Lane v. Horton

• Decision Date: 08 February 2021
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:19-cv-12689
• Parties: STERLING MAURICE LANE, Petitioner, v. CONNIE HORTON, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

STERLING MAURICE LANE, Petitioner, v. CONNIE HORTON, Respondent.

Case No. 2:19-cv-12689

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

February 8, 2021

Hon. Arthur J. Tarnow

OPINION AND ORDER (1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AND (2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A Wayne Circuit Court jury convicted Sterling Maurice Lane in 2016 of four felony offenses involving the possession of a firearm and ammunition. The court sentenced him as a third-time firearm offender to flat term of ten years' imprisonment for one of the firearm offenses and time served for the other offenses.

Lane challenges his state court convictions in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition raises four claims: (1) Lane's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the warrantless search of his girlfriend's house, (2) the misconduct of the prosecutor rendered Lane's trial fundamentally unfair, (3) Lane's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of his legitimate expectation of privacy in his girlfriend's home, and (4) insufficient evidence was presented at trial to sustain Lane's convictions.

The Court will deny the petition because these claims are without merit. The Court will also deny Lane a certification of appealability.

I. Background

As later established at trial, on November 4, 2015, Lane was with his girlfriend Loretta Smith at her Detroit home on Murray Hill Street. Lane and Smith had been in a romantic relationship for several years, Lane had a key to her house, and had permission to come and go from the house as he pleased.

That night, Smith had the blinds on the front window of the house drawn, and the front door was closed. Lane briefly exited the house, and then he quickly returned with police officers following close behind. According to Smith, the officers did not ask for permission to enter, nor did they present a warrant.

Police officers took Lane outside, and then they searched the living room, where they found a handgun underneath a couch cushion. Smith said that the gun belonged to her. Lane, who had prior firearm convictions, was arrested and charged with several firearm offenses as well as with possession of marijuana.

Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the firearm on the grounds that police officers violated Lane's Fourth Amendment rights when they entered and searched Smith's house without a warrant or permission.

The trial court held a suppression hearing. Detroit Police Officer William Zeolla testified that he and his partner responded to a call of shots fired near Smith's house during the night of November 4, 2015. Officer Zeolla saw Lane walking down the street and shined spotlight at him. Officer Zeolla testified that he then saw Lane grab his waistband on his right side and run after being targeted by the spotlight.

In Officer Zeolla's experience, people who grab their sides are "possibly armed with a handgun." (ECF No. 8-3, PageID.105.) So he decided to exit his car and give chase. Zeolla saw Lane run into Smith's house. Before following him inside, he saw Lane remove a blue steel revolver from his right side. (Id., PageID.106.) Looking through the living room window, the officer saw Lane lean down near a couch, where he later discovered and retrieved the handgun.

Defense counsel did not present any evidence at the hearing. Defense counsel argued that Lane lived at the house, and therefore the police required a warrant or exigent circumstances to enter the premises. The court pushed back on the contention that Lane lived at the house:

THE COURT: Okay. But is there anything that was presented that I could say: "Well, I'm lookin' at this man's I.D., and it was admitted." All you're doing is arguing. He's indicated-I've got to look at the evidence that's been presented. He (the officer) indicated that he did not live there. There was no examination as to: "What made you-or led you to that conclusion?" So, because it wasn't challenged, it was accepted. There was nothing introduced to show that this defendant resided there and would have an expectation of privacy at that dwelling. That's why I asked you is there any more evidence that's going to bepresented, because I've got to go by what's on the record. But, go ahead.

MS. ROLPH: I mean I can ask Mr.-voir dire Mr. Lane, right now, and ask Mr. Lane questions as it relates to that.

THE COURT: It's too late. It's too late. We're at argument. You had an opportunity to present it, and you didn't. That's what I was waitin' on, something to show that he would at least have an expectation of privacy in that particular location.

(Id., PageID.126-27.)

The Court then denied the motion to suppress on two grounds. First, the Court found an exigency circumstances exception to the warrant requirement:

First of all, the fact that this officer was lawfully at the location where he was, on a street, there is less that the People have to show, and there is a reduced expectation of privacy; he's, i.e., on a public street. Shots fired. He grabs his side. He believes he sees what he believes is the handle of a gun, he believes. He then pursues him, the officer. The defendant is running. The Court believes that the warrantless exception was that he could have secreted the gun, the fact that there could have been a public safety basis for him going after getting that gun. He could have run in there with the gun. He got there for shots fired. He makes this location.

(Id., PageID.135-36.)

The Court also found that Lane lacked standing to challenge the entry into Smith's house:

And, moreover, there is no showing that this defendant had any expectation of privacy in that location. The officer said it's his girlfriend's house, after further investigation. There was nothing that was indicated, on this record, that the Court could go by, such as, you know, proof of residency by the defendant, and I or he had his clothesthere, and I or he spent a considerable amount of time there at that location, or anything arising to that expectation of privacy.

(Id., PageID.136.)

At Lane's jury trial, the prosecutor presented evidence regarding the same events testified to at the suppression hearing. The parties stipulated to Lane's prior record. The jury found Lane guilty of felon in possession of a firearm, commission of a felony with a firearm third-offense, felon in possession of ammunition, and possession of marijuana. The court sentenced Lane to time served on all counts except the commission of a felony with a firearm, which carried a mandatory 10-year sentence.

Lane filed a claim of appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. His appellate counsel filed a brief on appeal that raised one claim:

I. Mr. Lane's conviction must be vacated where it was predicated on evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of Mr. Lane's standing to object to the search.

Lane also filed a pro se supplemental brief that raised the following additional claims:

II. The trial court errored in not suppressing the firearm found in Mr. Lane's fiancée's house violating his 4th Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

III. The cumulative effect of the prosecutor's errors added up to prosecutor misconduct violating the appellant's 14th Amendment due process or fundamental fairness.

IV. Mr. Lane's trial counsel was ineffective in her representation of appellant case violating his 6th Amendment rights.

V. There was insufficient evidence in this case to convict the appellant of felony firearm, felon in possession of firearm/ammunition.

The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Lane's convictions and sentences in an unpublished opinion. Lane, 2018 WL 472215. Lane then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising the same claims. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the application by standard order. People v. Lane, 919 N.W.2d 47 (Mich. 2018) (Table).

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of a state court's factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application occurs" when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411.

"A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, "[o]nly an 'objectively unreasonable' mistake, . . ....