Lanford v. Prince George's County, Md
| Decision Date | 26 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.DKC 2001-2614.,CIV.A.DKC 2001-2614. |
| Citation | 199 F.Supp.2d 297 |
| Parties | Danyale LANFORD v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD, et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
John Eric Smathers, McGowan Cecil and Smathers LLC, Laurel, MD, for Plaintiff.
Laura J. Gwinn, Office of Law for Prince George's County, Upper Marlboro, MD, Daniel Karp, Allen Karpinski Bryant and Karp PA, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.
Walter L. Blair, Blair and Lee PC, College Park, MD, for Movant.
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights case are the motions of (1) Defendants Mayor and the City Council of Cheverly and Larry Beyna to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, to bifurcate, (2) Defendants Prince George's County, Maryland and Prince George's County, Maryland, Department of Corrections, to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and (3) Plaintiff, Danyale Lanford, for leave to amend his complaint. The issues are fully briefed and the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing being deemed necessary. For the reasons that follow, the motions will be granted in part and denied in part.
The following facts are alleged in the complaint (and proposed amended complaint) by the Plaintiff. On or about June 8, 2000, Lanford was a front seat passenger in a vehicle driven by Anthony Campbell in Cheverly, Maryland.1 Officer Andre Owens, a Town of Cheverly police officer, attempted to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation and Campbell accelerated, in an attempt to evade Owens, without Lanford's consent. Campbell proceeded onto Route 50 at an approximate speed of 80 miles per hour. He continued fleeing, nearly striking other objects or vehicles, until the vehicle was eventually stopped by Owens. Campbell and Lanford were apprehended by Owens and Defendant John Doe # 1, a Prince George's County police officer.
Lanford was seized, handcuffed, detained, and arrested although he did not commit an offense. He was handcuffed with his hands behind his back. As he was being walked to the cruiser by Doe # 1, Doe # 1 threw Lanford to the ground causing him to hit his head on the ground. This resulted in a fracture of three vertebrae in his cervical spine. Lanford immediately screamed in pain and complained that his neck was injured. Owens and Doe # 1 ignored his pleas. Lanford was transported to the Cheverly Police Department by Owens, where he was booked and processed, despite his continued pleas for help. Lanford was presented to the Commissioner and a $10,000 bond was set. He spent three days and two nights in the Prince George's County Detention Center.
In the Detention Center, Lanford continually complained of pain in his neck, stating that he could not sleep and could barely move or walk. He was eventually taken to the detention center doctor, John Doe # 2, who, after being told of his condition, gave Lanford Tylenol and told him to take a shower. After he was released from custody, he went immediately to a hospital where he underwent eight hours of surgery for a fractured cervical spine at C3, C4, and C5 vertebrae. During the surgery, bone was removed from Lanford's hip and permanently fused to his spine with metal rods and screws. Lanford was in a neck brace for six months following surgery. Lanford continues to experience shooting pain from his neck, lives with daily pain in his neck and arms and his physical activities will be permanently limited. He has been told by doctors that he will suffer from arthritis in the future and will have a limited range of motion in his neck. Lanford is no longer able to perform any jobs that require strenuous physical activity and was forced to resign his position as a grounds keeper with the Town of Fairmont Heights.
The remaining claims in the original complaint are as follows: Count One — a federal civil rights violation against John Doe # 1 and Owens; Count Two — a civil rights violation against the County and Cheverly; Count Three — Maryland civil rights violations against Doe # 1 and Owens; Count Four — Maryland civil rights violations against the County and Cheverly; Count Five — assault claim against Doe # 1 and Owens; Count Six — battery claim against Doe # 1 and Owens; Count Seven — false arrest claim against Doe # 1 and Owens; Count Eight — false imprisonment claim against Doe # 1 and Owens; Count Nine — malicious prosecution claim against Owens; Count Ten — federal civil rights claim based on medical needs against Doe # 1, Owens, and Doe # 2; and Count Eleven — vicarious liability against the County and Cheverly. Plaintiff seeks to add as proposed Count Twelve — negligence claim against Owens and Doe # 1, Count Thirteen — negligence claim against Doe # 2; and Count Fourteen — claim for negligent hiring, training and retention against the County and Cheverly.
A party may move for leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) and "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). The general standard in making this determination is:
If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). As emphasized by the Fourth Circuit: "Foman's enumeration of factors ... embody a principle which focuses on prejudice or futility or bad faith as the only legitimate concerns in denying leave to amend, since only these truly relate to protection of the judicial system or other litigants." Davis v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 615 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir.1980).
A Rule 12(b)(6) challenge requires a court to accept all well-pled allegations of the complaint as true and to construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir.1997). Such a motion ought not be granted unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The court, however, need not accept unsupported legal allegations, Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir.1989), or conclusory factual allegations devoid of any reference to actual events. United Black Firefighters v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.1979). Nevertheless, neither vagueness nor lack of detail is a sufficient ground on which to grant a motion to dismiss. Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 78 F.Supp.2d 764, 775 (N.D.Ill.1999) (quoting Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir.1985)).
Rule 12(b) states:
If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Lanford seeks leave to amend his complaint in part to recognize the remand of claims concerning the driver of the car, Anthony Campbell, to state court and to correct the misnomer of defendants. In addition, despite the presence of already redundant and overlapping claims in the original complaint, Plaintiff seeks to add three negligence counts. None of the defendants oppose Lanford's motion to delete the counts pertaining to Campbell, to dismiss Prince George's County Department of Corrections as a named Defendant, and to substitute the Mayor and City Council of Cheverly, Maryland for Larry Beyna as a named Defendant. Prince George's County and Cheverly oppose the addition of negligence claims against Andre Owens and other unnamed individuals, and a negligent hiring, retention, and training claim against Prince George's County.
Defendants argue that adding Counts XII — Negligence against Owens and Doe # 1, and XIII — Negligence against Doe # 2, would be futile because public officials cannot be held liable for negligent performance of their discretionary functions. Similarly, the municipal defendants argue that adding proposed Count XIV — Negligent Hiring, Training and Retention against Prince George's County and the Town of Cheverly, would be futile because they are immune from liability for governmental acts or omissions. See Lovelace v. Anderson, 366 Md. 690, 785 A.2d 726, 734 (2001) ().
Plaintiff responds that municipalities may be held liable under respondeat superior for the negligent acts of its employees. See Id. at 635, 785 A.2d 726 ().
Under Maryland law, "[o]nce it is established that the individual is a public official and the tort was committed while performing a duty which involves the exercise of discretion, a qualified immunity attaches; namely, in the absence of malice, the...
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