Landes v. Faella
Decision Date | 09 July 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 553-A,553-A |
Citation | 255 A.2d 724,106 R.I. 23 |
Parties | Harry LANDES v. Anthony FAELLA. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is a civil action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from a motor vehicle collision at the intersection of Broad and Public Streets in the city of Providence.
The case was tried to a superior court justice and a jury which returned a verdict of $700 for plaintiff. Thereafter, defendant seasonably moved for a new trial alleging the usual grounds, and additionally, improper conduct between plaintiff's attorney 1 and the jury foreman. In connection with this latter ground, defendant filed an affidavit wherein he stated '* * * between the beginning and the ending of the trial of the above matter, I saw the trial attorney for the plaintiff and the foreman of the jury, hearing said case, sitting together on a bench in the Superior Court, and talking to each other * * *.'
At the hearing in connection with the new trial motion, the trial justice concluded that a first determination of the allegation of improper conduct required the taking of testimony of the parties involved. At said evidentiary hearing, defendant qualified the assertions contained in his affidavit relative to plaintiff's attorney and the jury foreman having conversed together on a bench. He testified that what he observed was a conversation between the jury foreman, who was seated on a bench, and plaintiff's attorney who was standing facing the foreman with his back to defendant. Calling for a summation of this testimony, counsel asked,
'Q When you saw-If I understand you correctly, Mr. Faella, you saw the foreman sitting down, you saw a man standing, talking to him, you approached within fifteen feet of them, you saw them speaking, you turned around and went back the way you came?'
to which defendant replied,
'A Rights.'
In his testimony, plaintiff's attorney recalled having spoken to the foreman, along with several other jurors in the cloak room after the jury had been discharged but, categorically denied conversing with the foreman or any other member of the jury during the course of the trial. The testimony of the foreman was to the same effect.
Nevertheless, the trial justice granted defendant's motion, stating, and we quote in full:
It is well settled that a motion for a new trial based on improper conduct between a member or members of the jury and one of the litigants or his attorney is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice. Screw Machine Corp. v. Cutter & Wood Co., 43 R.I. 34, 110 A. 382, 39 Am.Jur. New Trial § 96, and cases cited therein. Furthermore, it is also well settled that to insure confidence in trial by jury, a new trial will be granted whenever it appears that such improper conduct has tended to create bias or prejudice in the minds of the jurors. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 48 R.I. 56, 135 A. 325. See also 55 A.L.R. 750, 39 Am.Jur. New Trial § 96 and cases cited therein.
However, the same authorities are also agreed that before a jury verdict should be set aside for alleged improper conduct, there must be some showing that the conversation complained of was in some wise related to the trial. Here, as previously noted, there is not the slightest suggestion that the conversation of which defendant complained in any way related to the litigation or could have had any effect on the outcome thereof. Moreover, in Patton v. Hughesdale Mfg. Co., 11 R.I. 188, this court held that a motion for a new trial based on the ground of irregularity or misconduct which was known to the movant during the course of the trial, should not be granted where the alleged irregularity or misconduct was not brought to the court's attention before the jury returned its verdict. So holding, the court stated at page 189,
'The defendant having proceeded without objection to what had occurred, and thereby subjected the plaintiff to the expense of a trial occupying several days, which might have been avoided if the objection had been seasonably made, ought not to be permitted, after the jury have rendered a verdict adverse to it, to urge that objection as a reason for setting aside that verdict.'
We hold...
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