Landgraf v. USI Film Products

• Decision Date: 30 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-4485,91-4485
• Citation: 968 F.2d 427
• Parties: 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 897, 59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,662 Barbara LANDGRAF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. USI FILM PRODUCTS, Bonar Packaging, Inc., and Quantum Chemical Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 427

968 F.2d 427

59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 897,

59 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,662

Barbara LANDGRAF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. USI FILM PRODUCTS, Bonar Packaging, Inc., and Quantum

Chemical Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-4485.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

July 30, 1992.

Timothy B. Garrigan, Stuckey & Garrigan, Nacogdoches, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.

Gregory D. Smith, Mike A. Hatchell, Ramey, Flock, Jeffus, Crawford, Harper & Collins, Tyler, Tex., for Bonar, USI, Quantum.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

Barbara Landgraf brought suit against her employer asserting sexual harassment and retaliation claims under Title VII. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Although the district court found that sexual harassment had occurred, it concluded that Landgraf had not been constructively discharged and therefore was not entitled to any relief under Title VII. Landgraf asserts on appeal that the district court clearly erred in finding that she was not constructively discharged and that the district court erred in failing to make factual findings on her retaliation claim. She also argues that she is entitled to nominal damages even if she is unable to demonstrate a constructive discharge. Finally, she asserts that the damage and jury trial provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 should be applied retroactively to her case. We affirm the district court's judgment in all respects and find that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to this case.

I.

Landgraf worked for USI Film Products in its Tyler, Texas production plant on the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift. From September 1984 to January 1986, she was employed as a materials handler operating a machine which produced several thousand plastic bags per shift. While she worked at the plant, fellow employee John Williams subjected her to what the district court described as "continuous and repeated inappropriate verbal comments and physical contact." The district court found that this sexual harassment was severe enough to make USI a "hostile work environment" for purposes of Title VII liability. The harassment was made more difficult for Landgraf because Williams was a union steward and was responsible for repairing and maintaining the machine Landgraf used in her work.

Landgraf told her supervisor, Bobby Martin, about Williams' harassment on several occasions but Martin took no action to prevent the harassment from continuing. Only when Landgraf reported the harassment to USI's personnel manager, Sam Forsgard, was Williams' behavior investigated. By interviewing the other female employees at the plant, the investigation found that four women corroborated Landgraf's reports of Williams engaging in inappropriate touching and three women reported verbal harassment.

Williams denied the charges, contending that "they are all lying." Williams was given a written reprimand for his behavior, but was not suspended, although the written policies of USI list sexual harassment as an action "requiring suspension or dismissal." He was technically transferred to another department, however, USI officials conceded that he would still be in Landgraf's work area on a regular basis. This transfer was not a form of discipline against Williams; as soon as Landgraf resigned he was transferred back to the original department.

The investigation dealt not only with Williams' behavior but also involved questioning employees about their relationship with Landgraf. On January 13, 1986, Forsgard, Wilson, and Martin met with Landgraf. According to Wilson's notes describing the meeting, Forsgard first told Landgraf that her claim had been investigated and that USI had taken the action it deemed appropriate. The meeting then turned to focus on Landgraf's problems in getting along with her co-workers. She was told that she was very unpopular and was "among [her] own worst enemies." When Landgraf asked whether anything was going to happen to Williams she was told that USI had taken what it considered appropriate action and to notify them if Williams attempted to take revenge.

After working just two more shifts, Landgraf left her job at USI. She left a letter addressed to her colleagues stating that "the stress that each one of you help [sic] to put on me, caused me to leave my job." The letter did not refer to the sexual harassment or to Williams by name. Approximately two days later, Landgraf spoke to her supervisor about her decision to resign and specifically attributed it to the harassment by Williams.

II.

It is uncontested that Barbara Landgraf suffered significant sexual harassment at the hands of John Williams during her employment with USI. This harassment was sufficiently severe to support a hostile work environment claim under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). She reported this harassment to her employer through supervisor Bobby Martin on several occasions and no corrective action was timely taken.

Because Landgraf voluntarily left her employment at USI, however, she must demonstrate that she was constructively discharged in order to recover back pay as damages. In order to demonstrate constructive discharge, she must prove that "working conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign." Bourque v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir.1980); Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir.1990). The district court found that the sexual harassment by Williams was not severe enough that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign. This conclusion was strengthened by the district court's finding that at the time Landgraf resigned USI was taking action reasonably calculated to alleviate the harassment. The district court further found that "as evidenced by the language in her resignation letter, Landgraf's motivation for quitting her employment with USI was the conflicts and unpleasant relationships she had with her co-workers."

Landgraf argues first that the district court clearly erred in finding that USI had taken steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment. We disagree. Our review of the district court's factual finding is limited. As the Supreme Court has recently described the scope of our review: "If the district court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently." Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511-12, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). There was evidence that USI had given Williams its most serious form of reprimand and acted to reduce his contact with Landgraf at the workplace. Landgraf testified that Williams continued to harass her after his reprimand, however, she did not report these incidents to USI before resigning. Title VII does not require that an employer use the most serious sanction available to punish an offender, particularly where, as here, this was the first documented offense by an individual employee. The district court did not clearly err in concluding that USI took steps reasonably calculated to end the harassment.

Landgraf argues that the finding of no constructive discharge was clearly erroneous. We disagree. The district court, after hearing all the testimony in this case, concluded that Landgraf resigned for reasons unrelated to sexual harassment. The evidence in this case presented two possible reasons for Landgraf's decision to resign: problems with her co-workers, as evidenced by her note or sexual harassment as stated in conversation with Bobby Martin. Landgraf testified at trial that the sexual harassment was the reason for her resignation. She also stated that the reference to "the devil [who] has been your leader so far" in her resignation note was actually a reference to Williams. The district court concluded based upon this testimony and the note itself that the problems with her co-workers actually caused her resignation. Given these two plausible interpretations of the evidence, we must affirm the district court's finding. Landgraf also asserts that the conflicts she had with her co-workers were as a result of her problems with Williams. There was conflicting evidence on this question and the district court specifically found that Landgraf's conflict with her co-workers was unrelated to the sexual harassment by Williams. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Landgraf left her employment at USI for reasons unrelated to sexual harassment.

Moreover, even if the reason for Landgraf's departure was the harassment by Williams, the district court found that, particularly in light of the corrective actions taken by USI immediately before Landgraf resigned, the level of harassment was insufficient to support a finding of constructive discharge. To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate a greater severity or pervasiveness of harassment than the minimum required to prove a hostile working environment. Pittman v. Hattiesburg Municipal Separate School District, 644 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir.1981) (constructive discharge requires "aggravating factors"). The harassment here, while substantial, did not rise to the level of severity necessary for constructive discharge. Although USI's investigation of this incident may not have been overly sensitive to Landgraf's state of mind, the company had taken steps to alleviate the situation and told Landgraf to let them know of any further problems. A reasonable employee would not have felt compelled to resign immediately following the...