Lane v. Nelson

• Decision Date: 15 November 1875
• Citation: 79 Pa. 407
• Parties: Lane <I>et al. versus</I> Nelson.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

79 Pa. 407

Lane et al. versus Nelson.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 11, 1875.

November 15, 1875.

November 11th 1875.

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, WILLIAMS, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, and WOODWARD, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson county: Of October and November Term 1874, No. 56.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

A. L. Gordon and W. C. Corbet, for plaintiffs in error.

Jenks & Clark, B. J. Reid and J. Campbell, for defendant in error.—The sale under the order of the Orphans' Court of Jefferson county was void for want of jurisdiction: Menges v. Oyster, 4 W. & S. 20. The Act of April 1st 1873 is unconstitutional and void: Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304; Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171; Brown v. Hummel, 6 Barr 87; Dale v. Medcalf, 9 Id. 108; Greenough v. Greenough, 1 Jones 489; McCabe v. Emerson, 6 Harris 111; McCarty v. Hoffman, 11 Id. 507; Kneass's Appeal, 7 Casey 87; Menges v. Dentler, 9 Id. 495; Baggs's Appeal, 7 Wright 512; Caverow v. Insurance Co., 2 P. F. Smith 287; Schafer v. Eneu, 4 Id. 304; Shonk v. Brown, 11 Id. 321; Craig v. Kline, 15 Id. 399; Palairet's Appeal, 17 Id. 479; Richards v. Rote, 18 Id. 248.

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court, November 15th 1875.

It is settled by a current of authority that the legislature cannot, by an arbitrary edict, take the property of one man and give it to another; and that when it has been attempted to be taken by a judicial proceeding, as a sheriff's sale, which is void for want of jurisdiction, it is not in the power of the legislature to infuse life into that which is dead: Norman v. Heist, 5 W. & S. 171; Greenough v. Greenough, 1 Jones 489; De Chastellux v. Fairchild, 3 Harris 18; Meyer v. Dentler, 9 Casey 495; Baggs's Appeal 7 Wright 512; Schafer v. Eneu, 4 P. F. Smith 304; Shonk v. Brown, 11 Id. 320; Richards v. Rote, 18 Id. 248; Hegarty's Appeal, 25 Id. 503. To exercise judicial powers is not within the legitimate scope of legislative functions; and when vested rights are divested by acts of that character they will and ought to be judged inoperative, null and void: Baggs's Appeal. On the other hand, if an Act of Assembly is strictly within the scope of legislative power, it is not a valid objection that it divests vested rights. There is no clause, either in the Constitution of the United States or of this Commonwealth, which prohibits retrospective laws: Grim v. Weisenberg School District, 7 P. F. Smith 433. The legislature cannot impair the obligation of a contract, or pass an ex post facto law, for both of these are expressly forbidden. But an ex post facto law is one which makes an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed: Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 138. Retrospective laws and state laws divesting vested rights, unless ex post facto, or impairing the obligation of contracts, do not fall within the prohibition contained in the Constitution of the United States, however repugnant this may be to the principles of sound legislation: Grim v. Weissenberg School District; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386; Satterlee v. Matthewson, 2 Peters 413; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Peters 88.

Legislation of the character referred to is no novelty in this state. We have numerous instances in which it has been invoked for a great variety of purposes. In some cases it has been sustained, and in others declared unconstitutional. The boundary line between the domains of authorized and prohibited legislation is not very clearly defined. Acts of Assembly passed at different times to render valid defects in acknowledgment of deeds have been sustained, although the effect of them was to interfere with vested rights: Tate v. Stooltzfoos, 16 S. & R. 35; Mercer v. Watson, 1 Watts 330. In like manner Acts of Assembly, to remedy defects in judicial proceedings, have been held to be valid. Thus an act curing an irregularity in the entry of a judgment was held to be within the legitimate province of the legislature: Underwood v. Lilly, 10 S. & R. 97. In Bleakiney v. The Bank of Greencastle, 17 S. & R. 64, an act validating suits pending was sustained. In Estep v. Hutchman, 14 S. & R. 435, a private act, authorizing a guardian to convey land sold by the father of his ward and paid for by the purchaser, was sustained. In the case of The Turnpike Company v. The Commonwealth, 2 Watts 433, the broad principle is asserted that where a right exists, but no remedy to enforce it, it is within the constitutional power of the legislature to provide one. In Smith v. Merchand's Executors, 7 S. & R. 260, an act to enable purchasers of defective tax-titles to recover back from the county commissioners what they had paid over and above the taxes, was sustained, though the purchaser had no previous title to recover. In Grim v. Weissenberg School District, before cited, an illegal tax had been collected, under protest; after the party had brought suit to recover it back, an act legalizing the tax was passed, and it was held that the act defeated the cause of action, and was not unconstitutional for the reason that the legislature having the power antecedent to authorize the tax, could cure any irregularity or want of authority in levying it by a retroactive law.

While the legislature may not by a retroactive law render valid judicial proceedings which were utterly void for want of jurisdiction, as in Richards v. Rote, before cited, it is...