Lane v. Williams Plant Servs.

• Decision Date: 18 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. A14A0895.,A14A0895.
• Citation: Lane v. Williams Plant Servs., 330 Ga.App. 416, 766 S.E.2d 482 (Ga. App. 2014)
• Parties: LANE v. WILLIAMS PLANT SERVICES et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

330 Ga.App. 416

766 S.E.2d 482

LANE

v.WILLIAMS PLANT SERVICES et al.

No. A14A0895.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Nov. 18, 2014.

Reconsideration Denied Dec. 16, 2014.

Certiorari Denied April 20, 2015.

Morgan & Morgan, Phillip M. Eddings, Brunswick, for appellant.

McClain & Merritt, Jeffrey E. Hickcox, Atlanta, for appellees.

Opinion

BOGGS, Judge.

In this discretionary appeal, Kenneth Lane, Sr., appeals from the superior court order affirming the decision of the Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation (“Appellate Division”), which had affirmed the decision of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Lane contends that the superior court erred by (1) concluding that no legal error resulted from the Appellate Division's determination that his request to reinstate income benefits was barred by the two-year statute of limitation and (2) in concluding that the Appellate Division did not err by finding that his employer was not liable for additional medical expenses. For the reasons explained below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand this case for additional findings.

In the absence of legal error, the factual findings of the Board must be affirmed by the superior court and by the Court of Appeals when supported by any evidence in the administrative record. Erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as decisions based on erroneous theories of law, however, are subject to the de novo standard of review.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) MARTA v. Thompson, 326 Ga.App. 631, 757 S.E.2d 228 (2014). “Where statutory provisions are ambiguous, courts should give great weight to the interpretation adopted by the administrative agency charged with enforcing the statute. [Cit.]” Cook v. Glover, 295 Ga. 495, 500, 761 S.E.2d 267 (2014). Courts should defer to an “agency interpretation so long as it comports with legislative intent and is reasonable.” Cook v. Glover, 295 Ga. 495, 500, 761 S.E.2d 267 (2014). This deference is provided to the Workers' Compensation Board's construction of workers' compensation statutes. See MARTA v. Reid, 295 Ga. 863, 867 n. 6, 763 S.E.2d 695 (2014).

So viewed, the record shows that Lane received a workers' compensation award in 2008 for a low back injury. In March 2010, Lane's employer suspended his income benefits and mailed its last payment of benefits (through March 10, 2010) to him before March 9, 2010.¹ On March 9, 2010, Lane moved for an “interlocutory recommencement of income benefits” in which he contended that “benefits were improperly suspended.”² The ALJ denied this motion based upon its determination

that there is not enough evidence on which to order a recommencement of income benefits. The only evidence presented was an old medical record that had been attached to a WC–104 filed the year before.... As a second reason for denying the request, I determine that this issue would be best handled by evidentiary hearing.

Despite this suggestion, Lane took no further action for almost two years. Then, on March 13, 2012, he filed a WC–14 notice of claim requesting a hearing on his request for reinstatement of income benefits from “July 1, 2010 and continuing.” Following a hearing, the ALJ issued an order concluding that Lane's request for reinstatement of income benefits was barred by the statute of limitation, finding as follows:

OCGA § 34–9–104(b) states:

[A]ny party may apply under this Code section for another decision because of a change in condition ending, decreasing, increasing, or authorizing the recovery of income benefits awarded or ordered in the prior final decision, provided ... that at the time of application not more than two years have elapsed since the date the last payment of income benefits pursuant to Code Section 34–9–261 or 34–9–262 was actually made under this chapter.

I find that the Employee must have received the March 1, 2010 WC–2 not long after that date, given that his motion to reinstate income benefits was filed on March 9, 2010, the day before his income benefits were to end. As found before, though benefits were suspended effective March 10, the last payment was mailed sometime before March 9. Under OCGA § 34–9–221(b), the date of mailing is considered the date of payment, if mailed from outside of Georgia. Based on this, I find that the date of the last payment of income benefits under this chapter was “actually made” was therefore sometime before March 9. At any rate, OCGA § 34–9–104(b) could not have meant for the limitations statute to begin running from the date the last payment of income benefits was actually received, or the Legislature would have said so, rather than saying “actually made. ” ...

Be that as it may, the Employee's request for a hearing reinstating income benefits was not made until March 13, 2012. Even considering the official suspension date of March 10, 2010 as being the date the payment was “actually made,” the WC–14 was filed more than two years after that date. But considering that the date payment was actually made was before that date, that puts the Employee's hearing request even further, however slightly further, outside the limitations period.

With regard to Lane's request for payment of certain medical expenses, the ALJ concluded that because Lane was discharged from treatment by his authorized physicians on April 13, 2010, he was entitled to seek treatment from a doctor of his own choosing and obtain reimbursement from his employer.

Lane appealed from the ALJ's adverse ruling on income benefits, and his employer filed a cross-appeal from the ALJ's determination that it was liable for Lane's medical expenses. The Appellate Division “agree[d] with the [ALJ] that the date of mailing is the date payment was actually made. See OCGA § 34–9–221(b).” It disagreed with the ALJ's ruling on the employer's liability for medical expenses, finding:

The preponderance of competent and credible evidence indicates that the Employer/Insurer did not terminate the Employee's medical treatment in this case, nor did the authorized physicians terminate care to the Employee. Under these circumstances, the Employee is not entitled to change physicians unilaterally and require the Employer/Insurer to be responsible for the medical expenses.

Lane filed an appeal in superior court, and that court affirmed the Appellate Division's conclusion regarding the statute of limitation, stating:

The agency charged with administering the Workers Compensation Act has determined that a payment of income benefits is deemed to have been made when an employer or insurer issues a check and mails it, rather than when an employee receives it. The Court finds no basis for rejecting that interpretation of the Act. Construing “payment” to occur when the party obligated to make it takes the last step it is required to do to make it is not inconsistent with the language of the statute. There are many statutes that required mailing to be done in a manner which generates proof of the date of receipt. If the General Assembly had intended the above-cited statute to require proof of receipt to trigger the running of the statute, it could have so provided.

The superior court also affirmed the Appellate Division's finding that the employer was not liable for Lane's medical expenses.

1. Lane contends that the determination that his claim for additional income benefits was time-barred is contrary to law. We disagree.

(a) As noted above, this court must give deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute “so long as it comports with legislative intent and is reasonable.” Cook, supra. We need not decide whether the so-called mailbox rule embodied in OCGA § 34–9–221(b)³ should be applied to the limitation period in OCGA § 34–9–104(b), because the Appellate Division's determination that a payment is “actually made” when it is mailed to the recipient is reasonable and entitled to deference.

(b) Lane asserts that our decision in Trent Tube v. Hurston, 261 Ga.App. 525, 583 S.E.2d 198 (2003), mandates the conclusion that a payment is “actually made” under OCGA § 34–9–104(b) when it is received by the employee. We disagree. In Trent Tube, neither the ALJ, the Appellate Division, nor this court addressed when a mailed payment is “actually made.” While this court stated that the statute of limitation under OCGA § 34–9–104(b) “does not begin to run until an employee receives his last payment,” 261 Ga.App. at 527(1), 583 S.E.2d 198, we do not know the form or method by which the employee received his payment in Trent Tube. We note that OCGA § 34–9–221(a) provides that “[p]ayments shall be made in cash, negotiable instrument, or, upon agreement of the parties, by electronic funds transfer.”

Additionally, the issue before us in Trent Tube was whether the statute could be interpreted to run from “the date on which [the employee] was no longer entitled to income benefits.” Id. at 526, 583 S.E.2d 198. In rejecting that argument, we stated,

The statute of limitation does not begin to run until an employee receives his last payment ... whether he is later determined to be entitled to [it] or not.... Here, the last payment was indisputably “actually made” to [the employee] on [a date certain] less than two years before he filed his change in condition claim.

Id. at 527 –528(1), 583 S.E.2d 198.

While OCGA § 34–9–104(b) could be reasonably interpreted to mean that a mailed payment is “actually made” when it is received by the employee, an equally reasonable interpretation is that such a payment is “actually made” when it is placed in the mail. Now that the Board has interpreted the phrase “actually made” in OCGA § 34–9–104(b) in the context of a mailed payment, we must defer to its reasonable interpretation. We therefore disapprove of any language in Trent Tube that can be construed as holding that a mailed payment is “actually made” when it is received by the employee.

(c) We cannot consider Lane's alternative argument that the motion he filed on March 9, 2010 should be construed as a...