Lang v. Huron Board of Education, 8728

• Decision Date: 16 February 1945
• Docket Number: 8728
• Citation: 17 N.W.2d 695,70 S.D. 343
• Parties: ANDREW J. LANG, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF IND. DIST. OF CITY OF HURON, and South Dakota Employers Protective Association, Insurer, Appellants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

70 SD 343, 17 NW2d 695 (1945)

ANDREW J. LANG,

Respondent,

v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF IND. DIST. OF CITY OF HURON, and South Dakota Employers Protective Association, Insurer,

Appellants.

South Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal four Circuit Court, Beadle County, SD

Hon. Frank R. Fischer, Judge

#8728—Affirmed

Caldwell & Burns, Sioux Falls, SD

Attorney for Appellants.

Royhl & Longstaff, Huron, SD

Attorneys for Respondent.

Opinion Filed Feb 16, 1945; Rehearing Denied Apr 17, 1945

RUDOLPH, Judge.

This is a proceeding brought under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, SDC Title 64. The facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences respecting the material ultimate facts can be drawn. The only question presented is the application of legal principles to such facts and such was the only question before the Circuit Court. It follows that the Circuit Court did not err in entering a judgment for the claimant if it correctly applied the legal principles to the undisputed facts. Lang v. Jordan Stone Co. et al., 61 SD 330, 249 NW 314.

The facts disclose that on the morning of February 3, 1943, and for some years prior thereto, the claimant, Andrew J. Lang, was superintendent of the defendant school district, the boundaries of which are coextensive with the boundaries of the city of Huron. As such superintendent, the claimant had general supervision of the high school and four grade schools of the district, was the executive of the Board of Education, and supervised the schools and school property. He had no fixed hours of work but worked simply as the occasion demanded and often performed duties in connection with his work at his home which was located six blocks from the high school building. The morning of February 3d was stormy, a light rain was falling, the wind was blowing and the sidewalks and streets were covered with a coating of ice. Rather early in the morning and while claimant was still at his home, two telephone calls came to him inquiring whether there would be school on that day. A part of claimant’s duties was to observe the weather conditions and from such observation determine whether school should be called off or maintained during the day. At 7:30 in the morning and while claimant was still at the home, he opened the door and looked out to observe the condition of the weather and sidewalks and then determined that unless the storm and conditions got worse that school would be maintained. At 8:30 in the morning claimant left his home and started for the high school building where he maintained an office and generally observed office hours from 9 until 10:30 in the morning and from 1 until 5 in the afternoon. As he was proceeding toward the high school building he fell and sustained the injury for which he is now seeking compensation. After falling, he immediately returned to his home and at 10 o’clock called off school for the afternoon.

The Industrial Commissioner, upon these undisputed facts, concluded that the injury was not one “arising out of and in the course of the employment” of claimant. The Circuit Court concluded that the injury did arise out of and in the course of the employment and entered judgment awarding compensation. The defendant has appealed.

The South Dakota holding upon which appellant relies is found in the case of Driessen v. Schiefelbein et al., 67 SD 645, 297 NW 685. We do not believe this case is controlling. In the Driessen case the employee had certain fixed hours of work, he had completed his day’s work and was on his way home subjecting him to the very general holding that an employee, with fixed hours of work, going to and from his place of work is not performing the duties of his employment or anything incidental thereto, within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation laws. The claimant in the instant case had no fixed hours of work, but as the executive officer of the school district, performed his duties when and where the occasion demanded; his work was confined to no particular place within the district nor did it begin or end at any particular time. Claimant performed some of his duties at his home, and he was actually there engaged in performing his work on the morning the injury occurred. Claimant’s work was such that it naturally involved exposing him to the perils of the street. In the performance of his duties it was necessary for claimant to go upon the streets in supervising the several schools, and caring for the school property within the district. The fact situation is entirely different from that in the Driessen-Schiefelbein case, where the work of the claimant had definitely ended...