Laney v. Continental Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-8328,84-8328 |
| Citation | 757 F.2d 1190 |
| Parties | Sarah Maxine LANEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Charles L. Day, Marietta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant.
James M. Poe, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before RONEY and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and TUTTLE, Senior Circuit Judge.
Sarah Maxine Laney instituted this action to recover benefits under an insurance policy issued by Continental Insurance Company (Continental) insuring her husband, Pat Laney, against death caused by accident. She appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granting Continental's motion for summary judgment and denying her motion for partial summary judgment. We find that the district court did not err in concluding that the policy language "caused by accident" comprehended an "accidental means" policy under Georgia law thereby precluding recovery for Mrs. Laney. Accordingly, we affirm.
On July 6, 1982, Pat Laney died at his home in Cobb County, Georgia. Because the death was sudden and unexpected, the Cobb County Medical Examiner's office performed an autopsy on Laney on July 7, 1982. A sample of Laney's blood tested by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation Division of Forensic Sciences evidenced a positive blood alcohol level of .47 grams percent. The death certificate listed "acute ethanol intoxication (poisoning)" as the cause of death.
At the time of his death, Laney was insured against death caused by accident under a policy issued by Continental in the principal sum of $150,000.00. The policy covered "loss ... resulting directly and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries caused by accident occurring while this policy is in force." Mrs. Laney was the named beneficiary of the policy.
After Continental refused to pay benefits under the policy pursuant to demand, Mrs. Laney brought this action in the State Court of Cobb County. Continental subsequently removed the case to the district court on diversity of citizenship grounds. After entering into a stipulation of facts, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Neither party disputed that Laney voluntarily and intentionally consumed the whiskey and beer that caused his death. It was also undisputed that there was no evidence to suggest that Laney intended death to result from the consumption of the alcohol. The district court granted Continental's motion and denied Mrs. Laney's motion.
The issue before us on appeal concerns the construction to be given the policy language "caused by accident." Georgia law distinguishes between the terms "accidental injury" and "injuries resulting from accidental means." Jackson v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 130 Ga.App. 208, 209, 202 S.E.2d 711, 712 (1973); Johnson v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co., 92 Ga.App. 818, 819, 90 S.E.2d 36, 37 (1955). As the Georgia Court of Appeals stated in Johnson:
There is a very definite distinction between 'accidental injuries' and 'injuries resulting from accidental means.' Where an injury is unexpected but arises from a voluntary action it is an 'accidental injury,' but for an injury to result from accidental means, it must be the unexpected result of an unforeseen or unexpected act which was involuntarily and unintentionally done.
92 Ga.App. at 819, 90 S.E.2d at 37 (citations omitted). " 'Where an unusual or unexpected result occurs, by reason of the doing of an intentional act, with no mischance, slip or mishap occurring in doing the act itself, the ensuing injury or death is not caused by accidental means.' " Jackson, 130 Ga.App. at 209, 202 S.E.2d at 712 (citation omitted). Mrs. Laney argues that "caused by accident" is the legal and grammatical equivalent of "accidental injury," thereby requiring only that the result, i.e., death, be unexpected. Continental, on the other hand, maintains that the policy language must be equated with "accidental means" such that both the cause of the harm, i.e., ingestion of alcohol, and the result must be unexpected, accidental or unintentional. If Georgia insurance law construes "caused by accident" to be the same as "accidental means," the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper because the parties do not dispute that Laney voluntarily and intentionally consumed the alcoholic beverages that caused his death.
The appellant contends that the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Johnson establishes that "caused by accident" is the equivalent of "accidental injury." In Johnson, the insured died following a voluntary injection of 600,000 units of penicillin. The plaintiff-appellant, the beneficiary of six insurance policies issued to the insured, brought suit to recover benefits under these policies. Three of the policies provided extra benefits for the death of the insured if death resulted from "bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means." One of the policies provided indemnity for "death by accidental means." The two remaining policies paid benefits for "death due to bodily injury which was 'effected accidentally and through external and violent means.' " The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the petition. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment with respect to those policies which required that death be the result of accidental means. The appeals court, however, held that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer as to the two policies covering death "effected accidentally and through external and violent means." In the court's view, the petition alleged sufficient facts to show that the insured's death was accidental. Id. 92 Ga.App. at 820, 90 S.E.2d at 38. Mrs. Laney claims that the effect of the Johnson decision was to equate the term "effected accidentally" with "accidental injury," such that only the result of the action need be unexpected or unforeseen. As "effected accidentally" and "caused by accident" are synonymous, the appellant urges that the district court erred in holding that "caused by accident" includes death by "accidental means."
Although Johnson would seem to indicate a view contrary to that of the district court, a more recent decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia read the "accidental means" test into a policy providing coverage for losses arising "as a result of bodily injury caused solely by accident." In Continental Assurance Co. v. Rothell, 227 Ga. 258, 181 S.E.2d 283 (1971), the...
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