Lane v. State, No. 675S146

• Docket Nº: No. 675S146
• Citation: 364 N.E.2d 756, 266 Ind. 485
• Case Date: July 12, 1977
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

Page 756

364 N.E.2d 756 266 Ind. 485 Richard Emerson LANE, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). No. 675S146. Supreme Court of Indiana. July 12, 1977.

[266 Ind. 486]

Page 758

Jack Rogers, Franklin, Frank E. Spencer, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Charles M. Russell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

Richard Emerson Lane, the defendant, was charged with first degree murder and first degree murder in the commission of a robbery. After a trial by jury, he was convicted on both counts and was ultimately sentenced to life [266 Ind. 487] imprisonment on one count. The defendant filed a motion to correct errors and appeals to this Court, raising the following issues:

1.) Whether the defendant's statement was obtained after advisement of and a valid waiver of his constitutional rights; and

2.) Whether the testimony of the defendant's girlfriend should have been excluded as a confidential communication.

I.

A pre-trial motion sought the suppression of a statement made by the defendant and a rifle recovered through his aid. Evidence was submitted in a pre-trial hearing and the motion was denied. When the statement and the rifle were offered into evidence, the defendant objected. The objections were overruled and the evidence was admitted. The defendant contends that the statement should have been excluded from his trial on the grounds that it was given without an adequate advisement of his constitutional rights and without a valid waiver of his right to remain silent.

In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, guidelines were established to protect an individual's constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. A statement made by an accused during custodial interrogation is not admissible over his objection, unless law enforcement officers give adequate and specified warnings to the accused before questioning, and the accused waives those rights. Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313. In order for an accused to effectively waive his privilege of silence and his right to an attorney, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Brown v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 558, 270 N.E.2d 751. Volunteered statements fall completely outside the scope of Miranda ; the safeguards erected by that holding are directed at protecting the accused from abuses of interrogation.

[266 Ind. 488] "There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime . . .."

Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726. Volunteered statements are unaffected by Miranda because there can be no presumption of compulsion where there is no interrogation. An accused has a right to speak equal to his privilege of silence.

A corollary of an accused's right to remain silent is his right to cut off questioning.

"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point, he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise."

Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 473, 86 S.Ct. at 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d at 694. The admissibility of statements made by an accused after he

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has exercised his right to remain silent depends on whether his right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosely (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313; Mims v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 37, 262 N.E.2d 638.

The trial court heard evidence on the defendant's motion to suppress in a pre-trial hearing. Much...