Landin v. Healthsource Saginaw, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 June 2014
• Docket Number: Docket No. 309258.
• Citation: 854 N.W.2d 152,305 Mich.App. 519
• Parties: LANDIN v. HEALTHSOURCE SAGINAW, INC.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

305 Mich.App. 519

854 N.W.2d 152

LANDIN

v.HEALTHSOURCE SAGINAW, INC.

Docket No. 309258.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 4, 2014, at Detroit.

Decided June 3, 2014, at 9:05 a.m.

Hurlburt, Tsiros & Allweil, PC, Saginaw (by Mandel I. Allweil ), for plaintiff.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, PLC, Detroit (by Richard W. Warren and M. Misbah Shahid ), for defendant.

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY and SERVITTO, JJ.

Opinion

SERVITTO, J.

Defendant appeals as of right the trial court's denial of its motions for summary disposition. Defendant also appeals the trial court's rulings on several discovery and evidentiary issues and its denial of defendant's motions for a directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur. We affirm.

Plaintiff is a licensed practical nurse. He began working for defendant, a nonprofit community hospital, in March 2001 as an at-will employee and his employment was terminated in April 2006. Plaintiff asserts that he was terminated because he reported negligence by a coworker, which negligence he believed directly led to the death of a patient, to a supervisor. Plaintiff alleged that after he reported the believed negligence, he was retaliated against by defendant and the retaliation ultimately culminated in his termination. In his complaint against defendant, plaintiff alleged wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

Defendant initially moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8), arguing that plaintiff's public policy claim was preempted by § 2 of the Michigan Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MCL 15.362. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant later moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), asserting that plaintiff had identified no public policy on which his claim was grounded and that plaintiff could not and did not identify any law or policy under which his claim could survive. The trial court again denied defendant's motion for summary disposition. The trial court did not initially identify any specific law or public policy that would support plaintiff's cause of action but, in an October 13, 2011, opinion and order, the trial court stated that it was holding, as matter of law, that “Michigan law recognizes a cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of the public policy exhibited by MCL 333.20176a(1)(a)....” Defendant thereafter filed a renewed emergency motion for summary disposition based primarily on its assertion that the statute cited by the trial court provided no basis for plaintiff's public policy claim. The trial court again denied the motion and the matter proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which the jury reached a verdict in favor of plaintiff.

Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court committed error requiring reversal by failing to apply the proper analysis and law to defendant's second and third motions for summary disposition and thereafter committed error requiring reversal by denying defendant's motions. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for summary disposition. Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd. Comm., 477 Mich. 197, 202, 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007). A motion under “MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim on the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief may be granted.” Spiek v. Dep't of Transp., 456 Mich. 331, 337, 572 N.W.2d 201 (1998). Summary disposition under subrule (C)(8) is appropriate “if no factual development could justify the plaintiff's claim for relief.” Id. A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of the complaint. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 120, 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). In evaluating a motion for summary disposition brought under (C)(10), a reviewing court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358, 362, 547 N.W.2d 314 (1996) ; MCR 2.116(G)(5). If the proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Quinto, 451 Mich. at 362–363, 547 N.W.2d 314.

Michigan law generally presumes that employment relationships are terminable at the will of either party. Lytle v. Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich. 153, 163, 579 N.W.2d 906 (1998). There is, however, an exception to the at-will employment doctrine “based on the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable.” Suchodolski v. Mich. Consol. Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 695, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982).

In Suchodolski, the plaintiff began working for Michigan Consolidated Gas Company in September 1972 as a senior auditor and was discharged in January 1976. He sued his former employer in 1978, stating various theories of recovery in a six-count complaint. Relevant to the instant action, the plaintiff alleged that during his employment he discovered and reported poor internal management of the defendant corporation, that he was fired for attempting to report and correct questionable management procedures, and that his firing was retaliatory and against the public policy of Michigan. Id. at 693–694, 316 N.W.2d 710. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the defendant with regard to all six of the counts and the Court of Appeals affirmed with regard to five of the counts, including the count relevant to this action. Our Supreme Court, in affirming the Court of Appeals, opined that the only grounds that have been recognized as so violative of public policy that they serve as an exception to the general rule of at-will employment are: (1) explicit legislative statements prohibiting the discharge, discipline, or other adverse treatment of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or duty (e.g., the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2701 ; the Whistleblowers' Protection Act, MCL 15.362 ; the Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.1602 ), (2) where the alleged reason for the discharge was the failure or refusal of the employee to violate a law in the course of employment (e.g., refusal to falsify pollution reports; refusal to give false testimony before a legislative committee; refusal to participate in a price-fixing scheme), and (3) where the reason for the discharge was the employee's exercise of a right conferred by a well-established legislative enactment (e.g., retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims). Suchodolski, 412 Mich. at 695–696, 316 N.W.2d 710. The Supreme Court determined that the matter before it involved only a corporate management dispute and that the dispute lacked “the kind of violation of a clearly mandated public policy that would support an action for retaliatory discharge.” Id. at 696, 316 N.W.2d 710.

“Our Supreme Court's enumeration [in Suchodolski ] of ‘public policies' that might forbid termination of at-will employees was not phrased as if it was an exhaustive list.” Kimmelman v. Heather Downs Mgt. Ltd., 278 Mich.App. 569, 573, 753 N.W.2d 265 (2008). This does not mean, however, that trial courts have unfettered discretion or authority to determine what may constitute sound public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. As observed in Terrien v. Zwit, 467 Mich. 56, 66–67, 648 N.W.2d 602 (2002) :

In defining “public policy,” it is clear to us that this term must be more than a different nomenclature for describing the personal preferences of individual judges, for the proper exercise of the judicial power is to determine from objective legal sources what public policy is, and not to simply assert what such policy ought to be on the basis of the subjective views of individual judges....

In identifying the boundaries of public policy, we believe that the focus of the judiciary must ultimately be upon the policies that, in fact, have been adopted by the public through our various legal processes, and are reflected in our state and federal constitutions, our statutes, and the common law. See Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357, 51 S.Ct. 476, 75 L.Ed. 1112 (1931). The public policy of Michigan is not merely the equivalent of the personal preferences of a majority of this Court; rather, such a policy must ultimately be clearly rooted in the law. There is no other proper means of ascertaining what constitutes our public policy.

Consistent with this observation, the Terrien Court noted that as a general rule, making social policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts, id. at 67, 648 N.W.2d 602, and found instructive the United States Supreme Court's mandate: “ ‘Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. As the term “public policy” is vague, there must be found definite indications in the law of the sovereign to justify the invalidation of a contract as contrary to that policy.’ ” Id. at 68, 648 N.W.2d 602, quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66, 65 S.Ct. 442, 89 L.Ed. 744 (1945). Thus, courts may only derive public policy from objective sources. Kimmelman, 278 Mich.App. at 573, 753 N.W.2d 265.

Notably, the three public policy exceptions recognized in Suchodolski entail an employee's exercising a right guaranteed by law, executing a duty required by law, or refraining from violating the law. Id. These three recognized circumstances remain the only three recognized exceptions and the list of exceptions has not been expanded. While the Suchodolski Court's enumeration of public policies that might forbid termination of at-will employees may not have been phrased as if it were an exhaustive list (id. at 573, 753 N.W.2d 265 ), our courts have yet to find a situation meriting extension beyond the three circumstances detailed in Such...