Lane v. Holderman

Decision Date04 February 1957
Docket NumberNo. A--60,A--60
Citation129 A.2d 8,23 N.J. 304
PartiesChristopher LANE et al., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Carl HOLDERMAN, Commissioner of Labor and Industry of the State of New Jersey, Respondent-Respondent.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

John H. Yauch, Jr., for appellants(James E. Fagan, Newark, of counsel; Daniel A. Degnan, Newark, on the brief; Gilhooly, Yauch & Fagan, Newark, Attorneys).

Thomas L. Franklin, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent(Grover C. Richman, Jr., Atty. Gen., Attorney; David D. Furman, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel).

Sol D. Kapelsohn, Newark, and William J. Isaacson, New York City, for Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, amicus curiae(William J. Isaacson, New York City, Sol D. Kapelsohn, Newark, and Herbert Semmel, New York City, on the brief).

Roger Hinds, East Orange, amicus curiae, for National Consumers' League and Consumers' League of N.J., New Jersey Council of Churches, and its department, United Church Women of N.J., Protestant Episcopal Diocese of N.J., Dept. of Christian Social Relations, Protestant Episcopal Diocese of Newark, Dept. of Christian Social Relations, New Jersey State Federation of Colored Women's Clubs, Inc., New Jersey State Federation of Labor.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

WACHENFELD, J.

Appellants, 43 employers in the laundry, dry cleaning and dyeing industry, petitioned the Appellate Division under R.R. 4:88--10 for a judgment declaring the provisions regulating overtime rates in Minimum Fair Wage Standards Mandatory OrderNo. 10, promulgated by the Commissioner of Labor and Industry under the Minimum Wage Act, invalid.

The order in question was issued on November 7, 1955 and governs the employment of women and minors in the affected industry.Pursuant to the recommendations of the wage board appointed by the Commissioner to survey conditions prevailing in this field of service, the order fixed a basic minimum wage, after the first four weeks of employment, of 85 cents per hour for non-clerical workers and 80 cents per hour for clerical workers, effective May 6, 1956.In addition, it embodied administrative regulations formulated by the Commissioner which specified that, after a gradual start, commencing on November 8, 1956 women and minor employees must be paid one and one-half times the 'regular hourly wage rate' for work in excess of 40 hours per week.The provisions with respect to overtime compensation and the methods of adoption and computation are as follows:

'Overtime Rates.Overtime rates mean one and one-half times the employee's regular hourly wage rate which shall be paid to each woman and minor subject to the provisions of this Order for hours worked in excess of forty-eight (48) hours in any work week during the period of time beginning with May 6, 1956 through August 6, 1956; hours worked in excess of forty-four (44) hours in any work week during the period of time beginning with August 7, 1956 through November 7, 1956, and hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any work week beginning on or after November 8, 1956.The overtime rates established by this Order shall not apply in the case of any person employed on a weekly, monthly or yearly salary basis, whose salary reduced to a weekly basis is in excess of $60.00 and whose employment is in a bona-fide supervisory or executive capacity.'

'Regular Hourly Wage Rate.The term 'regular hourly wage rate,' as used in this Order, shall mean the amount that the employee is regularly paid for each hour of work.When an employee is paid on a piece work basis or any other basis than an hourly rate the 'regular hourly wage rate' shall be determined by dividing the total of the hours worked during the week into the employee's total earnings exclusive of part time bonuses for the week and exclusive of wages earned at overtime rates as such rates are defined in this Order.'

By stipulation, the issues presented for the consideration of the Appellate Division were limited to two in number.The first involves solely a question of statutory interpretation and concerns the authority of the Commissioner under the provisions of the Minimum Wage Act to define overtime rates and the number of hours worked per week after which said rates shall become effective.Implicit in this challenge to the powers of the Commissioner is the subsidiary consideration of whether, in any event, he had the right to base the prescribed overtime rates upon the hourly wage actually paid by the petitioners which might deviate from the basic minimum wage recommended by the wage board.The second issue, however, brings into controversy the constitutionality of R.S. 34:11--47, as amendedL.1941, c. 321, § 2, p. 862, N.J.S.A.The petitioners maintain that if the Commissioner does have the authority to establish overtime rates, its exercise is not sufficiently guided by standards to satisfy constitutional requirements concerning delegation of powers.

The Appellate Division determined all of these contentions adversely to petitioners except that attacking the use of the 'regular hourly wage' rather than the minimum of 80 or 85 cents an hour as the figure for computing overtime.With respect to the latter, the court below declined to express an opinion, being of the view that none of the petitioners enjoyed standing since they had not demonstrated injury by proving their regular hourly rates exceeded the minimum wage prescribed.

Upon application by 43 of the 64 employers originally supporting the cause, we granted certification.

Initially, it is important to observe by way of clarification that appellants do not assail the Commissioner's regulations, as embodied in the order in controversy, for lack of substantial evidence justifying their adoption.Neither do they impugn the subject order for any failure by the Commissioner or by the wage board to comply with the fairly elaborate procedural requirements of the Minimum Wage Act.Despite this, to discuss intelligently the arguments advanced by appellants, it seems necessary to give at least a cursory account of the conditions prerequisite to the issuance of a final mandatory order and the Modus operandi by which its terms are established.

The Minimum Wage Act was originally adopted by the Legislature in 1933. L.1933, c. 152.It has since been twice amended.L.1941, c. 321 and L.1953, c. 33,N.J.S.A. 34:11--34 et seq.The act declares the employment of women and minors in this State at an unreasonable and oppressive wage to be contrary to public policy.An unreasonable and oppressive wage is defined as one that is both less than the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered and less than sufficient to meet the minimum cost of living necessary for health.When the Commissioner finds a substantial number of women and minors in any occupation are receiving such wages, he is obligated to appoint a wage board.This body consists, at a maximum, of three representatives of the employers in the occupation involved, three representatives of the employees, and three disinterested members representing the public.

Upon the convening of the wage board, the Commissioner presents to it all the evidence and information in his possession relating to wages of women and minor workers in the occupation under scrutiny, any other information which he deems relevant to the establishment of a minimum fair wage, and witnesses he thinks material.The board has the power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of those it desires to hear, and the production of all books, records and other evidence relative to the matters under investigation.

Within 60 days after its organization, the wage board submits a report to the Commissioner embodying its recommendations of minimum fair wage standards for women and minors in the subject occupation.The Commissioner is directed to accept or reject the report within ten days thereafter.If the report is rejected, the Commissioner is enjoined to resubmit the matter to the same board or to a new board, describing his reasons for rejection.If the report is accepted, it must be published together with such administrative regulations the Commissioner proposes as appropriate to supplement the report and to safeguard the minimum fair wage standards to be established.At the time of publication, notice is required of a public hearing before the Commissioner.All persons favoring or opposing the recommendations contained in the report or the proposed regulations are given the opportunity of being heard.

Within ten days after the hearing, the Commissioner must finally approve or disapprove the report.Disapproval ordinarily entails resubmission of the matter to the same wage board or to a new board.When the Commissioner approves the report, however, he must promulgate a mandatory order containing the minimum fair wage rates included in the report and the proposed administrative regulations.The order becomes effective 180 days after it is issued.

The Commissioner and the wage board in establishing a minimum fair wage under the act consider: (1) all relevant circumstances affecting the value of the service or class of service rendered; (2) wages paid in the State for work of like or comparable character by employers who voluntarily maintain minimum fair wage standards; and (3) the factors which a court would consider in a Quantum meruit suit.A 'fair wage' is defined to be: 'a wage fairly and reasonably commensurate with the value of the service or class of service rendered.'R.S. 34:11--34, N.J.S.A.

I.Commissioner's Powers to Regulate Overtime Rates and to Determine When They Shall Go into Effect.

Appellants contend that 'the overall language and intent of the minimum wage act demonstrates that 'overtime' has a restricted meaning and does not purport to confer authority to fix overtime in the sense of a premium or penalty rate for excessive working hours.'The gist of their...

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