Lange v. State

Decision Date23 April 1884
Docket Number11,589
Citation95 Ind. 114
PartiesLange v. The State
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

From the Pulaski Circuit Court.

Judgment affirmed.

G Burson, R. L. Mattingly and H. Burns, for appellant.

F. T Hord, Attorney General, W. A. Foster, Prosecuting Attorney and W. B. Hord, for the State.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

The jurat to the affidavit on which the information is founded is thus signed: "B. S. B. Stamats, Notary Public," and is attested by the seal, containing these words: "Notary Public. Seal. Indiana." The contention of counsel is that the affidavit is not sufficient, because not attested by a proper notarial seal. We think the seal does indicate the official character of the officer, and that is all that the statute requires. The statute does not require that the seal shall state the name of the county in which the notary resides or for which he was appointed.

The purpose of the act of 1883 prohibiting one person from pointing a gun or pistol at another is to reach two classes of persons, those who in anger, or with malice, threateningly point such a weapon at another, and those who do so without anger or malice. One class is composed of the wicked, the other of the foolish; in one case the act proceeds from wickedness, in the other from lack of sense.

The evidence in this case shows that the appellant was influenced by evil motives, and that what was done by him was done in a spirit of revenge. He had made threats against the life of the prosecuting witness, and was intent, as his declarations show, upon doing him serious violence. Influenced by the passions of anger and revenge, the appellant stationed himself within twelve steps of the door of the witness's house, laid his gun upon the fence, pointed it at the door of the house, and called upon the witness to come out, declaring that he wanted to "shoot him dead." The appellant's purpose was a deliberate one, for he remained with his gun pointed toward the door for more than fifteen minutes. In our opinion this evidence made a case within the statute, for its language is very broad and comprehensive. The words of the statute are: "It shall be unlawful for any person over the age of ten years, with or without malice, purposely to point or aim any pistol, gun, revolver, or other firearm, either loaded or empty, at or toward any other person." The word "toward" is one of very comprehensive signification, for it means "in the direction...

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9 cases
  • Palmer v. Decker
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 8 Noviembre 1968
    ...him. Our statute makes it an offense to purposely point a pistol at another, and violation of this statute is an actionable wrong. Lange v. State, 95 Ind. 114. But where the weapon is accidentally and not purposely pointed at another, the statute does not apply. 'The first instruction asked......
  • Mimms v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 27 Noviembre 1967
    ...if death results from the act, unless, indeed, the act of pointing the weapon is justifiable or excusable upon some legal ground. Lange v. State, 95 Ind. 114.' In Minton v. State (1964), 244 Ind. 636, 195 N.E.2d 355, a judgment was affirmed where the appellant had violated Burns' Indiana St......
  • German v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • 30 Octubre 1975
    ...pistol,' etc. 'Purposely' as therein used means intentionally or designedly. Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231.' Also, see, Lange v. The State (1884), 95 Ind. 114; Graham v. The State (1894), 8 Ind.App. 497, 35 N.E. It must be concluded that proof of an intent or design by German to point a ......
  • Muncie National Bank v. Brown
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • 3 Diciembre 1887
    ... ... floor known as the Boyce block, on the north side of East ... Main street, in the city of Muncie, in said county and State; ... and, also, all of the wool, rags, feathers, and other country ... produce, and all of the show and display cases, and store ... furniture and ... the officer by whom it was used. It is a general seal, and ... such as our law recognizes as valid. Lange v ... State, 95 Ind. 114. The presumption is that the ... officer did his duty, and this presumption is aided by the ... indications apparent on ... ...
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