Lang v. Birch Shipping Co., 78 Civ. 3963 (CHT).

• Decision Date: 29 September 1981
• Docket Number: No. 78 Civ. 3963 (CHT).,78 Civ. 3963 (CHT).
• Citation: 523 F. Supp. 1112
• Parties: Gary LANG, Plaintiff, v. BIRCH SHIPPING COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

523 F. Supp. 1112

Gary LANG, Plaintiff, v.BIRCH SHIPPING COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 78 Civ. 3963 (CHT).

United States District Court, S. D. New York.

September 29, 1981.

Paul C. Matthews, New York City, for plaintiff.

William M. Kimball, New York City, for defendant.

OPINION

TENNEY, District Judge.

At the end of a six-day trial, the jury returned a special verdict which stated that the defendant was 75% responsible for the plaintiff's injuries, that the plaintiff was 25% contributorily negligent, and that the total damages were $100,000, thus leaving the plaintiff with a judgment for $75,000 against the defendant.The plaintiff, at this time, moves for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule")50(b) on the grounds that the jury's award was clearly inadequate and that the finding of contributory negligence was unsupported by any evidence.

The plaintiff, Gary Lang, was an able-bodied seaman aboard the SS Point Julie, a grain-carrying tanker, from January 31, 1978 when she was being loaded in Philadelphia, until April 23, 1978 when Lang left the ship in New Orleans.This period included approximately three weeks in March when the Point Julie's cargo of grain was unloaded in Alexandria, Egypt.Mr. Lang testified that the ship's atmosphere was constantly full of grain dust, especially during the loading and unloading; that the ventilation system was broken, allowing grain dust to enter his cabin; that the shipping company failed to provide adequate masks or other protective devices; and that as a result of his exposure to grain dust, he has suffered chronic obstructive pulmonary disease which renders him permanently disabled.The plaintiff offered expert testimony to corroborate his medical condition and to estimate his loss of earnings, past and future.

Through cross-examination and several of its own witnesses, the defendant urged that the grain dust was not unreasonable; that the safety precautions were adequate; that safety masks were available to those who wanted them, at least until the last few days of unloading; that the plaintiff could have taken additional precautions to minimize his illness, including using the available masks and leaving the ship; and that plaintiff's damage claims were grossly inflated in light of his diabetes, sinusitis, and history of working fewer months per year than he claimed.In response to this motion, defendant adds that the jury acted reasonably in awarding damages in light of the weaknesses in the plaintiff's expert's estimates.Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's New Trial Motion("Defendant's Brief")at 1-3.

On a motion for a new trial, the Court is governed by the following words of the Second Circuit:

The trial judge, exercising a mature judicial discretion, should view the verdict in the overall setting of the trial; consider the character of the evidence and the complexity or simplicity of the legal principles which the jury was bound to apply to the facts; and abstain from interfering with the verdict unless it is quite clear that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result.The judge's duty is essentially to see that there is no miscarriage of justice.If convinced that there has been then it is his duty to set the verdict aside; otherwise not.

Bevevino v. Saydjari,574 F.2d 676, 684(2d Cir.1978), quoting 6A Moore's Federal Practice and Procedure¶ 59.085, at 59-160 to -161 (1979)(footnotes omitted);Compton v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp.,425 F.2d 1130(2d Cir.), cert. denied,400 U.S. 916, 91 S.Ct. 175, 27 L.Ed.2d 155(1970).The plaintiff is correct that the standard for granting a new trial is considerably more lenient than the standard for granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict: a new trial may be granted where the court finds the verdict to be against the weight of the evidence, whereas a directed verdict or judgment n. o. v. requires a legal conclusion that the movant is entitled to judgment regardless of the credibility of the witnesses.Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial("Plaintiff's Memorandum")at 3.This distinction, however, does not give the trial court a free hand to throw out jury verdicts until its own view is adopted by a subsequent jury.To the contrary, as a general rule, "the court should avoid substituting its judgment for that of the jury."6A Moore's, supra, at 59-169.Furthermore, the opinion in Bevevino v. Saydjari, supra, reinforces the propriety of deferring to jury findings.There, the court of appeals ruled that "the district court was not required to grant a new trial simply because he disagreed with the jury."574 F.2d at 685.

In ruling on a motion for a new trial because of inadequate damages, the court"must apply the same standard as in determining whether a liability verdict is against the weight of the evidence."University Marketing and Consulting, Inc. v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co.,413 F.Supp. 1250, 1264(E.D.Pa.1976)(footnote omitted).In another case involving a claim of inadequate damages, the court wrote:

We are ever mindful that a jury's verdict should not be disturbed except in unusually persuasive circumstances where gross injustice ensues, that the Court should not substitute its own estimate of damages for that announced by the jury; that a jury's verdict should not be disturbed because it was not as generous as the facts in the case warranted....Where, however, as here, the Court's conscience is shocked by the jury's grossly inadequate award, ... it becomes the bounden duty of the Court to interfere lest a grave injustice result.

Centrowitz v. Texaco, Inc.,49 F.R.D. 142, 143(S.D.N.Y.1969).In Centrowitz, the jury found the defendant liable to the plaintiffs, and then arrived at a very low damage figure.It awarded $8,200 to one plaintiff who was unrefutably hit with tremendous force by the defendant's automobile, and it made no award to the victim's husband's estate which had incurred large expenses as a result of the accident.In an even more dramatic case, the court set aside a verdict of $2,340 which was awarded to the parents of an 18-year-old boy killed in a motorcycle accident for which the jury found he bore no responsibility.Feinberg v. Mathai,60 F.R.D. 69(E.D.Pa.1973).In short, before a court may set aside an award of damages as inadequate, the inadequacy must be patent and severe, such that leaving the verdict undisturbed would be an unconscionable miscarriage of justice.

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