Lang v. American Motors Corporation

• Decision Date: 15 June 1966
• Docket Number: No. 65-C-163.,65-C-163.
• Citation: 254 F. Supp. 892
• Parties: Hilary D. LANG, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, a Maryland corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

254 F. Supp. 892

Hilary D. LANG, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN MOTORS CORPORATION, a Maryland corporation, Defendant.

No. 65-C-163.

United States District Court E. D. Wisconsin.

June 15, 1966.

David L. Walther, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiff.

Herbert P. Wiedemann, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

REYNOLDS, District Judge.

This case is before the court on plaintiff's motion to remand to the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County.

On May 21, 1965, plaintiff commenced an action for monetary damages in the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County. The complaint alleges that plaintiff is a resident of Milwaukee County in the State of Wisconsin, and that the defendant is a Maryland corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing heavy goods, with its office and principal place of business in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. It further alleges that plaintiff was discharged from defendant's employ in violation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement which had been entered into between the defendant and plaintiff's bargaining agent, Local 75, U.A.W., A.F.L.-C.I.O.

Defendant filed a timely petition for removal to this court on the ground that plaintiff's action is a civil action in which the United States District Courts have original jurisdiction, in that said action is a suit for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 142 and 185. Defendant's verified petition, accompanied by bond and timely notice, was served upon the Clerk of the Circuit Court and plaintiff's counsel. On June 18, 1965, plaintiff filed a notice of motion to remand this action to the State court.

Section 1441 of 28 U.S.C.A. authorizes removal of a civil action from a State court to the United States District Court under the following circumstances (insofar as here relevant):

"(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

"(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. * * *"

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which is 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a), confers original jurisdiction on the district court as follows:

"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."

This action must be remanded unless it is a case arising under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, in which event it falls within the original jurisdiction of this court. This case arises under the laws of the United States, coming within this court's original jurisdiction if it falls within the scope of 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).

Plaintiff contends that this case does not come within the federal district court's original jurisdiction and therefore is not removable from a State court to this court, since the complaint does not allege that the labor organization in question represents employees in an industry affecting commerce. Plaintiff argues that whenever federal jurisdiction rests upon a federal question, the federal question must be disclosed in its entirety upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the petition for removal. In other words, plaintiff feels that the operation of the removal statutes may be circumvented in the present case by the simple expediency of omitting from the face of the complaint any allegations of interstate commerce.

Defendant contends that the law of removability of a case from a State court whose jurisdiction is concurrent with original federal jurisdiction is dependent upon whether the State court, if it heard the cause, would be obliged to apply only federal law, or whether it could apply State law.

If the State court could...