Landry v. Farmer

Decision Date10 May 1983
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 83-0147P.
PartiesWilliam W. LANDRY; Edward T. Grimley; Donald G. Poirier; Rachel E. Calcagni; Dorothy Edwardo; Stephanie C. Snee; Joyce L. Mota; Kathleen McConaghy; Patricia B. Conway; Arlene M. Romano; Carol A. Campbell; Karen M. Varone; Dorine Korpacz; and Ada F. Frank, v. Susan L. FARMER, in her capacity as Secretary of State of the State of Rhode Island; Anthony J. Solomon, in his capacity as General Treasurer of the State of Rhode Island; Bradford E. Southworth, in his capacity as Personnel Director of the State of Rhode Island; and Edward Casper, in his capacity as Controller of the State of Rhode Island.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

Julius C. Michaelson, Providence, R.I., for plaintiffs.

William R. Grimm, Alan R. Tate, Asst. Atty. Gen., State of R.I., Providence, R.I., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

PETTINE, Senior District Judge.

In this § 1983 action fourteen state employees of the Office of the Secretary of State allege that they were wrongfully discharged in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also allege that each layoff constituted a breach of contract.

The plaintiffs originally filed this action in state court where they obtained a temporary restraining order preventing the termination of their employment. Due to the substantial federal question raised in the complaint, the case was removed to Federal Court upon the petition of the defendant Secretary of State. To maintain the status quo, this Court issued a temporary restraining order. The parties agreed to consolidate the hearing on preliminary injunction with the hearing on the merits pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2). This opinion follows that hearing.

I. Facts

The personnel changes at issue in this litigation took place in a highly charged political context following the election of Susan L. Farmer as Secretary of State. Susan Farmer was sworn in as Rhode Island's Secretary of State on January 4, 1983. At that time approximately 52 persons were employed in the Secretary of State's office. This case involves fourteen of those fifty-two employees. Seven are Category I unclassified employees who were hired without written contracts for an indefinite term. The remaining seven are Category II unclassified employees who were hired for a limited duration only.

The First Amendment issues raised by this case require a careful analysis of the facts leading to the defendant's decision to terminate the plaintiffs' employment. The defendant contends that the layoffs were necessary in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the office of the Secretary of State. She claims that she decided, based on a detailed study by her First Deputy, Robert Vincent, that the office should be reorganized by eliminating the 14 positions held by the plaintiffs and creating 7 new positions with substantially different duties. The defendant contends that the changes were intended to provide more efficient service at reduced cost and that neither the political affiliations of the individuals laid off or hired was a factor in the decision making process. She also claims that the plaintiffs were considered for the seven new positions created by the reorganization, but were not hired because they were not as qualified as other applicants.

The plaintiffs claim that their discharge was a result of the defendant's desire to make room for political appointees. The Category I plaintiffs argue that although they had competently performed their jobs and possessed the skills necessary to carry out effectively the job duties of the seven newly created posts, they were never seriously considered for these positions. They say that they were not considered because the motivation for the personnel changes was substantially political. Their contention is that all of the individuals who replaced them in the Secretary of State's office were hired because of their political ties to Secretary Farmer or the Republican Party. Although no individuals were hired to replace the Category II plaintiffs, they assert that they were the scapegoats necessary to justify replacement of the Category I plaintiffs with political appointees. They claim that the only budgetary saving achieved by the reorganization resulted from their dismissal and that, consequently, their dismissal allowed the defendant to announce at a press conference that the reorganization was a cost-saving measure.

The evidence presented at trial related to both the general reasons for the personnel changes and the specific qualifications and political affiliations of the Category I plaintiffs and the individuals hired to replace them. The evidence presented in each of these areas will be discussed in turn.

A. Reasons for Personnel Changes

Defendant Farmer testified that after several weeks in office it became apparent to her that a reorganization of the Secretary of State's office was necessary to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. The Secretary found a number of problem areas that she felt could be corrected through a reorganization. These were as follows:

1) The Public Laws for the 1982 session had not yet arrived, nearly eight months after they had been passed;
2) the Administrative Laws compilation was two years overdue;
3) the State would recoup only $6,000 of its $79,000 expense in publishing the Public Laws as a result of the distribution system then in effect;
4) the number of visitors touring the State House was minimal;
5) there was no inventory control system for stock distribution and no planned purchasing of stock items;
6) lobbyists were not monitored in any significant way;
7) no steps had been taken toward computerization of corporate records;
8) no volunteer advisory panels existed to make recommendations to the Secretary in the areas of voter registration and education, legislative information, library management, and senior citizens issues;
9) the State Manual had not had a serious editorial review in years;
10) the booklets regarding corporation laws, the Uniform Commercial Code, election laws and lobby laws needed updating and reprinting; and
11) there was little centralized management in the corporation division.

The Secretary instructed her first deputy, Robert Vincent, to develop a reorganization plan. She directed him to address the problem areas she had identified and to focus on 1) the elimination of all temporary positions, 2) creation of a new division of public information, 3) the need for increased efforts to monitor lobbying activity, 4) the consolidation or elimination of unnecessary positions, 5) the need for a larger personal staff to the Secretary of State, 6) the need for a lawyer and for a better management structure in the Corporation Division and 7) the use of word processing and computerization.

On January 25, 1983, Vincent submitted a written memorandum concerning the reorganization to Secretary Farmer. This memorandum, which was subsequently approved with minor revisions, provided that the seven (Category II) limited duration positions should be eliminated. Additionally, the memorandum called for redefining the duties of seven permanent (Category I), positions. These positions were as follows:

1) Stephanie Snee — state house guide
2) Dorothy Edwardo — senior clerk typist (Law Revision)
3) Donald Poirier — senior clerk (Elections)
4) Rachel Calcagni — clerk secretary (Corporations)
5) Joyce Mota — senior clerk (Corporations)
6) William Landry — records custodian (Documents Dist.)
7) Edward Grimley — principal clerk typist (Documents Dist.)

In the place of the Category I positions, seven new positions were created by the reorganization plan. These positions are as follows:

1) administrative assistant for public information,
2) senior clerk typist (Elections),
3) administrative aide for public information,
4) coordinator for public information,
5) confidential secretary to the Secretary of State,
6) administrative aide to the Secretary; and
7) assistant director of corporations (Legal)

Vincent testified that each of these positions involved duties which were substantially different from the Category I positions eliminated by the reorganization. The Court finds this testimony credible. In the corporations division, Joyce Mota and Rachel Calcagni were terminated. Mota is employed as a Senior Clerk. In her own words, she described her job as, "in general, the certification of documents that are already filed in the Secretary of State's office, the preparing of certificates of good standing, dissolution, forfeiture, and documents of that type; the certification of bills that pass the legislature, plain copies of bills that pass the legislature, certified copy of any general laws." Calcagni types, proofreads, and checks documents for completeness and accuracy. The defendant does not criticize the work that these two individuals performed, but rather claims that their jobs can be successfully consolidated with other positions in the corporations division. By doing this, the defendant claims that it is possible to use the same position number and salary to provide Secretary Farmer with a personal secretary and administrative assistant. Both of these new jobs require a close, personal working relationship with the Secretary. The positions involve scheduling personal appointments, correspondence, phone calls, handling complaints and traveling with Secretary Farmer to personal appearances.

The reorganization plan eliminates the position of State House Guide. The uncontradicted testimony was that this is an unnecessary position for which the State is paying $13,192 a year. Stephanie Snee, the present guide, testified that she averages one tour a day and that it lasts no more than an hour to one hour and fifteen minutes. For the remaining seven hours in each day she sits at an information desk and answers questions for "people passing by". The...

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