Landry v. Amoco Production Co.

Decision Date24 May 1979
Docket NumberNo. 77-1468,77-1468
Citation595 F.2d 1070
PartiesGlenda T. LANDRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMOCO PRODUCTION COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Robert McComiskey and Frank A. Silverstri, New Orleans, La., Kenneth E. Badon, Lake Charles, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Edmund E. Woodley, Robert W. Fenet, Lake Charles, La., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.

Before THORNBERRY, CLARK and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

RONEY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents the sole issue of whether the district court should have held plaintiff Glenda Landry to be a Jones Act seaman as a matter of law. Glenda Landry was employed as a roustabout by Amoco Production Company when she attempted to jump from one of Amoco's barges to another and, missing her target, plunged into the water and sustained injuries. Claiming she was a seaman under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, 1 she instituted this suit seeking damages from Amoco. The jury found against her.

On this appeal plaintiff contends that, viewing the evidence most favorably to defendant Amoco, reasonable and fair-minded people would be compelled to reach the conclusion that she was a Jones Act seaman. Accordingly, she argues, the district court erred when it denied her motion for a directed verdict on seaman status and her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Although the determination of a person's status as a seaman is ordinarily a mixed question of fact and law, the facts governing plaintiff's status as a seaman were established beyond cavil, and the district court erred in not deciding her status as a matter of law. We reverse.

At the close of the evidence plaintiff moved for a directed verdict on the issue of her status as a seaman under the Jones Act. Denying this motion the district court submitted the question to the jury. On special interrogatories the jury found that Glenda Landry was not a member of the crew of a vessel or vessels, Amoco was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, damages totaled $98,000, and plaintiff was 50% Contributorily negligent. Because the jury found Glenda Landry was not a member of the crew of a vessel or vessels, the court concluded that she was not a seaman and therefore could not recover under the Jones Act.

Expressing great difficulty in reaching his decision, the trial judge then denied Ms. Landry's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The memorandum decision noted that numerous juries in the Western District of Louisiana had found seaman status under circumstances in which the worker's contact with vessels was markedly less than Ms. Landry's, but the trial judge indicated he was unaware of any case in which a jury finding denying seaman status had been reversed by a district or appellate court. Without moving for a new trial plaintiff appealed the denial of her motion for directed verdict and, in the alternative, her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Under the Jones Act "Any seaman who shall suffer a personal injury in the course of his employment" has the right to seek damages for injuries stemming from the negligence of his employer. 46 U.S.C.A. § 688. No definition of "seaman" is contained in the Act, and the spate of cases which have grappled with seaman status questions have consistently observed that there is no rigid set of circumstances governing such determinations. See, e. g., Holland v. Allied Structural Steel Co., Inc., 539 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1976), Cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105, 97 S.Ct. 1136, 51 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977); Offshore Company v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1969).

To establish seaman status a claimant must meet a threshold test of showing sufficient contact with water-borne or vessel-related activities. As articulated in Holland v. Allied Structural Steel Co., Inc., supra at 479, the claimant must prove that she or he was

connected, in more than a transitory way, with a vessel or vessels, and that his (or her) injuries have arisen in the course of his (or her) duties in the service of such vessel or vessels.

While it is firmly established that the question of whether the claimant is a seaman is ordinarily resolved by the trier of fact, the trial court may, nonetheless, enter a directed verdict where the record demonstrates that reasonable persons could not draw conflicting inferences which might lead to a different conclusion. Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1966); Porche v. Gulf Mississippi Marine Corporation, 390 F.Supp. 624, 630-631 (E.D.La.1975). See Jenkins v. Aquatic Contractors & Engineers, 446 F.2d 520, 521 (5th Cir. 1971). In Producers Drilling Co., supra, we affirmed a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff's claim of seaman status because there was "no room for conflicting inferences." The district court in Porche granted plaintiff's motion for directed verdict and found seaman status for the decedent since reasonable persons could not have found his activity to fall outside of the Offshore Company v. Robison, test. In Jenkins, supra, summary judgment was upheld by this Court because the only rational inference to be drawn from the evidence was that plaintiff was a Jones Act seaman.

The trial court mistakenly believed it could not grant plaintiff's motion for directed verdict or her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It is well established that where a trial judge's finding was colored by misapprehension of controlling legal principles, review of the evidence by this Court is free from constraints of the clearly erroneous rule. See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., 545 F.2d 422, 433 (5th Cir. 1977), Rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978).

Viewed most favorably to defendant, as they must be, the facts are as follows. In September 1974 Amoco Production Company hired Glenda Landry on probationary status as a roustabout. Ms. Landry was the first female in Amoco's western Lake Charles, Louisiana region to hold the position of roustabout. She had never held membership in a maritime union and did not possess seaman's papers while employed at Amoco.

As in the case of other roustabouts, plaintiff was not assigned to a particular barge but worked on different barges from time to time. Between her employment in September 1974 and her mishap in November 1974, plaintiff worked at the Hackberry gas injection site which could be reached by boat only.

Amoco's witnesses testified that a roustabout's work involved both land and water-related duties. The area foreman for the western half...

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