Laney v. United States

• Decision Date: 03 December 1923
• Docket Number: 4000.
• Parties: LANEY v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

294 F. 412

LANEY v. UNITED STATES.

No. 4000.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.

December 3, 1923

Submitted November 8, 1923.

Rehearing Denied December 21, 1923.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

James A. Cobb, William L. Houston, and Royal A. Hughes, all of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Peyton Gordon, of Washington, D.C., for the United States.

Before SMYTH, Chief Justice, VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice, and MARTIN, presiding Judge of the Court of Customs Appeals.

VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justice.

This appeal is from a verdict and judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, adjudging appellant, defendant below, guilty of the crime of manslaughter. The indictment charged the defendant with the crime of murder in the first degree, growing out of the killing of one Kenneth Crall during a race riot in Washington on July 21, 1919.

The defense interposed was self-defense, and a large number of assignments of error are based upon the refusal of the court to grant certain prayers offered by the defendant relating to the law of self-defense. The court instructed the jury on this subject, but we think it will be unnecessary for us to consider the assignments of error in relation to the prayers offered, since in our opinion, viewing the evidence in the most favorable aspect, self-defense does not enter into the case.

Defendant testified as follows:

'On the night of the 21st of July, 1919, I went to the theater with Mattie Burke, and came back and went up on Seventh street at the request of Teresa Dobbins, to get Florence and Garfield Wood. On my return to 617 Massachusetts avenue, as I got to the corner where the Home Savings Bank is located, a large crowd that was there started to yelling 'Catch the nigger.' and 'Kill the nigger.' and started to chase me. I ran ahead of them down Massachusetts avenue. When I got near to 617 Massachusetts avenue, I pulled out my gun and the crowd stopped chasing me. I went into the back yard, and while trying to fix the safety on my gun it went off. I then put the gun in my pocket and went to the front again, intending to go back to my place of employment. The mob was attacking a house across the street, and were coming both ways on Massachusetts avenue, from the direction of Sixth and from the direction of Seventh street. * * * While I was in the areaway between 617 and 619, the mob came across from the south side of the street, firing and hollering 'Let's kill the nigger.' The mob was firing at me, and I shot in the direction towards Seventh street. I fired to protect my life. I fired three shots. My pistol had eight bullets in it at first. There were four bullets in it when it was taken by the officials; three bullets having been fired in the front yard and one in the back yard.' The witness Mattie Burke testified, in relation to the movements of the defendant, as follows:

'Later he came running back, with a mob chasing him, throwing sticks and stones at him, hollering 'Catch the nigger!' I think Mr. Laney had his gun in his hand while he was running, but I did not see him do anything with it. He ran into the areaway between 615 and 617. The crowd, consisting of 100 or more men, then started after a house on the opposite side of the street. At that time William Laney went into the back yard and tried his gun. I was with him in the back yard at the time. Then we came out to the front again. After attacking the house on the opposite side of the street, the mob gathered in the car track as though they were coming toward 617, and then Laney fired his gun. After Laney had escaped through the back way, the crowd began to break into the house, and then I escaped myself over the back fence, and I did not see any more.'

It is clearly apparent from the above testimony that, when defendant escaped from the mob into the back yard of the Ferguson place, he was in a place of comparative safety, from which, if he desired to go home, he could have gone by the back way, as he subsequently did. The mob had turned its attention to a house on the opposite side of the street. According to Laney's testimony, there was shooting going on in the street. His appearance on the street at that juncture could mean nothing but trouble for him. Hence, when he adjusted his gun and stepped out into the areaway, he had every reason to believe that his presence there would provoke trouble. We think his conduct in adjusting his revolver and going into the areaway was such as to deprive him of any right to invoke the plea of self-defense. Of course, the extent to which a person assailed may go, under a given state of facts involving self-defense, is always a question of fact for the jury; but whether or not self-defense can be invoked under the evidence adduced is a question of law for the court to determine. If the facts, in the judgment of the court, are not such as to admit of this defense, the issue should not be left to the mere speculation of the jury.

It is a well-settled rule that, before a person can avail himself of the plea of self-defense against the charge of homicide, he must do everything in his power, consistent with his safety, to avoid the danger and avoid the necessity of taking life. If one has reason to believe that he will be attacked, in a manner which threatens him with bodily injury, he must avoid the attack if it is possible to do so, and the right of self-defense does not arise until he has done everything in his power to prevent its necessity. In other words, no necessity for killing an assailant can exist, so long as there is a safe way open to escape the conflict. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 Sup.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528; Lee v. State, 92 Ala. 15, 9 So. 407, 25 Am.St.Rep. 17; People v. Kennedy, 159 N.Y. 346, 54 N.E. 51, 70 Am.St.Rep. 557.

We are aware of the wide diversity of opinion as to the duty to retreat, but this difference arises from the circumstances of the particular case under consideration, rather than from any difference of conception as to the rule...