Langenau Mfg. Co. v. City of Cleveland

• Decision Date: 27 May 1953
• Docket Number: No. 33469,33469
• Citation: 159 Ohio St. 525,112 N.E.2d 658
• Parties: , 50 O.O. 435 LANGENAU MFG. CO. v. CITY OF CLEVELAND et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 525

159 Ohio St. 525

112 N.E.2d 658, 50 O.O. 435

LANGENAU MFG. CO. v. CITY OF CLEVELAND et al.

No. 33469.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

May 27, 1953.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A court of equity will intervene to prevent the enforcement of claimed rights in a court of law where it is shown that there are situations, or relations existing between the parties, which would render the enforcement of a single lawful claim unjust or inequitable.

2. A municipal corporation of this state, by virtue of its authority to approriate private property for a public use such as a public transportation system, has power to appropriate private property for the relocation of a railroad right of way, which relocation is necessary because of the location and construction of its own rapid transit system which must occupy the former right of way of such railroad.

3. It is the duty of the court in an appropriation proceeding to afford the property owner the right to fully show the extent and character of the real estate proposed to be taken and its maximum value for any purpose for which its use is available, including the use which is presently made of it.

4. The issue of the true value in money of property to be appropriated for a public use is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the court in the appropriation proceeding, and such court has unquestioned authority to determine the value of the property sought to be taken to the full extent of the constitutional rights of its owner therein.

The appellant, Langenau Manufacturing Company, owns and operates a large factory building on Franklin avenue in the west side in Cleveland, Ohio. A large number of machines are owned and operated by the company and are assembled in strategic sequence throughout the four floors of the building. Several of these machines weigh as much as ten tons. The machines on the first floor are imbedded in concrete piers sunk into the ground beneath the building for support. Machines on the other floors are bolted to the floor boards. It is claimed that this factory is the largest producer of casket and luggage hardware in the world.

The City of Cleveland, Cleveland Transit System, is engaged in acquiring rights of way for the construction of a rapid transit system to serve the east and west sides of greater Cleveland and seeks to acquire this factory building indirectly for that purpose. It is admitted that under the present plan for the proposed rapid transit system, the property of Langenau, if acquired, will not actually be occupied or used by the city for rapid transit purposes. Langenau's property adjoins the existing right of way of the Nickel Plate Railroad in the west side of Cleveland. By agreements between the transit system and Nickel Plate Railroad, the right of way and tracks of the transit system will be physically located and established on the existing right of way of the Nickel Plate Railroad. This procedure will necessitate the relocation of the Nickel Plate tracks and right of way in order to permit the continuance of railroad service by Nickel Plate. The plan provides that the relocated Nickel Plate tracks and right of way will be over the property now owned by Langenau.

In August 1952, a condemnation suit was instituted in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County by the city of Cleveland to acquire the entire property of Langenau as necessary to the establishment of the transit system. The condemnation proceeding was instituted under authority of Section 3677, General Code, which limits compensation in appropriation cases to the value of the real estate, exclusively.

Since in the appropriation proceeding above noted it is proposed to condemn and pay for the real estate only, Langenau on November 29, 1952, filed its petition in this action in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County to enjoin the appropriation proceeding for the reasons that the taking of this property will cause cessation of Langenau's business for at least 60 days; that the publicity attendant upon the proceeding will cause loss of business; that the interruption will disrupt its employment organization; that in the appropriation proceeding it is proposed not to reimburse plaintiff for moving and reinstalling machinery and equipment at an estimated cost of $90,000; that the appropriation will make useless to Langenau for the benefit of its employees a large parking lot a short distance from the factory; and that compensation for its bare real estate will not constitute compensation as guaranteed by the Constitution.

The city of Cleveland filed its answer admitting that it proposes to condemn only the real estate of Langenau and denies that it is entitled to injunctive relief.

The Common Pleas Court on December 12, 1952, refused a restraining order and dismissed Langenau's petition. An appeal on questions of law and fact was taken to the Court of Appeals and that court likewise denied injunctive relief and dismissed the action.

The cause is now in this court on appeal by reason of the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Strangward & Lloyd and John P. Butler, Cleveland, for appellant.

Green, Lausche & Wilmot and Robert Mooney, Cleveland, for appellee.

HART, Judge.

Langenau claims that, since the city of Cleveland takes the position that it has the power under Section 3677, General Code, to take only real estate and has no obligation to pay for anything else, even though as a direct result of the appropriation it will take personal property, Langenau is entitled to enjoin the appropriation to protect its constitutional rights in its personal property which will not be taken but will be destroyed.

A court of equity will intervene to prevent the enforcement of claimed rights in a court of law, where it is shown that there are situations, or relations existing between the parties, which would render the enforcement of a single lawful claim unjust or inequitable. 21 Ohio Jurisprudence, 1208, Section 138.

A number of cases are cited by Langenau which it claims support this proposition.

Equity will enjoin a municipality from appropriating property of a railroad company for the purpose of extending a public street across the property where it appears that the extension of the street will unnecessarily interfere with a reasonable use of the tracks of the railroad. Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. City of Greenville, 69 Ohio St. 487, 69 N.E. 976.

In the case of Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Commissioners of the Cleveland Metropolitan Park District, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635, 23 A.L.R. 866, the Board of Commissioners of the Cleveland Metropolitan Park District sought to appropriate outright a certain acreage of land and to acquire certain easements in the remainder, including the right to drastically regulate the owner's use thereof. An injunction was granted.

In the case of Sargent v. City of Cincinnati, 110 Ohio St. 444, 144 N.E. 132, the court enjoined the city of Cincinnati from appropriating for waterworks purposes the fee in property which was already used by the city for the same purpose under a perpetual lease at a rental which the city regarded as excessive in view of the then present value of the land.

In the case of Emery v. City of Toledo, 121 Ohio St. 257, 167 N.E. 889, an injunction was sought to restrain the city from taking possession of property sought to be appropriated for street and railroad grade separation purposes, on the grounds that the city was seeking to appropriate more property than was necessary that the city did not intend to use all the property for a public purpose, and that the legislation upon which the appropriation proceeding was predicated was insufficient and inadequate. In that case, however, an injunction was refused on the facts.

It will be noted that in the Greenville case the jurisdiction of the court of equity was invoked to test the right of interference with the rights of a public utility having a right of eminent domain and engage in operating a transportation system thereon; that in the Pontiac Improvement Company case, under the guise of an appropriation, restrictions were sought to be placed on the use of land not taken; that in the Sargent case the city of Cincinnati sought to relieve itself of an unfavorable lease, the value of the property having declined, which lease, however, afforded it full use of the premises; and that in the Toledo case the question related to the appropriation purposes and was resolved against the property owner.

In none of the cases above referred to was there involved the proper determination of the true value of the property proposed to be appropriated. That issue is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the court in the appropriation proceeding, and such court has the unquestioned authority to determine the value of the property sought to be taken to the full extent of the constitutional rights of its owner therein. Sargent v. City of Cincinnati, supra. It must be remembered that under Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, 'Private property shall ever be held inviolate, but subservient to the public welfare.'

On this subject, in 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 175, page 1044, it is stated:

'Where land is condemned for public uses, the value of buildings or other improvements and fixtures on the land must be considered in determining the...