–710(b) generally provide that (1) any judge who turns seventy while on the bench may complete his or her term of office without forfeiting retirement benefits; (2) any judge who is not eligible for...

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