Landon v. Clark

• Decision Date: 15 January 1915
• Docket Number: 94.
• Citation: 221 F. 841
• Parties: LANDON v. CLARK et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

221 F. 841

LANDON v. CLARK et al.

No. 94.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

January 15, 1915

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

Thomas Watts and Elbert N. Oakes, both of Middletown, N.Y. (John Bright, of Middletown, N.Y., of counsel), for appellants.

M. N Kane, of Warwick, N.Y. (John J. Beattie, of Warwick, N.Y., of counsel), for appellee.

Before LACOMBE, WARD, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

ROGERS Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff seeks to quiet title to certain real estate which he claims to own in fee simple and to have in possession, and which is under water, known as Wickham's Pond in the town of Warwick, in the county of Orange, and state of New York. The plaintiff derives title through a deed made June 30, 1906, by Jesse Durland conveying to Thomas D. Landon in fee simple 650 acres of land, more or less, describing the same by metes and bounds and adding:

'And also all the lands under water belonging to said Durland in what is known as Wickham's Pond in said town being all the lands and premises owned by the said party of the first part in the said town of Warwick.'

To show title in Jesse Durland, plaintiff relies upon an action brought in the courts of the state of New York by Elizabeth Clark and Mary F. Clark (Defendants in the case at bar) against Jesse Durland, in which action the present plaintiff claims it was adjudged and decreed that the defendants had no right, title, or interest in the lands described in the bill of complaint, and that Jesse Durland's title was good and valid. The claim is that, as between the defendants in the present suit and the plaintiff, who is the successor to the title of Jesse Durland, the title to the land in suit has been authoritatively determined by the action of the New York courts, and that the matter is res judicata, and justifies this court, without further proof of title in plaintiff ordering a decree entered quieting the title.

It appears that Elizabeth Clark and Mary F. Clark commenced an equitable action in the Supreme Court of the state of New York to restrain certain alleged trespasses which Jesse Durland had committed and induced others to commit at various times 'from year to year for many years past,' and which he threatened to continue whenever and at such times as he should choose or desire. The plaintiffs alleged in their bill that they were seised and in possession 'of certain lands and premises in the town of Warwick, in said county, partly covered by water and commonly known as Wickham's Pond or Clark's Lake, bounded and described as follows. ' Then followed a description of Wickham Pond by metes and bounds, and which embraced all the land covered by the waters of the pond. The bill further alleged ownership of a 200-acre farm adjoining the pond, 'the value of which,' so the bill alleged, 'is greatly enhanced by the ownership and peaceable possession of the premises above described. ' The bill went on to allege various trespasses committed by Durland upon 'the premises above described, known as Wickham Pond. ' It demanded judgment that Durland, his servants, and employes 'be forever enjoined and restrained from entering upon the premises above mentioned and described, known as Wickham's Pond or Clark's Lake, and from doing or performing any other act or thing in relation thereto derogatory to the title of the plaintiffs therein. ' It thus appears that in that suit the present defendants, as plaintiffs, alleged title not to any limited or specified part of Wickham Pond, but asserted exclusive and sole ownership to the whole and every part thereof, and prayed for an injunction excluding the defendant from the whole and every part of the pond. The defendant, Durland, in his answer set up that he had never claimed title to the whole of the lake, admitted that he had entered upon a certain part of the lake and had cut and taken away ice therefrom, and averred 'that he had the right to so cut and carry away said ice. ' He also alleged that 'he is the owner of a farm bordering upon and surrounding to a considerable extent said Wickham's Pond, and is the owner of a certain portion of said Wickham's Pond. ' He denied each and every allegation in the complaint which the answer had not specifically admitted. The court in its judgment decreed:

'That the defendant is, and was at the commencement of this action, seised in fee of that portion of said Wickham's Pond shown on the map by A. R. Taylor, surveyor, running through said pond on a course south 88 1/2 degrees east, from the east line of the homestead farm to a stake in the center of a ditch or inlet of Wickham's Lake.'

The land thus described in the judgment is the precise tract of land involved in the present suit, and is described in the bill of complaint in the identical language of the judgment. The defendants, while conceding that the land involved in the case at bar is the land described in the judgment, assert that the judgment is not res judicata as the finding as to the title by the New York courts was not necessary to the decision of the case, and they claim that a judgment does not operate as an estoppel in a subsequent action between the parties as to immaterial or unessential facts, even though put in issue by the pleadings and directly decided. The question, therefore, which we have to consider upon this appeal, is whether the judgment entered in the action brought in the New York courts by these defendants against this plaintiff's predecessor in title is conclusive as between the parties to the present suit as respects the title now sought to be quieted.

The doctrine of res judicata is that a fact which was actually in issue in a former suit, in which it was judicially passed upon and determined by a domestic court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment so far as concerns the parties to the action and their privies. It cannot be litigated again in any future action between the same parties or their privies, either in the same court or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction, upon the same or upon a different cause of action. The doctrine is based upon the theory that private right and public welfare demand that a question once adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction should be considered, except in direct proceedings to review, as forever conclusive upon the parties. 'Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium.'

The principle of res judicata is an old one in our jurisprudence. It is not only a cardinal principle of the common law, but it is one established in all civilized systems of jurisprudence. 'Res judicata pro veritate accipitur' was the well-known maxim of the Roman law by which a judgment was binding and conclusive upon the parties, and could not be contradicted or impeached by them as to a right or a fact which had been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Of such a matter it was said 'transit in rem judicatum.' In the trial of the Duchess of Kingston in Westminster Hall in full Parliament assembled in 1776, the defense in that great case turned upon the effect of a sentence rendered in the Ecclesiastical Court and which was claimed to be a conclusive bar to the suit then pending. Chief Justice De Grey declared the rule to be that: 'The judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is as a plea a bar, or as evidence conclusive, between the same parties upon the same matter, directly in question in another court.'

The doctrine applies to judgments at law and to decrees in equity. And a point which has been litigated and determined in a state court cannot be again drawn in question between the parties or their privies in a federal court, but must receive the same faith and credit there which would be accorded to it in the courts of the state where it was rendered.

The case of Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876), is regarded as the leading case among those decided in the Supreme Court of the United States upon this subject. The matter is there very fully considered and the English cases are examined. Mr. Justice Field, writing the opinion of the court, states the law as follows:

'In considering the operation of this judgment, it should be borne in mind, as stated by counsel, that there is a difference between the effect of a judgment as a bar or estoppel against the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim or demand, and its effect as an estoppel in another action between the same parties upon a different claim or cause of action. In the former case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. Thus, for example, a judgment rendered upon a promissory note is conclusive as to the validity of the instrument and the amount due upon it, although it be subsequently alleged that perfect defenses actually existed, of which no proof was offered, such as forgery, want of consideration, or payment. If such defenses were not presented in the action, and established by competent evidence, the subsequent allegation of their existence is of no legal consequence. The judgment is as conclusive, so far as future proceedings at law are concerned, as though the defenses never existed. The language, therefore, which is so often used, that a judgment estops not only as to every ground of recovery and defense actually presented in the action, but

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