Lane v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 27 April 1938 |
| Docket Number | 26907. |
| Citation | 14 N.E.2d 552,214 Ind. 376 |
| Parties | LANE v. CAMPBELL et al. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Dubois Circuit Court; Eldo W. Wood, Judge.
Edw C. Henning, of Evansville, for appellant.
W E. Cox, L. A. Savage, and Leo J. Stemle, all of Jasper, for appellees.
Appellant was employed as the attorney for Emil Campbell, the defendant in a divorce case pending in the Cubois circuit court. An order was made against the defendant, Campbell, to pay certain suit and support money into court. In this he failed and was cited to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. Upon the hearing he testified that he had no money or means with which to make the payments ordered, and no credit, or means of procuring money. The appellant acted as his attorney at this hearing. After the hearing Campbell was ordered committed until he complied with the order. Thereafter, through another attorney, Campbell filed a verified motion to set aside the order of commitment. In this motion he alleged that, before the order against him, and in anticipation of an allowance of attorney fees, and court costs, and support money to his wife, he had delivered to the appellant, as his attorney, the sum of $220 with which to pay, among other things, eight weeks' allowance of support money at $5 per week when such an order should be made; and that at the time he filed his affidavits, and testified in response to the rule to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for failure to pay the allowances, the appellant, Lane, who was then in court representing him, had in his possession sufficient money of the funds belonging to the defendant, which had been delivered to Lane for the express purpose of such payments, to discharge the rule. He prayed that the judgment holding him in contempt, and sentencing him to the State Penal Farm, be set aside, and that Lane be cited to show cause why he should not pay the money in his hands belonging to the defendant in discharge of the allowances. No citation was issued against Lane, but the order of the court recites that the motion of Emil Campbell came on for hearing and was submitted to the court for trial, and that the court heard the evidence of the defendant, Campbell, and the evidence of Lane, and argument of counsel, and that the allegations of the motion were found to be true, and that Lane had failed to pay the allowances, and that he had in his possession funds of the defendant with which to pay the same. The court further found that, at the hearing upon the contempt citation against the defendant, Lane was in court, 'and then and there stated to this Court that the defendant Emil Campbell had no money or funds with which to pay said support order.' It was recited in the order that Lane had been guilty of willful disobedience of the order of the court, and it was ordered that Lane pay the sum of $100 of the funds of the defendant in his possession to the clerk of the court within five days, the money to be used by the clerk toward the payment of the allowances, and that any balance of such sum be held pending the order of the court. It was also ordered that Lane be suspended from the practice of law in the Fifty Seventh judicial circuit for three months.
The appellant, Lane, filed a motion for a new trial. Pending a disposition of the motion, and after the expiration of the time within which appellant was ordered to pay the funds involved to the clerk, the defendant, Campbell, filed a verified petition showing that Lane had not complied with the order of the court, and asking that a rule issue against Lane requiring him to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for disobeying the order. A rule issued, and afterward appellant appeared by attorney and filed a verified answer. Afterward an entry was made to the effect that the court, being fully advised, found that Lane should pay the sum involved, and thereupon appellant paid the sum of $100, which was ordered held by the clerk until the further order of the court, and the clerk was ordered to return to Lane a certificate of deposit, which had theretofore been deposited with and accepted by the clerk. It was then held that, by such payment, Lane was discharged of the rule against him. The costs were taxed against appellant. The record then shows an argument on the motion for a new trial, which had been filed by Lane with respect to the original proceedings, and, at the conclusion of the argument, the court on its own motion struck out that part of the former order suspending Lane from the practice of law. Thereupon the motion for a new trial was overruled.
The record shows that the court considered a report of the Dubois County Bar Association, and found that the appellant is not a practicing attorney, admitted to practice in the State of Indiana, or in the counties comprising the Fifty Seventh judicial circuit, and ordered that the appellant be not permitted to practice in the counties of Pike and Dubois, comprising the Fifty Seventh judicial circuit, until he shall file with the clerk of the Dubois circuit court a certificate indicating his admission to practice before the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana, and satisfy the court that his name is upon the roll of attorneys of this court. Appellant objected to the inclusion of this in the order. Appellant then prayed an appeal, which was granted.
In the assignment of errors it is asserted that the court erred in assuming jurisdiction of the appellant in the contempt proceeding, and of the subject matter of the contempt proceeding; that the court erred in modifying its original order, and in carrying on a proceeding to prevent appellant from practicing law; also that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial.
The evidence upon which the court acted is not brought into the record. Section 4-3615, Burns' Ann.St.1933, section 837 Baldwin's Ind.St.1934, provides as follows: 'When an attorney, on request, refuses to deliver over money or papers to a person from whom or for whom he has received them in the course of his professional employment, whether in an action or not, he may be required, after reasonable notice, on motion of any party aggrieved, by an order of the court in which an action, if any, was prosecuted (or if no action was prosecuted, then by the order of any court of record) to do so, within a specified time, or show cause why he should not be punished...
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