Lands v. Ward
| Decision Date | 25 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1191074 |
| Citation | 349 So.3d 219 |
| Parties | Steve D. LANDS v. Betty WARD d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Joseph M. Cloud and F. Taylor Rouse of Cloud, Ryan & Rouse, LLC, Huntsville, for appellant.
Robert V. Wood, Jr., and Matthew T. Dukes of Wilmer & Lee, P.A., Huntsville, for appellee.
Steve D. Lands appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of Betty Ward d/b/a Lucky B's Trucking ("Lucky B") in a suit he filed seeking damages for injuries sustained on the job. The Morgan Circuit Court entered summary judgment in favor of Lucky B on both of Lands's claims -- negligence and wantonness -- because it held that Lucky B did not owe Lands a duty. We affirm the judgment as to the wantonness claim. But because Lands made a prima facie case of negligence and demonstrated genuine issues of material fact, we reverse the judgment as to that claim and remand the case for further proceedings.
Tennessee Valley Land and Timber, LLC ("TVL&T"), contracted with Lands to haul timber for processing at various locations in the Southeast. Kenneth Ward, the owner of TVL&T, provided Lands with a 1994 Peterbilt 379 Truck ("the truck") to make the deliveries. According to Lands, when Kenneth first provided the truck, he told Lands that it was sometimes difficult to start. If the truck would not start, Kenneth instructed Lands to use a "hot-wire" method, which required Lands to use a 12-inch piece of partially exposed wire to "jump" the truck while its ignition was left in the on position.
Although TVL&T allowed Lands to use the truck for work, the truck was owned by Lucky B. The truck bore the logo of Lucky B's Trucking and was registered by Lucky B with the United States Department of Transportation. Betty Ward, Kenneth Ward's wife, owns Lucky B's Trucking. Betty kept the truck garaged at her home and had an understanding with her husband regarding use of the truck. Despite this arrangement, there was no lease of the truck between the spouses or their respective businesses.
On the morning of September 25, 2015, Lands delivered logs to a sawmill for TVL&T using the truck. When he returned to Betty's home to garage the truck, Kenneth told Lands that he needed him to attach the truck to a trailer across the street and take it to another work site. After Lands drove the truck across the street, it died and would not restart. This was not the first time Lands had experienced this problem with the truck. On at least two prior occasions, he had to use the hot-wire procedure to start the truck after the engine died; he did so both times without incident.
Lands put the truck in neutral, engaged the parking brake, and got out of the truck to use the hot-wire method. With both feet on the frontwheel axle and a cigarette lighter in hand, he lifted the hood and connected the 12-inch piece of wire to the firewall solenoid. The truck jumped back to life and sent Lands to the ground. The truck then rolled over Lands, severing the muscles in the lower half of his leg.
Lands sued Lucky B, TVL&T, and other entities in the Morgan Circuit Court. Specifically, Lands sued Lucky B for negligence and wantonness. The essence of Lands's claims was that Lucky B, as the owner of the truck, had a duty under statute, regulation, and common law to inspect the truck and maintain it in safe condition. By failing to inspect and maintain it, he argued, the truck fell into disrepair and triggered the sequence of events that caused his injuries.
After a period of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Lands filed an opposition to the motion, which he supported with, among other things, the affidavit of Whitney Morgan, a specialist in commercial-motor-vehicle safety compliance; his own deposition testimony; Kenneth's deposition testimony; and Betty's deposition testimony. The trial court granted the summary-judgment motion on the claims against Lucky B but denied it on the claims against the other defendants. In its order, the trial court explained that it was granting Lucky B's summary-judgment motion because Lucky B did not owe Lands a duty. Following disposal of the claims against the other defendants via settlement, Lands appealed.
Lands appeals the summary judgment entered in favor of Lucky B. This Court reviews a summary judgment de novo. EBSCO Indus., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 775 So. 2d 128, 130 (Ala. 2000). We apply the same standard a trial court uses to determine if the evidence presented creates a genuine issue of material fact. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n v. ECO Pres. Servs., L.L.C., 788 So. 2d 121, 126 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 862 (Ala. 1988) ). Under that standard, if the moving party establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present substantial evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin Cnty., 538 So. 2d 794, 797-98 (Ala. 1989). We have defined "substantial evidence" as "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989). Finally, " ‘[i]n determining whether a summary judgment was properly entered, [this Court] must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.’ " Webb v. Henderson, 594 So. 2d 103, 103 (Ala. 1992) (citation omitted).
The trial court granted Lucky B's summary-judgment motion because it held that Lucky B did not owe Lands a cognizable duty as a matter of law. We disagree. And while we may affirm the trial court's judgment for any reason supported by the record -- so long as the requirements of due process have been satisfied -- see Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So. 2d 375, 380 (Ala. 2006), there is no ground on which to affirm the summary judgment on the negligence claim. The wantonness claim, however, was properly disposed of.
Lands's first claim against Lucky B was for negligence. To make out a prima facie case of negligence, Lands needed to establish "a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damage." Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 817 So. 2d 665, 679 (Ala. 2001). To be entitled to summary judgment, Lucky B needed to show that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See West, 547 So. 2d at 871. It failed to do so. Lands established a prima facie case of negligence against Lucky B -- including the duty element -- and demonstrated genuine issues of material fact necessitating jury resolution. The additional grounds argued by Lucky B on appeal lack merit.
Before the trial court and on appeal, Lands has argued that Lucky B owed him a duty imposed by statute, regulation, and common law. In essence, he argued that regulations promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA") and incorporated into the Alabama Code by reference, see § 32-9A-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, imposed a duty on Lucky B to inspect the truck and maintain it in a safe condition. The trial court disagreed and based its decision to grant Lucky B's summary-judgment motion on what it said was the lack of a duty owed by Lucky B to Lands.
In a negligence action, it is possible for a legal duty imposed by statute or regulation to inform the common-law standard of reasonable care or to supplant it entirely. See Parker Bldg. Servs. Co. v. Lightsey ex rel. Lightsey, 925 So. 2d 927, 930-931 (Ala. 2005). "A violation of [a safety] statute or ordinance can, therefore, be evidence of negligence under certain circumstances." Murray v. Alabama Power Co., 413 So. 2d 1109, 1114 (Ala. 1982). "The decision of whether a violation occurred, whether such violation was negligence, and whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries complained of will ... be left ... to the jury." Id. 1
Here, Lands argues that Lucky B's duties were informed by FMCSA regulations. Specifically, he cites 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(a), which provides: "Every motor carrier ... must systematically inspect, repair, and maintain, or cause to be systematically inspected, repaired or maintained, all motor vehicles ... subject to its control." As used in 49 C.F.R. § 396.3(a), a "motor carrier" includes the term "employer" as that term is defined elsewhere in the FMCSA regulations. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5. And "employer" means "any person engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle in connection with that business." Id. These regulations have been expressly incorporated into Alabama law by statute. § 32-9A-2(a)(1), Ala Code 1975 ). Further, the FMCSA has promulgated an additional regulation declaring that "[a] motor vehicle shall not be operated in such a condition as to likely cause an accident or a breakdown of the vehicle." 49 C.F.R. § 369.7(a).
We have held that the purpose of regulations like these is to eliminate the " ‘problem of a transfer of operating authority, with its attendant difficulties of enforcing safety requirements and fixing financial responsibility for damage and injuries to shippers and members of the public.’ " Phillips v. J.H. Transp., Inc., 565 So. 2d 66, 70 (Ala. 1990) (quoting Transamerican Freight Lines v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., 423 U.S. 28, 37, 96 S.Ct. 229, 46 L.Ed.2d 169 (1975) ). Simply put, the regulations are designed to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Eaton v. Westrock Coated Bd., LLC
...(2) that the plaintiff had a conscious appreciation of the danger at the moment the incident in question occurred." Lands v. Ward , 349 So.3d 219, 228-29 (Ala. June 25, 2021). See also, Crook v. Allstate , 314 So. 3d 1188, 1199 (Ala. 2020) (holding same).D. Wantonness To establish wantonnes......
-
Galea v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs
...of possession. The burden therefore shifted to the Galeas to put forth substantial evidence to rebut that showing. See Lands v. Ward, 349 So.3d 219, 222 (Ala. 2021) ("[I]f the moving party establishes the absence a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to ......