Landry v. Daley

Decision Date03 July 1968
Docket NumberNo. 67 C 1863.,67 C 1863.
Citation288 F. Supp. 200
PartiesLawrence LANDRY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard J. DALEY, Mayor of the City of Chicago, Cook County, Illinois; James Conlisk, Superintendent of Police of the City of Chicago, Illinois; John S. Boyle, Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; John J. Stamos, State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois; Raymond F. Simon, Corporation Counsel of the City of Chicago, Illinois; Joseph I. Woods, Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois; Richard J. Elrod, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Chicago, Division of Ordinance Enforcement; Maurice W. Lee, Magistrate, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; John S. Limperis, Magistrate, Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois; John T. Burke, Joseph Ratkvich and Robert Kulovitz, Police Officers of the City of Chicago, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Robert Tucker, R. Eugene Pincham, Kermit Coleman, Jean F. Williams, Ellis E. Reid, Lawrence E. Kennon, Leonard Karlin, Norman E. Lapping, Irving Birnbaum, Leo E. Holt, Cevil C. Butler, Edward Thompson, Chicago, Ill., Dennis J. Roberts, Newark, N. J., William M. Kunstler and Arthur Kinoy, New York City, for plaintiff.

John J. Stamos, State's Atty. of Cook County, Ill., Edward J. Hladis, Chief of Civil Division, Ronald Butler, Dean Bilton, Asst. State's Attys., for defendant state officers.

Raymond F. Simon, Corp. Counsel of Chicago, Richard J. Elrod, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Kenneth W. Sain, Asst., Corp. Counsel, for defendant city officials.

OPINION

WILL, District Judge.

This is an allegedly class action, brought by the plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 23(a) (1) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against certain officers of the City of Chicago and Cook County, Illinois. Some of the individual plaintiffs are negro citizens who currently face criminal prosecutions before the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. These prosecutions arose out of a series of demonstrations taking place in Chicago, Illinois in 1967. One prosecution, however, dates back to an arrest in 1966. The other individual plaintiffs are negroes and allegedly sue as representatives of the class of all negroes in the City of Chicago. Plaintiff, ACT, is an unincorporated association which is active in fostering civil rights for negroes through various kinds of protest activities. The defendants are either municipal officers of the City of Chicago or officers of Cook County, Illinois.

Both the city and county defendants have moved to dismiss this action in its present posture, contending that federal forebearance to the competency of the courts of Illinois is appropriate under the doctrine of abstention and that the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, bars federal equitable relief. These contentions are substantially similar to the arguments for dismissal advanced by the defendants on two previous occasions during the course of this litigation, but differ in substance and significance because of the present status of the case. It is necessary, therefore, to review the history of this case in order that these contentions may be placed in proper perspective.

Plaintiffs filed their complaint on October 27, 1967. Simultaneously, they moved that a three-judge court be convened to hear and determine the issues presented therein. The complaint alleges, essentially, that certain state statutes and ordinances of the City of Chicago were unconstitutionally broad, vague and indefinite regulations of speech and peaceful assembly1 and that these statutes and ordinances were being applied in an unconstitutional manner for the purpose of discouraging the plaintiffs' civil rights activities. On the basis of these allegations, the plaintiffs sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of these statutes and ordinances and/or the illegality of the application of these statutes and ordinances to their conduct. Plaintiffs also sought the issuance of injunctions restraining the defendants from enforcing these statutes and ordinances and from "impeding, intimidating, hindering, and preventing plaintiffs" from exercising their constitutional rights of speech and peaceful assembly.

Shortly after the filing of the complaint, the municipal and county defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds, inter alia, that the complaint failed to disclose a basis for equitable relief, that the doctrine of federal abstention was applicable, and that the federal anti-injunction statute barred the entry of an injunction against the defendants in regard to those criminal proceedings currently pending in the Illinois state courts. An opinion denying these motions was issued on December 28, 1967.2 The complaint was found to raise several substantial constitutional issues and to allege a formal basis for equitable relief. It was further determined that plaintiffs' claims regarding the challenged state statutes presented questions solely within the competency of a three-judge court. The plaintiffs' claims regarding the challenged city ordinances, however, were found to be inappropriate for determination by a three-judge court. Accordingly, these claims were severed from those involving the state statutes for consideration by a single-judge court.3 At that time, the questions of abstention and the applicability of the anti-injunction statute were deemed premature.4

The claims regarding the state statutes were certified to a three-judge tribunal. A determination of the alleged unconstitutional application of the statutes was held in abeyance and on January 27, 1968, a hearing was held. At this hearing plaintiffs confined their challenge to the constitutionality of the Illinois "Mob Action,"5 "Resisting or Obstructing a Peace Officer,"6 and "Intimidation"7 statutes. The challenges asserted in the complaint to the "Aggravated Assault"8 and "Aggravated Battery"9 statutes were abandoned. Although defendants confined their argument to the constitutionality of the challenged statutes, in their briefs they reasserted their contentions regarding the applicability of the abstention doctrine and the anti-injunction statute and the impropriety of federal equitable relief.

On March 4, 1968, the three-judge court filed its written opinion.10 Following the principles announced by the Supreme Court in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485-486, 489-492, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965), and Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249-252, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967), abstention was deemed inappropriate and a ruling was issued on the constitutionality of the challenged statutes. Subsections (a) (2) of the "Mob Action"11 and (a) (3) of the "Intimidation"12 statutes were found to be vague and overly broad. The remaining sub-sections of these statutes and the "Resisting or Obstructing a Peace Officer"13 statute were found consistent with principles of procedural and substantive due process. A declaratory judgment was therefore issued declaring the indicated sub-sections of the "Mob Action" and "Intimidation" statutes unconstitutional. null and void under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The remainder of each of these statutes and the "Resisting" statutes were declared valid. Although an injunction was not issued, the three-judge court retained jurisdiction to determine the other claims presented in the plaintiffs' complaint and "to render additional relief if necessary."14

The claims regarding the municipal ordinances, which had been reserved for single-judge determination, were likewise split. A determination of the alleged unconstitutional application of the ordinances was held in abeyance and a hearing was held at which only the validity of the two challenged city ordinances was argued. At this hearing, the municipal defendants raised the same questions concerning the applicability of the abstention doctrine and the anti-injunction statute that the county defendants raised in the three-judge hearing.

An opinion dealing with these issues was filed by this Court on the same day that the three-judge court's opinion was filed. Abstention was held to be inappropriate for the same reasons that were set forth in the three-judge opinion.15 Accordingly, a ruling was made on the constitutionality of the city ordinances. Portions of both the "Disorderly Conduct" and the "Obstructing or Resisting a Police Officer" ordinances were found to be vague and overly broad. Since the provisions of these ordinances were found to be inseparable, both ordinances were declared unconstitutional, null, and void in their entirety under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

An injunction against the enforcement of these ordinances was not issued at the time of this declaration. The Court, however, retained jurisdiction, and on March 18, 1968, a prospective injunction was entered proscribing any future enforcement of the ordinances or the institution of any new prosecutions under them. At the same time, the Court announced that it would make ad hoc determinations in those pending cases brought to its attention as to whether or not there was sufficient cause for prosecution and that it would exercise its equitable powers only in those pending cases, including those involving the plaintiffs, in which the prosecution was predicated solely on activities protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.16

On June 5, 1968, the three-judge court divested itself of jurisdiction over the claims raised in the complaint concerning the alleged unconstitutional application of certain state statutes and ordered the return of these claims to this court.17 At this time, therefore, this Court has all the remaining claims of the plaintiffs, relating to enforcement of both the state statutes and the municipal ordinances.

Since the declaratory...

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