Landreth v. Malik, 49732.

• Decision Date: 24 December 2009
• Docket Number: No. 49732.,49732.
• Citation: 221 P.3d 1265
• Parties: Dlynn LANDRETH, Appellant, v. Amit MALIK, Respondent.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

221 P.3d 1265

Dlynn LANDRETH, Appellant, v. Amit MALIK, Respondent.

No. 49732.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

December 24, 2009.

Hansen Rasmussen, LLC, and Jonathan J. Hansen, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Robert W. Lueck, Las Vegas, for Respondent.

Before the Court En Banc.

OPINION

By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.

In this appeal, We consider the subject matter jurisdiction of the family division of the district court. Article 6, Section 6(1) of the Nevada Constitution grants original and appellate jurisdiction to the district courts in the several judicial districts of the state. Article 6, Section 6(2) permits the Legislature to establish a family court as a division of any judicial district and prescribe its jurisdiction. Acting pursuant to this grant of constitutional authority, the Legislature validly limited the family courts' jurisdiction to the matters specifically enumerated in NRS 3.223. This case involves an unmarried, childless couple, who used to live together and now dispute the ownership of property. Because NRS 3.223 does not give the family courts jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes of this nature, the family court's judgment in this case was void and we reverse.

FACTS

Appellant Dlynn Landreth and respondent Amit Malik met in July 2001 and lived together in Arizona, Texas, and Florida from 2001 until 2004 when, according to Landreth, she decided to end the relationship and move to Las Vegas. The parties never married and did not have children together.

Landreth asserts that she acquired a residence after she arrived in Las Vegas using her own money to pay the down payment and to make subsequent upgrades and improvements to the home. Landreth acknowledges that the couple reunited briefly when Malik moved to Las Vegas, but maintains that in September 2005 the relationship ended.

According to Malik, however, the decision to move to Las Vegas was mutual, with Landreth moving first. Malik contends that the $80,000 used as a down payment to purchase the home originated from a joint checking account and that $50,000 used to renovate the home was also drawn from the couple's joint checking account.

In September 2006, Malik filed an action in the Eighth Judicial District Court's Family Court Division seeking half of the equity in the real property, half of certain personal property acquired during the relationship, and all of his separate personal property. Landreth was served with the complaint on October 4, 2006. She hired counsel to represent her, but she contends that she had difficulty communicating with her counsel because she was living in the Caribbean at the time.

During October and November, Malik granted Landreth numerous oral and written extensions of time to file an answer. On December 14, 2006, however, Malik served Landreth with a notice of intent to apply for a default judgment. Landreth maintains that notwithstanding the notice of intent to file default judgment and after its service, Malik nevertheless granted her additional extensions of time to answer the complaint. Landreth contends that a letter drafted from her counsel to Malik's counsel documented the oral agreement to extend time beyond December 19, 2006. However, on February 27, 2007, Malik filed a default. Landreth filed her answer and a counterclaim on March 5, 2007. Malik served Landreth with a notice of default hearing on March 22, 2007. Subsequently, Landreth filed a motion to set aside the default. In the motion, Landreth asserted that Malik's counsel violated Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.5A (formerly Supreme Court Rule 175) by failing to notify Landreth's counsel of his intent to seek a default after Malik had granted Landreth more time for filing her answer.

On May 18, 2007, the family court denied Landreth's motion to set aside the default, finding that Malik had offered Landreth numerous opportunities to answer but that her delay warranted the entry of default. Thus, the court entered default judgment against Landreth. The family court also found that the down payment on the Las Vegas home was drawn from the couple's joint checking account. Therefore, the family court found that Malik was a co-owner of the Las Vegas home and was the owner and co-owner of other personal property located within the residence. Landreth appeals.

DISCUSSION

We have not previously considered the subject matter jurisdiction of the family courts in the judicial districts where they have been established. We take this opportunity to do so.

For the first time on appeal, Landreth claims that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear Malik's case under Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 6(2) because the family court's jurisdiction is limited to cases specified under NRS 3.223. Specifically, Landreth argues that because the parties were not married, did not have children, and the litigation was limited to a dispute between two unmarried persons over the title and ownership of property, the family court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. Malik counters that because the parties maintained a meretricious relationship, the family court properly exercised jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EDCR) 5.02(a) and this court's precedent. We conclude that NRS 3.223 prescribes the jurisdiction of the family court and since this case concerned real and personal property acquired during a meretricious relationship, a matter not enumerated in NRS 3.233, the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter judgment in this case.

At the outset, we note that whether a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction "can be raised by the parties at any time, or sua sponte by a court of review, and cannot be conferred by the parties." Swan v. Swan, 106 Nev. 464, 469, 796 P.2d 221, 224 (1990). However, if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment rendered is void. State Indus. Ins. System v. Sleeper, 100 Nev. 267, 269, 679 P.2d 1273, 1274 (1984). We therefore address Landreth's subject matter jurisdiction argument, which requires that we review Article 6, Section 6 of the Nevada Constitution and interpret NRS 3.223.

Nevada Constitution Article 6, Section 6 establishes the original and appellate jurisdiction of the district courts and grants district court judges broad enumerated powers. Specifically, Article 6, Section 6(1) provides, in pertinent part:

The District Courts in the several Judicial Districts of this State have original jurisdiction in all cases excluded by law from the original jurisdiction of justices' courts. They also have final appellate jurisdiction in cases arising in Justices Courts and such other inferior tribunals as may be established by law. The District Courts and the Judges thereof have power to issue writs of Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction, Quo-Warranto, Certiorari, and all other writs proper and necessary to the complete exercise of their jurisdiction. The District Courts and the Judges thereof shall also have power to issue writs of Habeas Corpus....

The Nevada Constitution was later amended to include Article 6, Section 6(2), which provides: "The legislature may provide by law for: ... (b) The establishment of a family court as a division of any district court and may prescribe its jurisdiction." See S.J. Res. 24, 64th Leg. (Nev.1987); 1987 Nev. Stat., file no. 131, at 2444; S.J. Res. 24, 65th Leg. (Nev.1989); 1989 Nev. Stat., file no. 26, at 2222.

Following the constitutional amendment of Section 6(2), the Legislature established a family court, NRS 3.0105, and dictated the original and exclusive jurisdiction of family courts, along with the types of cases in which the family court may have concurrent jurisdiction. NRS 3.223; S.B. 395, 66th Leg. (Nev.1991); 1991 Nev. Stat., ch. 659, §§ 2-5, at 2174-75. In this case, we must clarify the subject matter jurisdiction of the family court, which requires that we interpret NRS 3.223. Statutory interpretation requires that this court look to the statute's plain meaning. MGM Mirage v. Nevada Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 209 P.3d 766, 769 (2009). When the statute's meaning is clear and unambiguous, this court must not construe the statute otherwise. Id. Specifically, NRS 3.223 provides:

1. Except if the child involved is subject to the jurisdiction of an Indian tribe pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., in each judicial district in which it is established, the family court has original, exclusive jurisdiction in any proceeding:

(a) Brought pursuant to title 5 of NRS or chapter 31A, 123, 125, 125A, 125B, 125C, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 159, 425 or 432B of NRS, except to the extent that a specific statute authorizes the use of any other judicial or administrative procedure to facilitate the collection of an obligation for support.

(b) Brought pursuant to NRS 442.255 and 442.2555 to request the court to issue an order authorizing an abortion.

(c) For judicial approval of the marriage of a minor.

(d) Otherwise within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

(e) To establish the date of birth, place of birth or parentage of a minor.

(f) To change the name of a minor.

(g) For a judicial declaration of the sanity of a minor.

(h) To approve the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a person as authorized by law.

(i) Brought pursuant to NRS 433A.200 to 433A.330, inclusive, for an involuntary court-ordered admission to a mental health facility.

(j) Brought pursuant to NRS 441A.500 to 441 A. 720, inclusive, for an involuntary court-ordered isolation or quarantine.

We conclude that the language of NRS 3.223 is plain and clearly establishes that, in the districts in which a family court has been established, the family courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases concerning family matters. Because Article 6, Section 6(2) of the Nevada Constitution specifically delegated to the Legislature the power to create...