Landron & Vera, LLP v. Somoza-Colombani
| Decision Date | 03 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 12-1858 (SEC) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
| Parties | LANDRON & VERA, LLP, ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. GUILLERMO SOMOZA-COLOMBANI, ET AL., Defendants. |
Before the Court are the defendants' motions to dismiss (Docket #12 & 18), the plaintiffs' opposition thereto (Docket # 14), and the defendants' reply (Dockets # 48).1 After reviewing the filings and the applicable law, the defendants' motion are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
This is a case involving political discrimination claims stemming from the 2008 election in Puerto Rico. Landrón & Vera, LLP (L&V), a Puerto Rico law firm, and two of its partners, Eileen Landrón-Guardiola, and Eduardo Vera-Ramírez (collectively, Plaintiffs), bring this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, because of their political affiliation, the defendants refused to honor L&V's contracts with the Puerto Rico Department of Justice (DOJ). The defendants, who are being sued only in their personal capacities, are Guillermo Somoza-Colombani (Somoza), the former Secretary of Justice, Grisel Santiago-Calderón (Santiago), "the former Acting Deputy Secretary in Charge of Litigation," and Antonio Sagardía-De Jesús (Sagardía), who was the Secretary of Justice from January to December 2009 (collectively, Defendants).
Because the Court is ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), it will draw Plaintiffs' well-pleaded facts from their complaint, supplementing them with references to documents annexed to or fairly incorporated into it. Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 69 (1st Cir. 2012).
L&V was founded in 2001 by Landrón-Guardiola and Vera-Ramírez. According to the complaint, Plaintiffs' affiliation to the Popular Democratic Party (PDP) is no mystery: L&V has "participated in hundreds of cases representing the PDP, its officers and its constituents against NPP officers and constituents." In 2001, L&V and the DOJ, whose Secretary at that time was appointed by the PDP, subscribed several contracts for legal services. From 2001 to 2009, L&V allegedly handled "more than three hundred [legal] matters" for the PDP-controlled DOJ.
Starting in late 2006, the DOJ allegedly commenced making "partial and belated payments." Different excuses were given by the DOJ, the complaint avers, and L&V had to "wait under the expectation that full payment would be forthcoming." Because of "bureaucratic and administrative incompetence," Plaintiffs allege that the payments "were delayed or partially paid although the monies for the relevant legal services' contracts were properly earmarked as required under the applicable laws and regulations." From July to September 2006, however, L&V "kept receiving referrals of cases to assume by the DOJ but the services' contract, signed by L&V, had not been signed by [the Secretary of Justice at that time]." According to the complaint, the contract in question was signed in September 2006, although "[the Secretary] should have done so" on June 20, 2006. In order to cure this deficiency, the DOJ "signed a retroactive contract that enabled the payment to L&V" for the services rendered during the July-September 2006 time frame.
At any rate, the DOJ's failure to make payments, Plaintiffs allege, simply continued. Things changed in late 2008, when the Department allegedly "admitted that it owed all amountsthat had been billed by L&V." According to the complaint, the amounts owed were "earmarked at the relevant time." A regime change was produced in the wake of the 2008 general elections, and, in January 2009, the NPP-controlled administration took over the DOJ. Because of this "timing," Plaintiffs allege that "no payment was made on the past due amount which at the time exceeded $1,000,000." Politics as usual, the heretofore interrupted contractual relationship between the DOJ and L&V ended shortly thereafter in February 2009.
During 2009, Plaintiffs say they continued requesting from Defendants "full payment of the monies owed to L&V" to no avail. Then, on March 20, 2009, the DOJ's "former Director of the Finance Department . . . certified in writing . . . that the monies owed to L&V as of December 31, 2008 amounted to $708,897.63." The parties met repeatedly to discuss the issue. For instance, defendant Santiago presided over a meeting held on August 26, 2009. Another meeting, which was also presided by Santiago, was held on September 10, 2009. According to the complaint, in that meeting Defendants stated "for the first time that payment could not be effectuated due to a circular letter issued by the then Comptroller which according to Santiago prevented the DOJ from lawfully paying L&V by the mechanism of Resolution." During the meeting, Plaintiffs informed Santiago that a law firm closely tied to the NPP, Aldarondo, López, Bras, PSC (ALB), "had been paid that same year (around $90,000)" via the so-called "Resolution mechanism." Plaintiffs also conveyed to Santiago that paying ALB "as opposed to L&V, was politically motivated discrimination." Plaintiffs also allegedly told Santiago that this "evidenced the different and politically motivated discriminatory treatment towards L&V."
In order "to cover up the political discrimination against L&V," the complaint avers, the DOJ "instructed [ALB] to reimburse the monies paid by Resolution which of course he did." Plaintiffs argue that this is "clear proof that [ALB] is being granted a different and preferential treatment because they are linked to the NPP." This "unequal treatment," the complaint furtheralleges, is evinced "by the fact that a resolution was made specifically to make a payment to [ALB] in circumstances where it had no formal written contract, during the period in which defendants were adamant in negating such possibility to the plaintiffs."
Things unraveled in late 2009. "After many communications requesting the decision in writing," through a letter (signed by Santiago) dated October 13, 2009, Plaintiffs were "informed . . . [that] the DOJ would not pay." According to the complaint, "no explanation was given." In fact, the letter "apparently was not notified" to then-Secretary Sagardía. After Sagardía left the DOJ in late 2009, Somoza succeeded him as Secretary. "In order to pursue a solution," Plaintiffs allege that "they personally and in writing . . . sought the assistance of defendant Secretary Somoza." With their patience running low, "Plaintiffs at this point accused Somoza . . . of the politically discriminatory nature of the decision not to pay L&V." According to the complaint, however, Somoza "knowingly and willfully sanctioned time and again the discriminatory action of not paying L&V."
On February 8, 2010, the DOJ reiterated its "'position' not to pay," as per the October 13, 2009 letter. "Again," Plaintiffs say, "this letter lacked any justification for this decision." "As they had no other alternative," Plaintiffs "filed for bankruptcy" shortly thereafter. Then, on October 13, 2010, Plaintiffs sent a written communication to Defendants, advising "them of the intent to claim damages for the violation of civil rights and for damages inflicted by them upon the plaintiffs." An identical letter ensued on October 12, 2011.
This suit followed on October 10, 2012. Docket # 1. In it, Plaintiffs sue Defendants in their personal capacities, alleging that they refused to honor the contracts with the DOJ because of Plaintiffs' political affiliation to the PDP, in violation of their rights under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The complaint also asserts a cause of action "under the Constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, including, but notlimited to, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code." Id., p. 20.2 Alleging garden-variety damages, Plaintiffs request a compensation in excess of $10 million. Id.3
Defendants Somoza and Santiago then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that (1) the complaint fails to articulate a plausible § 1983 claim for any of the alleged constitutional violations; (2) the complaint is time-barred; (3) Defendants are entitled to the Mt. Healthy defense; and (4) they are entitled to qualified immunity on all claims. Docket # 12. Sagardía, for his part, joined the motion to dismiss (see note 1 above) and additionally assails the sufficiency of the allegations directed at him. Docket # 18, p. 2. Plaintiffs timely opposed. Docket # 32.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs' "well-pleaded facts must possess enough heft to show that [they are] entitled to relief." Clark v. Boscher, 514 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2008). In evaluating whether the plaintiffs are entitled to relief, the court must accept as true all "well pleaded facts [and indulge] all reasonable inferences" in their favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). "Dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate if the complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)'s requirement of a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ocasio-Hernández v.Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2011). But even under the liberal pleading standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Twombly teaches that to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 550 U.S. at 556.
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court clarified that two underlying principles must guide a court's assessment of a complaint's adequacy. First, a court must discard any conclusory allegations in the complaint, as these are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. at 677. That is to say, courts must disregard "rote repetition of statutory language," McKenna v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 693 F.3d 207, 217 (1st Cir. 2012), as ...
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