Lange v. State

Decision Date22 May 1956
Citation2 Misc.2d 146,152 N.Y.S.2d 115
CourtNew York Court of Claims
PartiesJulia R. LANGE and Mathilde M. Lange, Claimants, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant.

Gott, Hadaway & O'Hare, Goshen, H. F. O'Hare, Goshen, of counsel, for claimants.

Jacob K. Javits, Atty. Gen., Timothy F. O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel, for the State.

HUNT, Judge.

This is an application, pursuant to notice of motion dated April 30, 1956, which, with the supporting papers, was served on the Attorney General on the same day, for an order directing that the notice of intention to file a claim, duly filed herein on November 21, 1955, be accepted as and deemed a claim filed within the two year limitation provided by section 10, subdivision 1 of the Court of Claims Act.

It is undisputed that for the purpose of the State Thruway System, pursuant to Article 12-A of the Highway Law and Article 2, Title 9, of the Public Authorities Law, the claimants were served on April 23, 1954, with notices of the appropriation of the fee to several acres of their land and of temporary easements over other lands of the claimants which are located in Orange County; appropriation maps and descriptions were filed in the Orange County Clerk's Office on November 21, 1953.

The claimants' time to serve the formal claim thus expired on April 23, 1956. The present application was made within seven days thereafter and the delay in making timely filing of the claim was due to a combination of circumstances, including conditions arising from the advanced ages of the claimants, but the Attorney General with commendable frankness states that the State has not been prejudiced by the delay. In fact, it would be most difficult to make a case of prejudice because the State and its agents intended to do what was done, that is, actually take part of the claimants' lands for the use of the State Thruway System.

The Attorney General does, however, raise the question whether the notice of intention can be deemed the claim herein because it fails to comply with Section 11 of the Court of Claims Act in that it fails to state the nature of the claim and the items of damage. Section 11 provides that a claim 'shall state the time when and place where such claim arose, the nature of same, and the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained and the total sum claimed', and, as to a notice of intention, it is provided that it 'shall set forth the same matters except that the items of damage or injuries and the sum claimed need not be stated'. The Attorney General simply contends that the notice does not state 'the nature of same and the items of damage or injuries...

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