Lane v. Watson

• Decision Date: 02 March 1889
• Citation: 17 A. 117,51 N.J.L. 186
• Parties: LANE et al. v. WATSON et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

17 A. 117

51 N.J.L. 186

LANE et al.

v. WATSON et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

March 2, 1889.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Rule to show cause why a new trial should not be granted.

The suit was brought on a promissory note dated New York, August 12, 1887, for $5,000, payable in New York, six months from date, made by the Passaic Bleachery, a corporation of this state, to the order of the defendants, and indorsed by them to the plaintiffs. It appeared that this note was made and indorsed in pursuance of a written contract between the plaintiffs and the Passaic Bleachery, to the effect that, for discounting the note, the plaintiffs should receive more than 6 per cent. per annum. The cause was tried at Passaic circuit, and a verdict directed to be found for the defendants.

J. D. Bedle and Barkalow, Pennington & Barkalow, for the rule. M. Dunn, contra.

BEASLEY, C. J. This was a New York transaction, and it was admitted that the law of that state was applicable to the affair. It was shown at the trial, and indeed was not disputed, that the money for which the note in question was given was loaned at a rate of interest more than 6 per cent., and the defendants contended that by a statute of New York such a contract was absolutely void. But the existence of an act of this character, and which was applicable to this case, was not shown at the trial. There was no evidence offered on the subject, and it was a mistake to suppose that the pleadings admitted a law to have been in force at the time this contract was entered into. The plea did nothing more than to allege that, by a certain statute of the state of New York, all loans on which should be reserved more interest than 6 per cent. per annum should be void, but it did not give the date of such enactment, nor was it averred that it existed when the agreement on which the defense relied was made. The replication did not, Therefore, admit by its silence on the subject anything more than the fact that such a law had been enacted; it did not admit its applicability to the case. From this obvious defect no legal defense to the action was exhibited at the trial. But, independently of this defect in the proofs, we likewise are of opinion that the defense was not established. That defense was the subsistence of usury in the contract, which, it was insisted, vitiated such contract by force of the New York statute. In reply to this contention the plaintiff pleaded and offered in evidence another statute of that...