Lang v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Decision Date | 30 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | CV-21-1955-PHX-DWL (JFM) |
| Parties | Shamika Lang, Plaintiff v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security which denied her disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under the Social Security Act.
This matter is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(10), Local Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following two prior unsuccessful disability applications (with hearings in August 2016 and August 2019) Plaintiff has asserted that she became disabled as of September 2019, when she was 41 years old, due to spinal pain, leg arthritis, headaches anxiety, and mood disorders. She has past work as a cashier, a warehouse worker, a banker, a caregiver, and a customer service representative.
At her hearing, Plaintiff testified that her disability primarily arose from her mental health (depression, bipolar disorder) and chronic pain. (AR 51.) She testified to pain arising from various spinal/musculoskeletal impairments (left leg, spinal). (AR 52-53.) In addition, the ALJ questioned her about her migraines. (AR 53-55.)
In a decision issued July 13, 2021, the ALJ found Plaintiff generally eligible for benefits given her date last insured, and non-employment. The ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: depressive disorder; personality disorder; cervical degenerative disc disease; lumbar degenerative disc disease; left knee osteoarthritis; and migraines. The ALJ also found the following a non-severe impairment of hip osteoarthritis, and a non-medically determinable impairment of limited memory or cognition. The ALJ found no combination of impairments that established disability under the listings, including none on the basis of spinal disorders, extremity impairment, migraines, mental impairments or obesity. The ALJ found Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, except she had the following additional limitations:
the claimant can lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and has no limitations in her ability to sit, stand or walk throughout an 8 hour workday. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and she can occasionally stoop, kneel, balance (as defined in the Selective Characteristics of Occupations of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles), crouch, and crawl, but she can never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She is not capable of working where she would be exposed to excessive vibration, or to excessive noise or bright, flashing lights exceeding what is generally encountered in an office-type work environment. The claimant is limited to working in non-hazardous environments, i.e., no driving at work, operating moving machinery, working at unprotected heights, and she should avoid concentrated exposure to unguarded hazardous machinery. The claimant is further limited to simple, routine tasks, work involving no more than simple decision-making, no more than occasional and minor changes in the work setting, and work requiring the exercise of only simple judgment. She is not capable of multitasking, or work requiring considerable self-direction. She can work at an average production pace, but not at a significantly above average or highly variable pace. She is further precluded from work involving direct public service, in person or over the phone, although the claimant can tolerate brief and superficial interaction with the public which is incidental to her primary job duties. She is unable to work in crowded, hectic environments. The claimant can tolerate brief and superficial interaction with supervisors and co-workers, but is not to engage in tandem tasks.
(AR 27-28 (emphasis added).)[1] Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (a) rejecting Plaintiff's symptoms testimony without adequate reasons; and (b) failing to support the residual functional capacity determination with substantial evidence. Thus, Plaintiff seeks a reversal and remand for award of benefits.
Reviewed Decision - In this instance, because the Appeals Council denied review (AR 2), the ALJ's decision is the final decision of the agency, and the decision now under review. 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
Bases for Reversal - The court may set aside the agency's disability determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007).
The phrase “substantial evidence” is a “term of art” used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains sufficient evidence to support the agency's factual determinations. And whatever the meaning of “substantial” in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is more than a mere scintilla. It means-and means only-such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (quotations, alterations and citations omitted).
Limited to ALJ's Reasoning - In reviewing the ALJ's decision, neither the parties nor the Court can manufacture their own reasons to support the decision made by the ALJ. “We review only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). But in identifying the ALJ's reasons, the Court is not constrained solely by the ALJ's organization of his opinion, and can make reasonable inferences reading the decision as a whole. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by rejecting her symptoms testimony because the ALJ: (a) failed to provide specific reasons, instead referring generically to “alleged symptoms” and summarizing portions of the medical records; (b) required entire consistency with or corroboration between her symptoms testimony and the medical and other evidence; (c) relied on the waxing and waning of physical (including back and leg pain, and migraines) and mental symptoms, which is not a clear and convincing reason to reject symptoms testimony; (d) dismissed recognized instances in the record that supported the symptoms testimony, while relying on other portions of the same records without reconciliation, or while relying on outdated records; (e) failed to explain (and was not qualified to explain) how the negative findings identified impugned the symptoms testimony; (f) relied on temporary relief from treatment; (g) failed to show activities of daily living translated into a work capable persistence and pace; (h) relied on Plaintiff's use of an unprescribed action (elevating her leg) to obtain pain relief. Plaintiff argues that had her symptoms testimony been accepted then, according to the vocational expert's testimony, she would have been unemployable.
The Commissioner argues: (a) the ALJ provided multiple specific, clear and convincing reasons to reject the symptoms testimony, including inconsistency with the objective medical evidence; (b) evidence suggesting the variability of symptoms was subject to more than one rational interpretation; (c) Plaintiff's mental health symptoms were properly rejected on the basis of inconsistency with Plaintiff's activities of daily living, and repeated reports to care providers and their findings; (d) the ALJ properly relied upon a correlation between Plaintiff's mental health symptoms and her returning to work, and the conclusion that they were reactions to the stress of working rather than medical impairment, failure to comply with treatment, and reports that her termination from work were layoffs rather than disability; (e) the ALJ properly relied upon normal MRI imaging and examinations to reject her spinal and leg pain; (f) the ALJ properly relied on the fact that Plaintiff's conditions had not worsened since she was previously denied disability benefits; (g) the ALJ properly relied upon Plaintiff's improvement in physical symptoms with treatment, including surgery, epidural injections; (h) the ALJ properly relied on the lack of medical prescription for elevating her legs on a prolonged basis; (i) the ALJ properly relied on Plaintiff's conservative or limited treatment, and limited medical findings to support reliance on the waxing and waning of complaints; (j) the ALJ properly relied on effective treatment to reject symptoms testimony on headaches; (k) the ALJ properly relied on activities of daily living; and (1) the ALJ properly considered both favorable and disfavorable findings in the medical record.
The law recognizes that pain is inherently subjective, is (in the current state of medical science) all but impossible to measure, and is difficult to verbalize. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has established a two-step analysis for determining the extent to which a claimant's symptom testimony must be credited:
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