Landry v. Park Wood Products, Inc.

Citation201 So.2d 306
Decision Date19 July 1967
Docket NumberNo. 2079,2079
PartiesJohn C. LANDRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PARK WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Louisiana (US)

Ray Bradford, Jr., and Mansour & Lauve, by Lewis O. Lauve, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant.

John R. Hunter, Jr., Alexandria, for defendant-appellee.

Before TATE, FRUGE and HOOD, JJ.

HOOD, Judge.

Plaintiff, Johnny C. Landry, instituted this workmen's compensation suit against his employer, Park Wood Products, Inc., claiming benefits based on total and permanent disability, Judgment on the merits was rendered by the trial court in favor of defendant, rejecting plaintiff's demands, and plaintiff has appealed.

Plaintiff sustained a heart attack while working for defendant on August 26, 1966, and as a result of that attack he has been totally disabled within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act since that time. The principal question presented on this appeal is whether the heart attack which plaintiff suffered on the above mentioned date was caused by and directly related to the work which he was performing in the course of his employment on that date.

At the time the alleged accident occurred, and for many years prior thereto, defendant was engaged in the business of manufacturing wooden cabinets, including chests for silverware and cabinets for high fidelity loud speakers. Plaintiff, a 44-year-old slightly obese man, had been employed by defendant for a number of years as a 'spray finisher' in its manufacturing plant. A substantial part of plaintiff's duties included the spraying of partially completed cabinets with a stain and then wiping the stain off with rags. In performing those duties it was necessary for him to do some lifting or moving of the cabinets.

Plaintiff reported to work at 7:00 a.m. on August 26, 1966, and he began working about 10 or 15 minutes later. At about 8:30 a.m. he experienced a pain in his chest which he thought was caused by indigestion. He quit work at that time and took some antacid tablets in the hope that they would give him relief. He then rested for a while, but the pain persisted so he left the plant about 9:45 that morning to obtain treatment. An examination made by Dr. R. L. Robbins on that day revealed that plaintiff had suffered a heart attack, diagnosed more specifically as an acute myocardial infarction. He was hospitalized for nine days, and the evidence is clear that he is totally and permanently disabled as a result of that heart attack.

The only items which were being fabricated in defendant's plant on the day plaintiff sustained this heart attack were cabinets for high fidelity speakers. As the cabinets were being manufactured they would be transported to the various workers by a conveyor belt or by dollies. There were only four employees, other than the foreman, working in the plant that day, one of whom was plaintiff and two of whom were women employees. Plaintiff was performing his usual duties of spraying the cabinets and then wiping them off. Each cabinet was about 13 by 16 by 25 inches in size. Plaintiff and most of the other employees estimated the weight of each such cabinet at from 15 to 25 pounds. The foreman weighed one of them and found that it weighed 27 1/2 pounds.

There is a conflict in the testimony as to whether plaintiff lifted any of these cabinets during the short period or time he worked that day. He testified that he did, and that he was actually lifting one of them from that conveyor belt to a dolly or rack when he first got sick. His foreman and one of his fellow employees testified that he did not lift any cabinets that morning. The other two employees stated that they did not see him do any lifting. The trial judge, accepting plaintiff's version of the facts, concluded that during the time plaintiff worked that day he lifted some of the cabinets off the conveyor belt and placed them on racks or dollies so they could be hand sanded by other employees. After they had been sanded, plaintiff then removed the cabinets from the dollies, placed them on a stand, sprayed them with a liquid and then wiped the cabinets off with a rag. This, of course, was the way in which he routinely performed his usual duties every day, and it had been routine for him for several years. He testified that the cabinets which he lifted that morning were heavier than usual, because the defendant manufactured more silverware chests than speaker cabinets, but that he had lifted heavier cabinets or boxes in performing the duties of his employment.

Plaintiff did not remember how many cabinets he had lifted that morning before he got sick. The evidence shows, however, that work in the plant proceeded without interruption after plaintiff quit working at about 8:30 a.m., and that a total of only 36 cabinets were worked on that day. Plaintiff obviously could have handled only a few of the cabinets during the short period of time he worked . One of the employees testified that the work performed by plaintiff was not strenuous, and the evidence supports that statement. The women employees in the plant performed the same type of duties as those performed by plaintiff. One of them, Mary Monk, testified that she lifts cabinets from the conveyor belt and puts them on dollies every day as a regular part of her job. Another woman employee, Ella Metoyer, testified that she pulls the racks or the dollies from place to place in the plant as a part of her duties, and that she did that on the morning plaintiff got sick. The trial judge concluded that the usual work which was performed by plaintiff, and particularly the work which he performed on the morning he sustained the heart attack, 'was not strenuous or ardous work.' We concur in that finding.

The building in which this work was being done is cooled and ventilated by exhaust fans. There is a 'tunnel' in the building, however, which is heated by steam, and the cabinets are carried through this heated tunnel on a conveyor belt as a part of the finishing process. The heat from the tunnel causes the inside of the building to be warmer than it would be if the heated tunnel were not there, and plaintiff contends that the heat contributed toward his illness. Plaintiff, however, suffered his heart attack rather early in the morning, and although it was hot in the building the evidence indicates that it was not extremely hot and certainly not as hot as it generally gets later during the day at that time of the year. The following are some of plaintiff's statements as to the temperature in the building that day: 'It gets pretty warm in there * * *. That was early in the morning, it wasn't too hot * * *. To the best of my knowledge it was not that hot at that time, but it gets hot enough * * *. Well, I had a moisture sweat--it was warm enough * * *. It was hot. When I got sick it was hot in there * * *. I got very hot * * * it wasn't hot as it generally gets * * *. I don't think it was overheating that actually really brought it (the heart attack) * * *.' We think the evidence shows that plaintiff did not get overheated that morning.

Dr. R. L. Robbins, a specialist in internal medicine, examined plaintiff shortly before noon on August 26, 1966, and he has been treating him since that time. He diagnosed plaintiff's condition as an acute or massive myocardial infarction, and he feels that plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled. Dr. Robbins testified: 'I believe there's no doubt that since his symptoms occurred while he was doing this work, that it was as a result of the work.' This appears to be the only statement made by Dr. Robbins which relates to the principal issue presented here, that is whether there was a causal connection between plaintiff's work and his present disability. It is clear from the quoted statement that in Dr. Robbins' opinion there was a causal connection between plaintiff's work and his present disability. As we understand his testimony, however, his reasoning is that if a heart attack occurs while the patient is at work then it necessarily follows that the attack occurred as a result of the work.

Dr. Robert Edwin Ball, Jr., also a specialist in internal medicine, examined plaintiff on January 19 or 20, 1967. He concluded that plaintiff had suffered a myocardial infarction which was caused by a coronary occlusion, and he agreed with the treating physician that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled. Dr. Ball is of the firm opinion, however, that there is no causal connection between the work which plaintiff was performing and the heart attack which he suffered. He testified that a coronary occlusion is the result of arteriosclerosis which is a natural disease that develops over a long period of time, and that in his opinion the coronary occlusion which plaintiff suffered can be attributed only to the pre-existing disease which he had and not to the work he was performing. The history which he obtained from Landry indicated that when the heart attack occurred plaintiff was performing the same routine duties which he had been performing every work day for a number of years, including the lifting of some cabinets. The history indicated that each cabinet weighed about 25 pounds, and the doctor concluded that the work which plaintiff was performing was relatively light work. He assumed that it was hot in the building, but he felt that the heat had nothing to do with the heart attack since plaintiff was accustomed to it on a day-to-day basis. He agrees that strenous physical activity or unusual exertion could contribute to a heart attack, but he feels that there was no such exertion, unusual heat or other factors present here which could have had any causal connection with plaintiff's illness and disability. He testified that 'More people with sedentary occupations have heart disease than do laborers.' He stated that in his opinion plaintiff in this suit had a pre-existing heart disease, that the heart...

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