Lane v. Bonin

• Decision Date: 16 February 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:08–244.
• Citation: 772 F.Supp.2d 678
• Parties: Thomas LANE, Plaintiff,v.William BONIN, Martin Henry, Frank Mehalko and Harvey Cole, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

772 F.Supp.2d 678

Thomas LANE, Plaintiff,

v.William BONIN, Martin Henry, Frank Mehalko and Harvey Cole, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:08–244.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

Feb. 16, 2011.

Don Bailey, Don Bailey Esquire, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.Robert A. Willig, Office of Attorney General, Pittsburgh, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT

GIBSON, District Judge.

I. SYNOPSIS

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants (Doc. 27) (the “Motion” or the “Motion for Summary Judgment”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Plaintiff, Thomas Lane, opposes the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Doc. 35. For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a workplace dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants, all of whom work for the Pennsylvania State Police. Doc. 1 at 1–3. Plaintiff alleges that his First Amendment freedom of speech and his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated when he suffered adverse employment actions in retaliation for filing a workplace complaint and for his truthful but unpopular testimony when he was named as a witness by a supervisor in another workplace investigation (both of which he alleges are protected speech under the First Amendment (Doc. 1 at 18, ¶ 112)). Doc. 1 at 1, 19–22. Among the alleged retaliatory actions cited by the Plaintiff are:

• an alleged increase in workload (in the form of increased report filing responsibilities); ¹

• the allegedly unjust placement of the Plaintiff in a program for “low performers”, which resulted in his being required to complete increased “ride alongs” with a superior officer with whom the Plaintiff had a strained relationship (Officer Mehalko, see discussion, infra );

• inability to switch shifts and take vacation days as he would have wished, which Plaintiff alleges was commonly permitted;

• allegedly harassing phone calls to his house when he called in sick on one instance; ²

• an allegedly retaliatory sexual harassment complaint lodged against him by a coworker, Defendant Mehalko, which lead to his transfer to another barracks/work location; ³

• the issuance of a supervisor's notation against Plaintiff when he failed to fill the gas tank of his patrol vehicle at the end of his shift;

• the initiation of a criminal investigation for trespass against the Plaintiff by his supervisor after a dispute and physical altercation between the Plaintiff and a nonparty private citizen which occurred when Plaintiff and his father were conducting a land survey of the nonparty's neighbor's property; ⁴

• threatening and derogatory statements made about Plaintiff by a coworker to other members of the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”).Doc. 1.

Plaintiff also alleges that his due process rights were violated during the internal investigation (noted above) of his alleged sexually harassing behavior towards this coworker, Defendant Mehalko. Doc. 1 at 5–6, 21, ¶ 116; Doc. 36 at 13–14. Plaintiff alleges that he first received notification of the allegations against him on January 16, 2007, and alleges that they were made in direct retaliation for Plaintiff's earlier claims against Defendant Mehalko, which had been categorized as sexual harassment claims (and which had resulted in Defendant Mehalko being involuntarily transferred to the Indiana barracks for a period of about two and a half months pending investigation of those claims). Doc. 1 at 3–4. Plaintiff alleges that when he received notification of the allegations against him he contacted a supervisor, Corporal Zona, and informed him that he believed these allegations were made simply for retaliatory purposes. Doc. 1 at 5. Plaintiff states that “[o]n or around February 24, 2007, [he] was interviewed by Lieutenant Madigan about the retaliatory complaint filed by Corporal Mehalko”. Plaintiff states that on or around March 2, 2007 he again contacted Lieutenant Madigan and gave him the name of a coworker, Trooper Miller, and requested that Trooper Miller be interviewed in Plaintiff's defense. Doc. 1 at 6. Plaintiff acknowledges that Trooper Miller was interviewed in this capacity, but seems to object to the fact that Trooper Miller was interviewed by phone, and not in person. Doc. 1 at 6. On March 28, 2007, Plaintiff was informed that the investigation had concluded, and it had been determined that Plaintiff had violated PSP's sexual harassment policy. Id. The Plaintiff requested that all notations as to the investigation and disposition be removed from his record, but this request was denied. Doc. 1 at 6–7.

Plaintiff claims damages in the form of adverse consequences to his work record ( i.e., a notation to his file regarding an unfavorable investigation), involuntary transfer to another barracks, undesirable work assignments which resulted in an increased work load ( i.e., finishing overdue reports, supra ), a notation on his work record that criminal charges against him were investigated (he was vindicated), as well as medical injuries/damages due to loss of sleep, worry and emotional distress. Doc. 1 at 1 & 20.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment may only be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); see McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir.2005); citing Debiec v. Cabot Corp., 352 F.3d 117, 128 n. 3 (3d Cir.2003). A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment against a party is appropriate where that party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element for which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, and which is an essential element of that party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In evaluating the evidence, the Court must interpret the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Watson v. Abington Township, 478 F.3d 144, 147 (3d Cir.2007); see also Troy Chemical Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir.1994); citing Oritani Sav. And Loan Ass'n v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 989 F.2d 635, 637 (3d Cir.1993). The burden is initially on the moving party to demonstrate that the evidence contained in the record does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir.2004). See also Troy Chemical Corp. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 408, 37 F.3d 123, 125–126 (3d Cir.1994); citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–32, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial as to some element or claim, the moving party may meet its initial burden as to issues of material fact by showing that the admissible evidence contained in the record would be insufficient to carry the non-moving party's burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

Once the moving party satisfies its burden that the record contains no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the non-moving party, who must go beyond his or her pleadings by the use of affidavits, depositions, admissions or answers to interrogatories, in order to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In attempting to do so, the non-moving party cannot defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment by simply reasserting unsupported factual allegations contained in his or her pleadings. Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir.1989).

IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court's jurisdiction has been invoked over Plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) and (a)(4), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), as the parties, witnesses and evidence in this case are located in Cambria County in the Western District of Pennsylvania.

V. DISCUSSION—ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The arguments supplied by both parties regarding the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment are largely a disorganized recitation of disputed facts, hearsay and name-calling. Plaintiff, as noted above, claims unconstitutional retaliation by Defendants for exercise of his First Amendment right to free speech, as well as violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. In response, Defendants make the following legal arguments:

a. Plaintiff's activity is not protected by the 1st Amendment;

b. Plaintiff can never show the necessary causation between his speech and the Defendants' allegedly retaliatory actions;

c. The alleged retaliatory acts are not “adverse” as they would not deter a person of “ordinary firmness” from exercising his 1st Amendment rights; further, the alleged retaliatory acts either never happened or are nothing more than trivial and de minimus;

d. Due process was never triggered;

e. If procedural due process was triggered Plaintiff received it;

f. Even assuming that Due Process was denied, Plaintiff's utilization of the PSP's grievance procedures after this denial remedied any procedural due process violation;

Doc. 27 at 16, ¶ 39.

A. CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The instant claim “is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the...