Lane v. State

• Decision Date: 25 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 82A05–1212–CR–640.,82A05–1212–CR–640.
• Citation: 997 N.E.2d 83
• Parties: Michael A. LANE, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

997 N.E.2d 83

Michael A. LANE, Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 82A05–1212–CR–640.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Oct. 25, 2013.

Matthew J. McGovern, Anderson, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Katherine M. Cooper, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

Michael A. Lane appeals his convictions for Murder,¹ class B felony Conspiracy to Commit Dealing in a Schedule II Controlled Substance, ² and two counts of class C felony Criminal Recklessness.³ He presents the following restated issues for review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by rejecting Lane's tendered jury instruction on reckless homicide as a lesser included offense of murder?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting certain hearsay evidence after concluding that Lane had opened the door to this previously excluded evidence?

We affirm.

On January 5, 2010, Jason Derrington arranged a drug deal between Michael Hooper and David Clark, in which Clark was to purchase $5000 worth of Oxycontin from Hooper. Hooper was Derrington's friend, and Derrington had facilitated a number of drug deals between Hooper and Clark in the past. At some point that day, Clark informed Derrington that he was unavailable and would be sending money for the transaction with Lane, whom Derrington knew as “Little Mike”. Derrington had met Lane several times before through Clark and felt comfortable with the last-minute change. Clark instructed Derrington to meet Lane in the back parkinglot of the Sunburst Apartments in Evansville.

Derrington went to Hooper's residence that evening and informed him of the change in plans. Hooper did not know Lane, so he decided to stop first at the home of Frank Hurst, Hooper's cousin. Hooper asked Hurst to give them a ride, and Hurst agreed. Hurst had one handgun on his person and one in the glove box of his car. He had permits for both weapons. Hurst apparently did not know Derrington or Lane and was allegedly unaware that he was driving Derrington and Hooper to a drug deal. Hooper sat in the front passenger seat of Hurst's vehicle, and Derrington sat directly behind Hurst.

The group arrived at the parking lot before 8:00 that evening and sat in the car while Derrington texted and made phone calls. After several minutes, Hooper asked Derrington, “where's he at”, and Derrington responded, “he's coming”. Transcript at 425, 426. At some point after 8:00, Lane got into the vehicle and sat in the back seat next to Derrington and behind Hooper. Hooper passed a bottle of Oxycontin to Lane, and Lane handed a Crown Royal bag filled with money to Derrington. Hooper directed Derrington to count the money. As Derrington began counting some of the money from the bag, he heard Lane's door open and saw the bag of remaining money move. Derrington grabbed the bag back but then realized that Lane had a gun. Lane started shooting as he exited the car. He first shot Derrington in the leg and then shot Hooper in the back near his right armpit as Hooper had his hands in the air. Lane shot Hooper at close range, with the shot coming from inside the car likely between the front passenger seat and the door frame.⁴ Neither Derrington nor Hooper were armed.

After the first two shots, Derrington fled from the car and Hurst retrieved his .38 caliber revolver from the glove box and fired four shots. At that point, Lane was standing outside and firing into the car. Lane shot Hurst in the chest during the crossfire. Lane also went around the back of the vehicle and shot at Derrington as he fled. Derrington was struck in the back by one of Lane's shots, which caused immediate and permanent paralysis. Lane then fled the scene. At some point, Hooper and Hurst also exited the car, but Hurst reentered and placed his revolver back in the glove box.⁵

Evansville police received the first dispatch call at 8:24. Upon arriving at the scene, officers found Hooper dead or near death behind Hurst's car, Derrington seriously injured on the ground near the driver's door, and Hurst injured in the driver's seat. There was also $4000 in cash strewn in the backseat and floorboard, along with a Crown Royal bag. Hurst immediately informed officers that he was armed. Both Hurst and Derrington identified the shooter as “Little Mike”. Derrington also indicated that he had Little Mike's phone number in his cell phone. After securing the scene, officers discovered that this number was 812–454–7192, which was Lane's number. Within an hour of the shooting, Derrington was presented with three photo arrays. Derrington, without hesitation, identified Lane from the third photo array. At the hospital, Hurst also identified Lane as the shooter but then expressed some brief hesitation. The following day, January 6, 2010, the State filed charges against Lane for murder, felony murder, two counts of attempted murder, and conspiracy to deal in a schedule II controlled substance.

Lane evaded capture until October 2011, when he was arrested in Chicago on the outstanding warrant. Detective Brent Melton traveled with two other officers to pick up Lane in Chicago. Melton read Lane his Miranda rights before transporting him back to Evansville. While talking with Melton on the drive back to Evansville, Lane adamantly stated that the money he brought to the scene was his own money, not David Clark's.

Lane's first jury trial commenced on August 7, 2012 but ended in a mistrial because only eleven jurors were selected following voir dire. The second trial commenced on October 8, 2012 and lasted five days. Among many other witnesses, Hurst and Derrington testified against Lane. The jury found Lane guilty of murder, two counts of criminal recklessness as a lesser-included offense of attempted murder, and conspiracy to commit murder.⁶ Before sentencing, Lane filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his tendered lesser-included-offense instruction on reckless homicide. The trial court denied this motion and subsequently sentenced Lane to an aggregate sentence of fifty-five years in prison. Lane now appeals. Additional facts will be provided below as needed.

1.

Lane argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense of murder. He claims a serious evidentiary dispute existed regarding his state of mind at the time of the shooting. Specifically, Lane argues that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that Hooper, Hurst, and Derrington ambushed Lane and that “Lane fired wildly in retreat to scare [them] away.” Appellant's Brief at 9. ⁷

When considering instructions on lesser-included offenses, a court must first determine whether the lesser offense is either inherently or factually included within the crime charged. Young v. State, 699 N.E.2d 252 (Ind.1998). It is well establishedthat reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder. Id. Accordingly, the next step in the analysis of whether the instruction should be given is “whether the evidence provided by both parties creates a serious evidentiary dispute about the element or elements which distinguish the greater from the lesser offense.” Id. at 255.

When an instruction is refused on grounds that a serious evidentiary dispute does not exist, as in the instant case, we reverse only upon an abuse of discretion. Young v. State, 699 N.E.2d 252. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Turner v. State, 751 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ind.Ct.App.2001), trans. denied.

The only difference between murder and reckless homicide is the mens rea the State must prove to obtain a conviction. Young v. State, 699 N.E.2d 252. Reckless homicide requires proof that he defendant acted recklessly, while murder requires knowing or intentional conduct. SeeI.C. § 35–42–1–5; I.C. § 35–42–1–1. Thus, the issue here is whether the evidence presented at trial by both parties created a serious evidentiary dispute about whether Lane knowingly or recklessly killed Hooper when he shot him in the back.⁸ The trial court answered this question in the negative, explaining:

the evidence in this case was that the shooter actually shot into the car, that there were three people in close proximity in that vehicle, I do not think there was any evidence to dispute the fact that whoever shot into that car did it in a knowing fashion and aware of what the consequences of that action would be[.]

Transcript at 773.

“A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35–41–2–2(b) (West, Westlaw current with all 2013 legislation). On the other hand, conduct is reckless if the actor engaged in said conduct “in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct.” I.C. § 35–41–2–2(c).

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found no serious evidentiary dispute regarding whether Lane knowingly or recklessly shot Hooper. The evidence presented at trial reveals that Lane shot Derrington and then Hooper (both unarmed) while exiting the car after a botched drug transaction. Lane shot Hooper in the back as Hooper sat in the front passenger seat with his hands up. The location of the wound on Hooper's body and the pathologist's description of the bullet's trajectory are consistent with Derrington's testimony of how and where Hooper was shot. After Derrington and Hooper were shot, Hurst returned fire and was then shot by Lane. The fact that Lane shot wildly in retreat once he was out of the vehicle and realized Hurst was firing back does not change the fact that...