Lane v. Lensmeyer

• Decision Date: 15 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC 86116.,SC 86116.
• Citation: 158 S.W.3d 218
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: Henry G. LANE, et al., Appellants, v. Patricia S. LENSMEYER, Boone County Collector, and Columbia 93 School District, Respondents.

158 S.W.3d 218

Henry G. LANE, et al., Appellants, v. Patricia S. LENSMEYER, Boone County Collector, and Columbia 93 School District, Respondents.

No. SC 86116.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

February 15, 2005.

Rehearing Denied April 5, 2005.

Craig S. Johnson, Jefferson City, MO, for Appellants.

John L. Patton, Columbia, MO, G. Alex Bartlett, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondents.

Melissa K. Randol, Kyle Farmer, Missouri School Board Association, Columbia, for Amicus Curiae, Missouri School Boards' Association, Missouri Association of School Administrators and Missouri Municipal League.

MARY R. RUSSELL, Judge.

Henry G. Lane, William and Margie Anglen, Lloyd Haley, Curtis Braschler, Gordon L. Trumbo, Beulah F. Alverson, Ernest W. Greenup, and Ronald M. Lucas (collectively "Taxpayers") appeal from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Boone County in favor of the Boone County Collector, Patricia S. Lensmeyer ("Collector"), and the Columbia 93 School District ("School District") on Taxpayers' amended petition alleging School District's 2001 tax levy rate violated section 67.110.2, RSMo 2000.¹ After opinion by the Court of Appeals, Western District,² this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

This Court affirms the judgment of the trial court, finding that the trial court did not err in determining that School District's tax rate did not violate section 67.110.2 in that it was calculated to produce substantially the same revenues as required in the annual budget.

I. Facts and Procedural History

School District adopted its 2001-2002 school year budget in June 2001. The budget stated a local property tax revenue need of $56,232,505. Based on its declared needs and its total assessed valuation of $1,281,852,353, School District proposed a 2001 tax levy rate of $4.7544 per $100 assessed valuation. After a public hearing, School District adopted the tax levy rate. Collector dispersed the 2001 tax bills, including those of Taxpayers, which reflected taxes due to School District based on the adopted levy rate.

Plaintiff Henry Lane ("Lane") filed a two-count petition against School District seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that School District's 2001 tax rate was excessive and unlawful under section 67.110.2 and (2) an injunction requiring School District to revise the 2001 levy to conform with the provisions of section 67.110.2.³ In his original petition, only Lane and School District were named parties. Lane, however, was later granted leave to file an amended petition listing himself and the eight other plaintiff Taxpayers as named plaintiffs.⁴

The amended petition filed by Taxpayers alleged that School District's 2001 tax levy rate was excessive and illegal under section 67.110.2. They sought (1) a declaratory judgment that the tax levy rate was excessive and unlawful under section 67.110.2 and (2) a refund from Collector pursuant to sections 139.031 and 139.290 for the taxes they paid as a result of the allegedly excessive 2001 tax rate.⁵ Taxpayers argued that the levy rate violated section 67.110.2 because it was not "calculated to produce substantially the same revenues as required in the annual budget," in that it would produce $57,287,725, which was $1,055,220 (1.88 percent)⁶ more than the declared local property tax need of $56,232,505 in School District's 2001-2002 budget.

At trial on Taxpayers' amended petition seeking a declaratory judgment and a tax refund, Taxpayers called three witnesses: Collector; Kevan Snell, Director of Business Services for School District and Treasurer for its School Board ("Treasurer"); and Lane. School District presented the testimony of Dr. Chris Straub ("Expert"), a school finance consultant. The trial court found Treasurer and Expert to be "knowledgeable and qualif[ied] as experts with respect to school finance in Missouri" and it found their testimony was credible. The trial court entered its judgment in favor of Collector and School District finding that School District's 2001 tax levy rate did not violate sections 67.110 or 137.073. It further determined that the provisions of section 139.290 relied on by Taxpayers did not afford them "a procedure for securing any relief under the allegations and proof in this case." Taxpayers appeal.

II. Jurisdiction

At the outset, this Court must determine its own jurisdiction of this appeal. Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Mo. banc 1997). Without jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed. Id. This Court has no jurisdiction if Taxpayers failed to state a claim pursuant to Rule 55.27(a)(6), (2001).

Count I of Taxpayers' amended petition sought a declaratory judgment that the tax levy was in excess of that permitted by section 67.110.2. A court may grant a declaratory judgment if presented with: (1) a justiciable controversy that presents a real, substantial, presently-existing controversy admitting of specific relief, as distinguished from an advisory decree upon a purely hypothetical situation; (2) a plaintiff with a legally protectable interest at stake, "consisting of a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief"; (3) a controversy ripe for judicial determination; and (4) an inadequate remedy at law. Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 25 (Mo. banc 2003) (quoting Northgate Apts., L.P. v. City of N. Kansas City, 45 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Mo.App.2001)).

Taxpayers failed to meet the requirements for declaratory judgment in that they had an adequate remedy at law for addressing the issue of excessive taxes paid because they could request a refund of the taxes they believed were collected in violation of section 67.110.2. Indeed, Count II of Taxpayers' amended petition requests a partial refund, pursuant to section 139.031.5,⁷ for the 2001 taxes paid for School District. As a basis for their refund claim under section 139.031.5 in Count II, Taxpayers asserted that the tax levy violated section 67.110.2. As such, the very issue on which Taxpayers sought a declaratory judgment in Count I was a proof element of their refund claim in Count II.

An action for declaratory judgment is inappropriate when the issue can be raised by some other means. Parshall v. Buetzer, 121 S.W.3d 548, 552 (Mo.App.2003). There is no showing that the resolution of Taxpayers' Count II would not fully redress the issue on which they sought a declaratory judgment in Count I and would not be an adequate remedy without recourse to declaratory judgment. Count I of Taxpayers' amended petition for a declaratory judgment failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment thereon. Therefore, in reviewing this case, this Court treats the trial court's judgment on Taxpayers' amended petition as an adjudication as to only Count II, the refund claim.

As to Count II, the jurisdictional issue is whether Taxpayers have standing to bring this appeal.

First, School District asserts that the voluntary dismissal with prejudice of Lane's original petition prevents Lane⁸ from having standing in this appeal because a party is estopped and waives his right to appeal when a judgment is entered at his request. Stewart v. Stewart, 866 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Mo.App.1993). Lane's original two-count petition listed only himself and School District as named parties. He later filed a written motion for leave to amend his petition pursuant to Rule 55.33(a), (2001).⁹ In sustaining Lane's motion, the trial court made the following docket entry:

PLAINTIFF APPEARS PERSONALLY AND BY COUNSEL. DEFENDANT APPEARS BY COUNSEL. AT PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST, COUNTS I AND II DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AND PLAINTIFF GIVEN LEAVE TO FILE 1ST AMENDED PETITION. SAME FILED. SUMMONS ORDERED ISSUED.

The portion of the trial court's docket entry dismissing Lane's petition with prejudice is clearly at odds with its express grant of leave to file the amended petition. Once a petition is dismissed with prejudice, the trial court is powerless to reinstate it, including the filing of an amended petition. Liberman v. Liberman, 844 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Mo.App.1992). The trial court is presumed to know the law and, as such, this Court infers that the trial court in this case understood that it could not both dismiss Lane's petition with prejudice and grant him leave to amend it. See Harrison v. Coomber Realty & Inv. Co., 359 Mo. 862, 224 S.W.2d 63, 64 (1949) (stating that the trial court is presumed to know the law). Because the trial court granted Lane leave to file the amended petition and proceeded with the case, it could not have intended to dismiss his original petition with prejudice. The dismissal language was superfluous and without effect and does not cause Lane to lack standing in this appeal.

School District further challenges Taxpayers' standing to bring this appeal by asserting that they are not "aggrieved" by the trial court's judgment in that the total amount of all their tax refund claims, both individually and collectively, is insufficient for them to be "aggrieved" within the meaning of section 512.020.¹⁰ This Court disagrees.

School District argues that Koehr v. Emmons, 55 S.W.3d 859 (Mo.App.2001), stands for the proposition that where the amount of the tax refund claimed is significantly less than the filing fee for the appeal, the appellants are not "aggrieved" within the meaning of section 512.020. Reliance on Koehr, however, is misplaced. In Koehr, the plaintiffs, individually and as representatives of a class of ad valorem taxpayers, filed a petition seeking a refund of taxes allegedly levied in excess of the limits set forth in the Hancock Amendment. 55 S.W.3d at 861. In addressing the individual tax refund claim, the court explained that the amount allegedly overpaid, just $4.04, was less than 10 percent of the filing fee for the appeal. Id. at 864. It indicated that "such an insubstantial sum does not provide a proper...