Langdale v. People of State

• Decision Date: 30 September 1881
• Citation: 100 Ill. 263,1881 WL 10613
• Parties: CHARLES R. LANGDALEv.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

100 Ill. 263

1881 WL 10613 (Ill.)

CHARLES R. LANGDALE

v.THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Springfield Sept. 30, 1881.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. CYRUS EPLER, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. JAMES & WALLACE, for the plaintiff in error:

An order purporting to be the order of a board of school directors must be legal on its face. Dana v. State, 2 Ohio, 91; McMillam v. State, 5 Id. 269.

A school order, to be legal, must be issued by the order of the board of school directors, and must be signed by the president and clerk of said board. Hurd's Stat. 1880, p. 980, sec. 67, chap. 122.

A board of school directors must be organized by electing a president and clerk, and no act of said board is legal unless so organized, and such act must show that it has been done by the president and clerk attaching their signatures thereto. Hurd's Stat. 1880, p. 968, sec. 42, chap. 122. See, also, sec. 48, same chapter and title.

If the prosecutor attempts to set out an instrument in writing, in an indictment, in words and figures, he is bound to the strictest accuracy. Brown v. People, 66 Ill. 344; Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio, 55; Russell on Crim. Law, vol. 2, p. 375, (5th Am. ed.); Roscoe on Crim. Ev. p. 510, (5th Am. ed.)

If an instrument in writing is offered in evidence under an indictment attempting to set it out in words and figures, and the instrument in writing offered varies in any material or descriptive part from the one set out in the indictment, it can not be permitted to go to the jury as evidence. Wharton's Am. Crim. Law, vol. 1, secs. 306, 307, 606; 3 Starkie on Evidence, (3d Am. ed.) sec. 1530, p. 1529; Spangler v. Pugh, 21 Ill. 84; Jacksonville, N. W. and S. E. Railway Co. v. Brown, 67 Id. 201.

Messrs. FORREST & HUMPHREY, for the People:

It was not necessary for the prosecution to show that the order was legal. One of the chief elements of crime in this case is the illegality and fictitiousness of this instrument, and the knowledge of the defendant of those facts when he put it in circulation. Under such circumstances, it matters not whether the instrument is drawn in legal form or not.

It is not necessary that an indictment purporting to set out a bill, etc., shall give the number, its vignettes, mottoes and devices, or the words and figures in the margin, which constitute no part of the contract of the forged or fictitious instrument. Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio, 55; Commonwealth v. Bailey, 1 Mass. 62; Commonwealth v. Stevens, Id. 204; People v. Franklin, 3 Johns. Cases, 298; Commonwealth v. Searle, 2 Binney, 332; State v. Carr, 3 N. H. 367; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 Cush. 605; Commonwealth v. Wilson, 2 Gray, 270.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an indictment by the grand jury of Logan county against Charles R. Langdale, for passing a fictitious school order. The indictment was framed under sec. 107, chap. 34, Rev. Stat. 1874, which declares: “Whoever shall make, pass, utter or publish, with an intention to defraud any other person, or with like intention shall attempt to pass * * * any fictitious bill, note or check purporting to be the bill, note or check, or other instrument of writing for the payment of money or property, of some bank, corporation, copartnership or individual, when in fact there shall be no such bank, corporation, copartnership or individual in existence, the said person knowing the said * * * * instrument of writing for the payment of money to be fictitious, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than twenty years.”

It was charged in the indictment that the defendant, on the 15th day of June, 1880, with intent to defraud certain persons therein named, feloniously did pass upon and unto them a certain false and fictitious order, purporting to be issued by a corporation, to-wit: by the school directors of district number 8, in township 24, in range 4 west, in Tazewell county, in the State of Illinois, drawn upon the treasurer of said township 24, range 4 west, in said county of Tazewell, for the payment of money to the said Charles R. Langdale, or bearer, to-wit: the sum of $36, with interest thereon at eight per cent per annum, when in fact and in truth, at the time when said fictitious order was so passed as aforesaid, or at any time prior thereto, there was no such corporation or school district in existence, he, the said Langdale, well knowing the said order to be fictitious. What purports to be a copy of the order is then set out in the indictment, and the indictment then concludes in the usual manner. On a trial before a jury the defendant was found guilty, and his term of imprisonment fixed at one year in the penitentiary. To reverse the judgment this writ of error has been sued out.

It is urged that the school order read in evidence is not a legal order on its face, and as it does not purport to be a school order, defendant is guilty of no crime in passing the order. This position is predicated on the theory that every school order, to be legal and binding, must be signed by the president and clerk of the school board. Where a board of directors have a president and clerk, and direct the payment of money from the treasurer for any legitimate purpose, it is a very proper mode of executing the school order to have it signed by the president and secretary of the board. But this is not the only method of executing such an order. Section 67, chap. 122, of the School law, in express terms authorizes a school order to be signed by a majority of the board. Under a fair and reasonable construction of the School law either method may be adopted, and whether a school order may be executed by the president and secretary of the board, or by a majority of the directors who constitute...