Landis v. Moyer
| Citation | 610 F.Supp.3d 649 |
| Decision Date | 11 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:19-CV-470 |
| Parties | Carlton Theodore LANDIS, Plaintiff v. Correctional Officer MOYER, Bureau of Prisons, Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
Carlton Theodore Landis, Pine Knot, KY, Pro Se.
Melissa Swauger, U.S. Attorney's Office, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Carlton Theodore Landis, a prisoner who was housed at all relevant times at the United States Penitentiary, in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania ("USP Lewisburg"), filed an amended complaint against defendants Senior Officer Moyer and the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), purporting to sue them under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), state tort law, and the Administrative Procedures Act. Before the court are defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment; Landis's motion for reconsideration; and Landis's motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss. Because our analysis begins and ends with defendants’ dispositive motion, we do not consider the merits of Landis's motions.
Landis's amended complaint arises from a series of events that he alleges began in the fall of 2018 while he was incarcerated at USP Lewisburg. Landis alleges that at some unspecified time in the fall of 2018, he complained to prison officials about a dangerous cell assignment. (See Doc. 78 at 12 ¶ 1). Specifically, Landis claims that he had been forced to share a cell with a prisoner who was "openly adverse" to Landis's prior cooperation with federal authorities. (See id. ) According to Landis, prison officials retaliated against him for his complaints "by unjustly revoking his recreation from September 21, 2018, to October 4, 2018." (See id. )
On October 5, 2018, after Landis participated in recreation, defendant Moyer escorted him back to his cell. (See id. at 12 ¶ 2). Landis complained to Moyer that, during recreation, other prisoners had threatened and harassed him about his prior cooperation. (See id. ) Landis claims Moyer then threw him against a wall, applied pressure to his neck, buttocks, and groin, and suggested that Landis would not have to worry about such harassment if he "wasn't a snitch." (Id. at 12-13 ¶ 2). Landis alleges he suffered various injuries as a result of this assault, including soreness, bruising, and swelling of his testicles, buttocks, and inner thighs, and swelling of his left eye. (See id. at 16-17 ¶ 15).
Landis asserts that he filed a grievance related to the October 5, 2018 harassment and assault. (See id. at 13 ¶ 3). He claims officials at USP Lewisburg thereafter retaliated against him for filing the grievance by revoking his recreation from October 8, 2018, through June 1, 2019. (See id. ) He further claims officials at various BOP facilities continue to retaliate against him by removing his protective custody status and changing his housing assignments. (Id. at 14-15 ¶¶ 5, 7).
Defendants move to dismiss Landis's amended complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides that a court may dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1). Such jurisdictional challenges take one of two forms: (1) parties may levy a "factual" attack, arguing that one or more of the pleading's factual allegations are untrue, removing the action from the court's jurisdictional ken; or (2) they may assert a "facial" challenge, which assumes the veracity of the complaint's allegations but nonetheless argues that a claim is not within the court's jurisdiction. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008) ). In either instance, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish jurisdiction. See Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002) ).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide "the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, "the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’ " Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32 ; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts "that allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
Defendants’ Rule 12(b) motion raises both jurisdictional and merits challenges to Landis's claims. Our analysis begins, as it must, with defendants’ challenges to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
Defendants argue first, and correctly, that Landis's Bivens claim against defendant Moyer in his official capacity is barred by sovereign immunity. (See Doc. 120 at 13-14). Sovereign immunity constitutes a jurisdictional bar to claims against the United States and its agencies, unless Congress has specifically waived such immunity. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). Moreover, "[a]n action against government officials in their official capacities constitutes an action against the United States" and is therefore also "barred by sovereign immunity, absent an explicit waiver." Lewal v. Ali, 289 F. App'x 515, 516 (3d Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential); Webb v. Desan, 250 F. App'x 468, 471 (3d Cir. 2007) (nonprecedential).1 And Bivens does not waive sovereign immunity with respect to claims brought against federal employees sued in their official capacities. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72, 122 S.Ct. 515, 151 L.Ed.2d 456 (2001). Thus, to the extent Landis attempts to assert a Bivens claim against Moyer in his official capacity, that claim is barred by sovereign immunity and will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Lewal, 289 F. App'x at 516 ; Webb, 250 F. App'x at 471.2
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The court may not entertain a civil suit for a claim cognizable under Section 1346(b) against "any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1).
As a threshold matter, we note that Landis expressly states that he does not want his complaint construed as "asserting any claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act." (See Doc. 89 at 2). Thus, to the extent Landis's complaint appears to pursue an FTCA claim, he has expressly disavowed it. Landis believes he can nonetheless proceed on his tort claims against defendant Moyer under the common law because Moyer acted outside the scope of his employment when he committed the alleged torts. (See Doc. 149 at 6-7; see also Doc. 89 at 2-3). Upon review of the allegations of the complaint, there is no question Moyer was acting within the scope of his BOP employment at the time of the alleged incidents. See CNA, 535 F.3d at...
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