Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa
Decision Date | 03 March 1919 |
Docket Number | No. 197,197 |
Citation | 249 U.S. 110,39 S.Ct. 185,63 L.Ed. 504 |
Parties | LANE, Secretary of the Interior, et. al. v. PUEBLO OF SANTA ROSA |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Solicitor Gen. King and Messrs. Charles D. Mahaffie, of Portland, Or., and C. Edward Wright, of Washington, D. C., for appellants.
Messrs. Ralph S. Rounds, of New York City, Alton M. Cates, of Los Angeles, Cal., and Henry P. Blair, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
This is a suit to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of the General Land Office from offering, listing, or disposing of certain lands in southern Arizona as public lands of the United States. The lands include the site of the pueblo of Santa Rosa and the surrounding territory, comprise some 460,000 acres, and are within the region acquired from Mexico under what is known as the Gadsden Treaty of December 30, 1853. 10 Stat. 1031. The suit is brought by the pueblo of Santa Rosa, and its right to the relief sought is based on two allegations, which are elaborated in the bill: One that under the laws of Spain and Mexico it had, when that region was acquired by the United States, and under the provisions of the treaty it now has, a complete and perfect title to the lands in question; and the other, that in disregard of its title the defendants are threatening and proceeding to offer, list and dispose of these lands as public lands of the United States. In the court of first instance the bill was challenged by a motion to dismiss in the nature of a demurrer, and the motion was sustained. In the Court of Appeals the case made by the allegations in the bill was held to be one entitling the plaintiff to the relief sought, and the decree of dismissal was reversed with a direction that a permanent injunction be awarded. Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Lane, 46 App. D. C. 411. The latter decision is challenged here on two grounds: One, that the plaintiff is not a legal entity and has no capacity to maintain the suit; and the other, that in any event, the defendant should not be subjected to a permanent injunction without according them an opportunity to answer the bill.
The plaintiff is an Indian town whose inhabitants are a simple and uninformed people, measurably civilized and industrious, living in substantial houses and engaged in agricultural and pastoral pursuits. Its existence, practically as it is to-day, can be traced back through the period of Mexican rule into that of the Spanish kings. It was known then, as now, as the pueblo of Santa Rosa, and its inhabitants were known then, as now, as Pueblo Indians. During the Spanish, as also the Mexican, dominion it enjoyed a large measure of local self-government and was recognized as having capacity to acquire and hold lands and other property. With much reason this might be regarded as enabling and entitling it to became a suitor for the purpose of enforcing or defending its property interests. See School District v. Wood, 13 Mass. 193, 198; Cooley's Const. Lim. (7th Ed.) p. 276; 1 Dillon, Munic. Corp. (5th Ed.) §§ 50, 64, 65. But our decision need not be put on that ground for there is another which arises out of our own laws and is in itself sufficient. After the Gadsden Treaty Congress made that region part of the territory of New Mexico and subjected it to 'all the laws' of that territory. Act Aug. 4, 1854, c. 245, 10 Stat. 575. One of those laws provided that the inhabitants of any Indian pueblo having a grant or concession of lands from Spain or Mexico, such as is here claimed, should be a body corporate and as such capable of suing or defending in respect of such lands. Laws New Mex. 1851-52, pp. 176, 418. If the plaintiff was not a legal entity and juristic person before, it became such under that law; and it retained that status after Congress included it in the territory of Arizona, for the act by which this was done extended to that territory all legislative enactments of the territory of New Mexico. Act Feb. 24, 1863, c. 56, 12 Stat. 664. The fact that Arizona has since become a state does not affect the plaintiff's corporate status or its power to sue. See Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 414, 5 Sup. Ct. 208, 28 L. Ed. 794.
The case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 8 L. Ed. 25, on which the defendants place some reliance, is not in point. The question there was not whether the Cherokee Tribe had the...
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