Lane v. Sklodowski

• Decision Date: 29 August 1983
• Docket Number: No. 58601,58601
• Parties: , 73 Ill.Dec. 462 Michael P. LANE, Director of Corrections, Plaintiff, v. Robert L. SKLODOWSKI, Judge, et al., Defendants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 322

454 N.E.2d 322

97 Ill.2d 311, 73 Ill.Dec. 462

Michael P. LANE, Director of Corrections, Plaintiff, v. Robert L. SKLODOWSKI, Judge, et al., Defendants.

No. 58601.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Aug. 29, 1983.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen. of Ill., Chicago (Michael J. Hayes, James R. Carroll, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago (Richard Devine, First Asst. State's Atty., Michael E. Shabat, Joan S. Cherry, Myra J. Brown, Glenn Sechen, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), Daniel D. Doyle, State's Atty., Winnebago County, Rockford, John A. Barra, State's Atty., Peoria County, Chris L. Fredericksen, Asst. State's Atty., Peoria, Edward F. Petka, State's Atty., Steven J. Prodehl, Asst. State's Atty., Joliet, for defendants.

Robert W. Gettleman, Arthur Don, D'Ancona & Pflaum, Ruthanne DeWolfe, Chicago, for John Howard Ass'n, amicus curiae.

SIMON, Justice:

Our primary responsibility in this original action is to determine the scope of the authority granted to the Director of the Department of Corrections under a statute which provides for the early release of prisoners on account of good conduct. This opinion explains the basis for orders previously entered in this case on July 12, 1983, and July 15, 1983.

In this action the Director, Michael P. Lane, sought the issuance of writs of mandamus and prohibition or a supervisory order directing the respondents, judges of the circuit courts of Cook, Peoria, Sangamon, Will and Winnebago counties, to dismiss numerous proceedings which had been initiated against him by several State's Attorneys. The petition for leave to file this action was filed a day after a judge of the Cook County circuit court issued a body attachment for the Director's arrest, threatened to imprison him if he did not appear in person before the judge the next morning, and directed that the Attorney General was not to represent the Director in that proceeding. On the same day the petition was filed, we granted leave to file the action and issued a stay of all the circuit court proceedings. The respondents are represented before this court by the State's Attorneys who brought the initial proceedings in the circuit courts.

The proceedings in Cook and Peoria counties sought a rule to show cause why the Director should not be held in contempt, while the actions in Sangamon, Will and Winnebago counties sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction. All of the actions, however, required the circuit courts to determine the scope of the Director's authority to award meritorious good time under section 3-6-3(a)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a)(3)), which provides:

"Sec. 3-6-3. Rules and Regulations for Early Release. (a)(1) The Department of Corrections shall prescribe rules and regulations for the early release on account of good conduct of persons committed to the Department which shall be subject to review by the Prisoner Review Board.

(2) Such rules and regulations shall provide that the prisoner shall receive one day of good conduct credit for each day of service in prison for all classes of felonies other than where a sentence of 'natural life' has been imposed. Each day of good conduct credit shall reduce by one day the inmate's period of incarceration set by the court.

(3) Such rules and regulations shall also provide that the Director may award up to 90 days additional good conduct credit for meritorious service in specific instances as the Director deems proper." (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a).)

Under this section there are two sources of good conduct credits which can lead to the early release of a prisoner: (1) the one-day credit for one day served provided for in subsection (2), and (2) the 90-day credit for meritorious service provided for in subsection (3).

The Director and the State's Attorneys disagree on the interpretation to be placed on the 90-day limitation in subsection (3). The Director contends that it applies only to the amount of credit for meritorious service that he can award a prisoner at any one time while the State's Attorneys contend that it prevents the Director from granting more than an accumulative total of 90 days credit for meritorious service to an individual prisoner over the period of his incarceration. The Director incorporated his interpretation of the statute into the Administrative Regulations of the Department of Corrections (see Admin. Regs. Dept. Corr. sec. 864(II)(E) ), and made it a regular practice of the Department to grant individual prisoners more than one award of 90 days. The State's Attorneys observe that prisoners have received as many as 313 days credit for meritorious service.

After hearing oral arguments in this case on July 12, 1983, we entered the following order:

"The Court holds, contrary to the Director's contention, that the statute in question (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a)(3) ) confers authority on the Director to grant no more than a total of 90 days additional good conduct credit for meritorious service; therefore, the writ is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending proceedings in this case are stayed until further order of this Court.

A written opinion will follow."

We clarified this order on July 15, 1983, by the following additional order:

"This matter coming on to be heard, on the motion of the petitioner-plaintiff, Michael P. Lane, for clarification of and a stay of the Court's order in this cause of July 12, 1983, and the court being fully advised;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, (1) The effect of this Court's order of July 12, 1983, shall not extend to or apply to any awards of additional good conduct credit made by the petitioner-plaintiff, Michael P. Lane, prior to July 13, 1983; (2) Considering that the adequacy of prison facilities and personnel and related matters, referred to in the petition and motion, are essentially matters within the province of the General Assembly, the motion to stay the effect of this Court's order of July 12, 1983, is denied."

"It is a primary rule of statutory construction that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. In so doing, courts look first to the terms of the statute." People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill.2d 469, 475, 60 Ill.Dec. 632, 433 N.E.2d 674; Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill.2d 136, 139, 5 Ill.Dec. 262, 361 N.E.2d 136.

In this case the relevant portion of the statute provides that "the Director may award up to 90 days additional good conduct credit for meritorious service in specific instances * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a)(3).) The Director argues that the use of the plural "instances " shows that the legislature intended to permit multiple awards of up to 90 days each. The use of the plural does indicate that the statute permits multiple awards, but that does not mean that the interpretation the Director places upon the statute is correct. The proper interpretation of the statutory language is that the Director may make multiple awards of less than 90 days each provided that the total number of days awarded to any one prisoner does not exceed a total of 90 days. A consideration of section 3-6-3(a)(3) in the light of the purpose and structure of the 1977 act that added it to the Unified Code of Corrections (Pub.Act 80-1099, 1977 Ill.Laws 3264, 3289) persuades us that this interpretation is the correct one.

The 1977 act created a determinate sentencing structure in Illinois by establishing minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment for all felonies (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1) and by circumscribing the discretion of any official to grant prisoners early release. For example, the Act abolished the Parole and Pardon Board, which previously had possessed broad powers to establish a prisoner's date of release (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, pars. 1003-3-2(a)(1), 1003-3-3), and replaced it with a Prisoner Review Board with only limited authority, not relevant here, to determine the time of release. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, pars. 1003-3-2(a)(3), (4).) Under the new determinate-sentencing system, the time of early release is fixed by operation of law. Each prisoner serving less than a life sentence is entitled to mandatory supervised release after serving "the full term of a determinate sentence less time credit for good behavior." Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-3-3(c).

In the 1977 act the legislature also carefully circumscribed the Director's authority to grant, revoke and restore good-conduct credits. Whereas the former provisions of the Unified Code of Corrections granted the Director broad discretion in formulating the rules and regulations for the diminution of sentences on account of good conduct or meritorious service (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a) ), section 3-6-3(a)(2), quoted above, now provides that a prisoner earns automatically one day of good conduct credit for each day served in prison (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a)(2) ) and section 3-6-3(a)(3), which is the subject of this action, now provides that the Director may only award "up to 90 days additional good conduct credit for meritorious service in specific instances." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(a)(3).) Likewise, prior law granted the Director broad discretion in revoking good-conduct credits as a penalty for prison rule infractions (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(c) ), but section 3-6-3(c) now provides that prisoners may not be penalized more than one year for any one infraction and that revocation by the Director of more than 30 days of credits in any one year requires review by the Prisoner Review Board (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-6-3(c)(2) ). If the Director decides to restore more than 30 days of credits previously revoked the same section also provides for review of...