Lane v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A.
Decision Date | 29 March 1985 |
Docket Number | No. 84-7077,84-7077 |
Citation | 756 F.2d 814 |
Parties | 1985-1 Trade Cases 66,533 Louis J. LANE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CENTRAL BANK OF ALABAMA, N.A., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
James M. Gaines, Smith, Gaines, Gaines & Sabatini, Huntsville, Ala., for plaintiff-appellant.
John M. Heacock, Jr., Lanier, Shaver, & Herring, Huntsville, Ala., Jerry W. Powell, Birmingham, Ala., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before VANCE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and PITTMAN *, District Judge.
Louis J. Lane ("Lane") appeals from a decision of the district court awarding summary judgment to appellee Central Bank of Alabama ("Central"). The district court held that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear claims arising under the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1972(1). Accordingly, Lane's claim was deemed barred by res judicata since Lane failed to assert the federal claim in a prior state court action involving the same facts relied upon by Lane in the district court. We affirm.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court correctly held that its jurisdiction under the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act was concurrent with that of the state courts. Our analysis "begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction." Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 2875, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981). This presumption "can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests." Id. 1
Gulf Offshore requires that we examine the provision in question for an "explicit statutory directive" mandating exclusive federal jurisdiction. Gulf Offshore 453 U.S. at 478, 101 S.Ct. at 2875. The jurisdictional section accompanying the Bank Holding Company Act states:
Any person who is injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in Sec. 1972 of this Title may sue therefore in any district court of the United States in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without regard to the amount in controversy, and shall be entitled to recover three times the amount of the damages sustained by him, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
12 U.S.C. Sec. 1975. The district court correctly noted that use of the permissive term "may" is entirely consistent with the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962) ( ); Greene v. County School Board of Henrico County, Va., 524 F.Supp. 43 (E.D.Va.1981) ( ); Ted's Tire Service, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 470 F.Supp. 163 (D.Conn.1979) ( ); Burrell v. Turner Corp. of Oklahoma, Inc., 431 F.Supp. 1018 (N.D.Okla.1977) ( ). In short, we find no explicit statutory directive evincing a congressional desire to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. 2
Similarly, our review of the legislative history reveals no "unmistakable implication" that Congress intended to confine jurisdiction to the federal courts. See S.Rep. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.; Conf.Rep. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5519 et seq.; see also 116 Cong.Rec. S15707 et seq. (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1970). Lane points to a statement in the legislative history by Assistant Attorney General Richard McLaren to the effect that the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act would provide a "valuable supplement" to the antitrust laws. See 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5519, 5559. From this, Lane argues that Congress was well aware that the antitrust laws were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, see Blumenstock Bros. Ad. Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440, 40 S.Ct. 385, 386, 64 L.Ed. 649 (1920), and concludes that the Bank Holding Company Act is also within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. As noted above, 3 however, Congress specifically defined "antitrust laws," and the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act were not included in that definition. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 12. Given this fact, we conclude that the legislative history's reference to the anti-tying provisions as a "supplement" to the antitrust laws is simply insufficient to provide the "unmistakeable implication" needed to rebut the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction.
Finally, Lane argues that there is a "clear incompatibility between state court jurisdiction and federal interests." Gulf Offshore, supra, 453 U.S. at 478, 101 S.Ct. at 2875. To support this argument, Lane notes that he was, in large part, prevented from proving his case in the prior state court action due to the operation of Alabama's "Dead Man's Statute." See Ala.Code Sec. 12-21-163 (1975). Because of this statute, Lane argues that it is grossly unfair for a resident of one state to receive a favorable interpretation of federal law from his state court while a resident of another state receives a contrary analysis of the same federal right from his state court. If, however, differing state evidentiary rules were sufficient to provide the "clear incompatibility" necessary for exclusive federal jurisdiction, suits based upon any federal statute would support an argument for exclusive jurisdiction. Although Lane presents a persuasive argument against the Alabama "Dead Man's Statute," that argument should properly be addressed to the Alabama legislature rather than to this court.
The fact that the anti-tying provisions are narrowly drawn and proscribe specific conduct also suggests that exclusive jurisdiction is not necessary to promote national uniformity in the interpretation of the anti-tying provisions. The same cannot be said of the antitrust laws which broadly prohibit anticompetitive and monopolistic behavior. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 457 U.S. 332, 354, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 2478, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982) ( ); 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.
Finally, we note that Congress appears to have perceived no incompatibility between state and federal interests since it allowed the states to enact further legislation in this area. 4
* Honorable Virgil Pittman, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
1 At the outset, Lane suggests an alternative method of analyzing the issue. Rather than engaging in a straightforward analysis of the issue under the factors enumerated by the Supreme Court in Gulf Offshore, Lane argues that the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts would be clearly established if the anti-tying provision could be deemed an antitrust law since it is well-settled that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of claims arising under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Blumenstock Bros. Ad. Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436, 440, 40 S.Ct. 385, 386, 64 L.Ed. 649 (1920); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park District of Peoria, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 873, 59 L.Ed.2d 57 (1979). We decline, however,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Chivas Products Ltd. v. Owen
...Bank Holding Company Act even though that act contains enforcement and venue provisions similar to those in the civil RICO statute. Lane, 756 F.2d at 817. From my review of the record, herein, none of the majority's proffered rationales persuasively supports the requisite "clear incompatibi......
-
Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc.
...to that of RICO found in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), was described as a " 'valuable supplement' " to the antitrust laws (see, Lane v. Central Bank, 756 F.2d 814, 817, (11th Cir.), quoting 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5519, 5559) and yet it has been held that States can exercise concurrent juri......
-
Simpson Elec. Corp. v. Leucadia, Inc.
...with concurrent state court jurisdiction (see, Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra, at 477, 101 S.Ct. at 2874; Lane v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A., 756 F.2d 814; Kelly v. Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 549 F.Supp. 8; Bains v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 440 F.Supp. Alt......
-
Ritchie v. Carvel Corp.
...in the federal courts. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. at 506, 82 S.Ct. at 522; see also Lane v. Central Bank, 756 F.2d 814, 817-18 (11th Cir.1985) (private right of action to enforce the anti-tying provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1975, using virtually......