Laney v. Hosp. Bd. Of Dir.S Of Lee County

• Decision Date: 14 December 2010
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:09-cv-678-FtM-29SPC
• Citation: Laney v. Hosp. Bd. of Dirs. of Lee Cnty., Case No. 2:09-cv-678-FtM-29SPC (M.D. Fla. Dec 14, 2010)
• Parties: KRISTINA LANEY, Plaintiff, v. HOSPITAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LEE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, corporation doing business as Lee Memorial Health System, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

KRISTINA LANEY, Plaintiff,

v. HOSPITAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF LEE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, corporation doing business as Lee Memorial Health System, Defendant.

Case No. 2:09-cv-678-FtM-29SPC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

Date: December 14, 2010

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Hospital Board of Directors of Lee County's Motion to Dismiss Count I of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Doc. #47.) Plaintiff Kristina Laney filed a Response. (Doc. #50.) Also before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #51), to which a Response (Doc. #59) was filed on October 18, 2010. The dispositive issue as to both motions is whether plaintiff has a cause of action for violation of her federal constitutional right to procedural due process of law based upon the termination of her employment with the Lee Memorial Health System. As to this issue, there are no material disputed facts, so the matter may be resolved under either motion. The Court has considered the legal memoranda submitted in connection with the summary judgment motion as to this issue, but resolves the matter on the motion to dismiss.

I.

Kristina Laney (Laney or plaintiff) filed a one-count Amended Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (Doc. #46) (the Amended Complaint). The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are as follows: Defendant Hospital Board of Directors of Lee County (hereafter Lee Memorial Health System)¹ is a legislatively created political subdivision of the State of Florida which is a special taxing district operating hospitals within Lee County, Florida. From February 1987 through April 17, 2009, plaintiff was employed by the Lee Memorial Health System or its predecessor, most recently as a respiratory therapist at Health Park Medical Center. Plaintiff was terminated on April 17, 2009, based upon allegations of insubordination, poor judgment, poor attitude towards co-workers, not following department policy, and patient safety. Plaintiff's termination was upheld following a June 24, 2009 internal Grievance Hearing. Plaintiff asserts that this Grievance Hearing violated her due process rights because allegations were made against her in addition to those contained in her April 17 notice of termination; all testimony was unsworn; many allegations were supported solely by hearsay; she was not allowed to compel attendance of witnesses; and witnesses helpful to Plaintiff were limited in number, were scheduled for work in such a way to make their appearances virtually impossible, or were told by defendant's personnel that they were not required to attend. Plaintiff claims, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that she was thereby deprived of her constitutionally protected property interest in her public employment without due process.

II.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit has recently held that cases brought under § 1983 are governed by the same motion to dismiss standards as other civil cases. Randall, 610 F.3d at 710. "To survive dismissal, the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggest that the [plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a speculative level; if they do not, the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed." James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng'g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008)(citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)); see also Edwards v. Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). The Court need not accept legal conclusions which are set forth in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Dismissal is warranted if, assuming the truthof the factual allegations of plaintiff's complaint, there is a dispositive legal issue which precludes relief. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989); Brown v. Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1009-10 (11th Cir. 1992).

In this case, the dispositive legal issue is whether plaintiff has a cause of action for violation of her federal constitutional right to procedural due process of law based upon the termination of her employment with the Lee Memorial Health System. Plaintiff agrees that a motion to dismiss is the proper procedural vehicle to resolve this legal issue. (Doc. #50, p. 3.) The resolution of the issue, in turn, depends upon whether plaintiff had a constitutionally protected property interest in her employment with the Lee Memorial Health System, and if so, whether she has an adequate state remedy for termination of the employment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that plaintiff had no property interest in her employment with the Lee Memorial Health System and, in any event, did have an adequate state remedy. Therefore, the motion to dismiss will be granted for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

III.

Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under color of state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A party who asserts a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must allege and ultimately prove that (1) plaintiff was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) the person who deprived her of that right acted under color of state law, and (3) there was a causal connection between the constitutional violation and defendant's acts or omissions. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999); Troupe v. Sarasota County, Fla., 419 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2005); Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001)(en banc). Only the first element is at issue in the motion to dismiss.

The constitutional right at issue in this case is the right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees each citizen that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...." U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has determined that the Due Process Clause provides both procedural and substantive rights. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005). The substantive due process component protects an individual's life, liberty and property against "certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). Substantive due process protects only those rights that are "fundamental, " that is, rights that are so implicitin the concept of ordered liberty that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed. Moore, 410 F.3d at 1342-43. "Fundamental rights are those rights created by the Constitution." Greenbriar Vill., L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook City, 345 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2003). "[E]mployment rights are state-created rights and are not 'fundamental rights' created by the Constitution, " and therefore are only protected under the procedural, rather than substantive, component of the Due Process Clause. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).

Plaintiff alleges that she was deprived of her federal constitutional right to procedural due process. "In this circuit, a § 1983 claim alleging a denial of procedural due process requires proof of three elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process." Arrington v. Helms, 438 F.3d 1336, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006)(citing Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also Bradsheer v. Florida Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 20 So. 3d 915, 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Even if plaintiff alleges and satisfies these elements, she cannot state a federal procedural due process claim if adequate state remedies are available to her. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1562-64; Walton v. Health Care Dist., 862 So. 2d 852, 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). "It is the state's failure to provideadequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim." Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000).

This rule (that a section 1983 claim is not stated unless inadequate state procedures exist to remedy an alleged procedural deprivation) recognizes that the state must have the opportunity to "remedy the procedural failings of its subdivisions and agencies in the appropriate fora-agencies, review boards, and state courts" before being subjected to a claim alleging a procedural due process violation.

Id. Plaintiff's case, therefore, hinges on whether she has a property interest in her employment under Florida law and whether she has an adequate state remedy available to challenge her termination.

A. Property Interest in Public Employment in Florida

Plaintiff alleges that she had a property interest in her employment with Lee Memorial Health System. If she is incorrect, there can be no denial of due process. Economic Dev. Corp. v. Stierheim, 782 F.2d 952, 953-54 (11th Cir. 1986). It is undisputed that plaintiff was employed by the Lee Memorial Health System. It is also undisputed that Lee Memorial Health System is a public body, and therefore a "public" employer within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment case law. Neither party disputes that plaintiff was an employee in the ordinary sense of the word, and was therefore a "public employee" engaged in "public employment" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment case law. The Courtlooks to state law to determine whether such public...