Langenfelder v. Jones

• Decision Date: 12 June 1940
• Docket Number: 31.
• Parties: LANGENFELDER et al. v. JONES.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

13 A.2d 623

178 Md. 421

LANGENFELDER et al. v. JONES.

No. 31.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

June 12, 1940

Appeal from Circuit Court, Anne Arundel County; Ridgely P. Melvin Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by John W. Jones claimant, opposed by Conrad J. Langenfelder and another trading as C.J. Langenfelder & Son, employer, and the insurance carrier wherein a decision of the State Industrial Accident Commission was reversed. From a judgment for claimant, the employer and insurance carrier appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

R. Tilghman Brice, III, of Annapolis, and Robert E. Coughlan, Jr., of Baltimore, for appellants.

W. Hamilton Whiteford, of Baltimore (Marvin I. Anderson, of Annapolis, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before OFFUTT, PARKE, SLOAN, MITCHELL, SHEHAN, JOHNSON, and DELAPLAINE, JJ.

SHEHAN, Judge.

The controversies on this appeal relate to rulings of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County in a workmen's compensation case in which the State Industrial Accident Commission was reversed. The lower court refused to grant a prayer for a directed verdict for the defendants, and from this action and because of certain rulings on testimony, to which exceptions were noted, the employer and insurer appealed. In the trial court a single issue was presented for the consideration of the jury, as follows: 'Was the disability suffered by the claimant the result of an accidental injury occurring on or about the first day of July, 1937, arising out of and in the course of his employment?' The answer of the jury on this issue was 'Yes.' At the conclusion of the testimony, the employer and insurer offered the following prayer 'A', 'The Court instructs the Jury that there is no legally sufficient evidence in this case to prove that the disability of the claimant is the result of the accidental injury, and therefore the answer of the Jury to the issue must be No.' An additional prayer was offered by the employer and insurer which merely deals with the burden of proof which was granted, and no exception was taken. With respect to prayer 'A', the action of the court in refusing the prayer is seriously questioned. The evidence shows that the claimant, while in the employ of Langenfelder and Son, the appellant, and while using a crow-bar in an effort to line up rails being used in the construction work, the crow-bar slipped and threw him on an iron form then in use by the employer, thus injuring his right side and right leg. The prayer does not deal with the weight of the testimony, and the extent or gravity of the injury, but with the legal sufficiency of the evidence tending to show that the injury, and resulting disability, was caused by the accident. It is obvious from the testimony, and it is admitted, that the accident did happen, and arose out of, and in the course of, the claimant's employment. This causal connection between the accident and the injury is the only serious question presented in the record and in the argument at bar. The commission evidently thought that this connection did not exist. The lower court thought that there was some evidence of it and refused the prayer. Moller Motor Car Company v. Unger, 166 Md. 198, 170 A. 777; Baber v. John C. Knipp & Sons, 164 Md. 55, 163 A. 862.

With respect to the several exceptions to the testimony, all of them concern the examination of Dr. Claffy, an expert called upon the part of the claimant, whose qualifications are admitted but the validity of the interrogatories addressed to him, and his answers, are in dispute. We will now consider these exceptions because the granting of the prayer, or its rejection, depends largely upon the admissibility of the evidence in question. The following question propounded to the witness presents the first exception: 'Are you able to express an opinion, based upon your professional knowledge and skill, and also upon the testimony you have heard, what, if any, connection there was between the accident alleged to be suffered by Jones on or about July 1, 1937, and the subsequent condition for which he was operated upon?' Exceptions 2 and 3 merely present amplification of the first question. There was an objection to this question, which was overruled. We think this action presents reversible error. In Northern Central Railroad Company v. Green, 112 Md. 487, 76 A. 90, 97, the test to be applied to such questions was stated to be as follows: 'A hypothetical question must embrace every material element of the hypothesis founded upon the evidence, and it must not import into the question any element not founded upon the evidence in the case. If it offends in either respect, it is defective, and it is error to permit such a question to be answered; and, if inadvertently admitted over an objection, it is error to refuse a motion to strike out the answer.' See, also, Gordon v. Opalecky, 152 Md. 536, 137 A. 299; Washington, B. & A. Electric Railroad Company v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243, 118 A. 648. This test is elaborately amplified and applied by Judge Offutt in his opinion in the recent case of Mathiesen Alkali Works, Inc. v. Redden, Md., 10 A.2d 699, 702, with respect to the hypothetical question there propounded and the opinion holds that: 'The question under consideration omitted (a) any direct reference to plaintiff's injuries (because the word 'accident' does not embrace within its meaning injuries resulting from the accident, Words & Phrases, Webster's Dictionary), (b) to the fact that Dr. Wilkerson who examined him four days after the accident saw no evidence of injury to the ear, (c) to the fact that he had no broken bones, (d) to the fact that he finished his route after the accident, or (e) to the fact that he lost no time from his work until April 10th nearly three months after the accident. Because of those omissions the question was bad and the objection to it should have been sustained. If the vice were merely formal since there was no objection on that ground, the error might not be regarded as reversible, * * * but it is more than that. It asks for an expert opinion upon stated facts which at most permitted a guess which the jury were as well qualified to make as the witness.' Applying these requisites to the question in the present case, it will be observed that the...