Landon v. Padgett
| Decision Date | 12 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NUMBER 13-261-SCR |
| Parties | BRENDA LANDON v. PHILIP A. PADGETT, M.D., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
Before the court is the West Baton Rouge Parish Council's Motion for Summary Judgment. Record document number 21. The motion is opposed.1
Careful consideration of the record and the parties' arguments supports finding that under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act there is no genuine dispute for trial on the issue of whether defendant West Baton Rouge Parish Council had an employment relationship with plaintiff Brenda Landon.2 It did not. As to the plaintiff's Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law claim, the result is different.
Plaintiff Brenda Landon filed a Complaint against defendants the West Baton Rouge Parish Council, and the Parish of West BatonRouge (which are considered as the same entity for the purpose of this case and are referred to hereafter as "WBRP"), and Philip A. Padgett, M.D., who is the West Baton Rouge Parish Coroner (sometimes referred to in the parties' memoranda as the "Coroner's Office" and referred to hereafter as the "Coroner").3 Plaintiff alleged claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §621, et seq, and "Louisiana's anti-discrimination laws."4 Plaintiff alleged that she was employed by the West Baton Rouge Parish Coroner and was subject to offensive harassment based on her age beginning in 2007. Plaintiff alleged that after reporting the illegal conduct she continued to be subject to a hostile work environment and was ultimately wrongfully terminated on September 27, 2011.
Defendant moved for summary judgment based on the argument that it is not the plaintiff's employer, and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the ADEA and the LEDL. Defendant WBRP asserted that the Coroner is not an employee or agent of WBRP, but rather an elected official under the Louisiana StateConstitution whose office is a state agency which operates independently of regulation by the local governing authority. Defendant WBRP also provided evidence to establish that it does not exercise the requisite control over the employees of the Coroner necessary for WBRP to be held accountable as the plaintiff's employer.5 WBRP argued that even though the Coroner receives annual appropriations from WBRP to pay his employees and other necessary expenses, it is not their employer under the ADEA and the LEDL.
Plaintiff opposed the motion. Plaintiff essentially argued that her affidavit and supporting documents and other evidence establish that her employee compensation and benefits are administered and controlled by WBRP.6 Therefore, plaintiff argued, this fiscal relationship between WBRP and the Coroner shows that there is a genuine dispute for trial on the issue of whether WBRP is her employer or joint employer within the meaning of the ADEA and the LEDL.
Summary judgment is only proper when the moving party, in a properly supported motion, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(a), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). If the moving party carries its burden under Rule 56(c), the opposing party must direct the court's attention to specific evidence in the record which demonstrates that it can satisfy a reasonable jury that it is entitled to verdict in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. This burden is not satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions or only a scintilla of evidence. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). In resolving the motion the court must review all the evidence and the record taken as a whole in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. The court may not make credibility findings, weigh the evidence or resolve factual disputes. Id.; International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059, 112 S. Ct. 936 (1992).
The substantive law dictates which facts are material. Littlefield v. Forney Independent School Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282(5th Cir. 2001). The threshold issue in this case is whether an employment relationship exists between the plaintiff and defendant WBRP, within the meaning of the ADEA and the LEDL.
Under the ADEA the term "employer" is defined as follows:
[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968, employers having fewer than fifty employees shall not be considered employers. The term also means (1) any agent of such a person and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency, that such term does not include the United States or a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States.
Determining whether a defendant is an employer under the ADEA involves finding: (1) the defendant falls within the statutory definition and (2) the existence of an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Texas, 5 F.3d 117, 118 (5th Cir. 1993), citing, Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist. , 906 F.2d 1017, 1019 (5th Cir. 1990).
The Fifth Circuit uses the the "hybrid economic realities/common law control test" to determine whether an employee-employer relationship exists under the ADEA. Under this test the most important factor is the right to exercise control over an employee's conduct. Deal, 5 F.3d at 119. The focus for determining the existence of control has been on the allegedemployer's right to hire and fire the employee, supervise the employee, and set the employee's work schedule. Id. The economic realities component of the test has focused on whether the alleged employer paid the employee's salary, withheld taxes, provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of employment. Id.
In decisions addressing the employee-employer relationship when the case involves governmental entities, the Fifth Circuit has stated that the single or joint employer theory is not applicable when the defendants are governmental subdivisions. See, Dumas v. Town of Mount Vernon, 612 So.2d 974, 980, n. 9 (5th Cir. 1980); Trevino v. Celanese Corporation, 701 F.2d 397, 404 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1983); Karagounis v. university of Texas Health Science Center at San Antonio, 168 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 1999)(per curiam)(unpublished); Garrett-Woodberry v. Mississippi Board of Pharmacy, 300 Fed.Appx. 289 (5th Cir. 2008)(unpublished).7
Under the LEDL, the term "employer" is defined as follows:
In contrast to federal law, Louisiana's definition of employer focuses on which entity pays the employee. There is no corresponding Louisiana jurisprudence holding that Louisiana's focus, when determining employer status, is the issue of control, as it is under the federal scheme. Dejoie v. Medley, 9 So.3d 826, 830 (La. 2009). Federal courts applying Louisiana law and Louisiana state courts have consistently held that the definition of "employer" under Louisiana law, for the purpose of employment discrimination cases, has been specifically defined. To satisfy the definition of "employer" under Louisiana law, the entity must: 1)receive services from an employee; (2) in return give compensation to that employee; and, 3) must meet the requirement of a minimum number of employees (currently 20 or more). Id. ; Duplessis v. Warren Petroleum, Inc., 672 So.2d 1019 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1996); Onyeanusi v. Times-Picayune Publishing Corp., 485 So.2d 622 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Hospital Corp. of America, 767 F.Supp.2d 678, 693 (W.D.La. 2011); Griffith v. City of New Orleans, 2013 WL 2555787 (E.D. La. June 10, 2013); Dupre v. Westlawn Cemeteries, 2013 WL 3730125 (E.D. La. July 12, 2013); Seal v. Gateway Companies, Inc., 2002 WL 10456 (E.D.La. 2002); Hornsby v. Enterprise Transportation Co., 987 F.Supp. 512, 515 (M.D.La. 1997)( La.Rev.Stat. § 23:1006, previous provision); Langley v. Pinkerton's Inc., 220 F.Supp.2d 575 (M.D.La. 2002).
In determining whether an employer gives compensation, factors to consider include: (1) who paid the employee's wages; (2) who withheld federal, state, unemployment, or social security taxes; (3) whether the employee's name appeared on the employer's payroll; and, (4) whether the employee participated in the employer's benefit plans. Central to the determination of whether a defendant is an employer for purposes of the LEDL is whether the defendant paid the plaintiffs wages and withheld federal, state, unemployment, or social security taxes. Moreover, for purposes of the LEDL the source of the funds used to compensate the employee is crucial to determining whether the alleged employer gave the plaintiff compensation. Dejoie, 9 So.3d at 831; Griffith, supra; Dupre, supra.
Under the hybrid economic realities/common law control test, the most important factor is the right to exercise control...
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