Langer v. George Washington University

Decision Date30 July 2007
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 07-262 (EGS).
Citation498 F.Supp.2d 196
PartiesMark LANGER, Plaintiff, v. The GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

James C. Bailey, Jason H. Ehrenberg, Bailey & Ehrenberg, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Raymond Charles Baldwin, Stephanie E. Sawyer, Seyfarth Shaw, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EMMET G. SULLIVAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Mark Langer worked as Head of Acquisitions for The George Washington University's ("GW" or "University") Gelman Library System until he was terminated in November 2006. Plaintiff alleges violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), District of Columbia Family and Medical Leave Act ("DCFMLA"), and District of Columbia Human Rights Act ("DCHRA"), in addition to various common law claims. Pending before the Court is defendant Jack A. Siggins' Partial Motion to Dismiss. Siggins seeks to dismiss plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count VII) and intentional interference with employment relationship and/or business relations claim (Count VIII). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Siggins' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working as Head of Acquisitions for the University's Gelman Library System in July 2003. He was classified as a Librarian II. In June 2005, plaintiff was reappointed to the rank of Librarian II and his employment was extended through June 30, 2009.

Before plaintiff began work at GW and during the time he worked there, he suffered from major depressive disorder, attention-deficit disorder, and chronic migraine headaches. Plaintiff was officially diagnosed with these conditions in 1995. In late 2005, plaintiffs depression worsened. At the end of 2005 or beginning of 2006, he notified his employer that he suffered from depression and a disability and would benefit from certain accommodations in the workplace. In February 2006, plaintiff was forced to take medical leave as a result of his depression. He underwent intensive outpatient therapy at the Washington Psychiatric Institute during that time. Plaintiff was cleared to return to work by his treating physicians in late February 2006. Plaintiff requested accommodations on account of his disability several times throughout 2006. Plaintiff also provided his employer with a letter in June 2006 from his treating physician regarding his worsening medical condition.

Plaintiff claims that rather than working with plaintiff to find suitable accommodations, defendants GW and Jack Siggins (plaintiffs supervisor and University Librarian) took a series of illegal and retaliatory actions against plaintiff. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendants communicated with one of plaintiff's treating physicians in an attempt to elicit a statement that plaintiffs requested accommodations were unreasonable, docked plaintiff seven days pay in August 2006, refused to allow plaintiff to work after 7:00 p.m., chastised plaintiff for arriving after 9:00 a.m. even though plaintiff received permission to do so, attempted to force plaintiff to take long-term disability rather than working with plaintiff to find accommodations in the workplace, and otherwise refused to respond to plaintiffs reasonable requests for accommodations in the workplace.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Siggins personally harassed and intimidated plaintiff and attempted to force plaintiff to resign. Siggins allegedly asked plaintiff intimidating and inappropriate questions on his first day back to work, told plaintiff he was on a short leash, told plaintiff he would have fired him if it was not for the FMLA, and retroactively changed plaintiffs July 2004 through July 2005 performance ratings to eliminate plaintiffs alleged stellar performance ratings and reflect his alleged poor performance.

Plaintiff claims that defendants' actions prevented him from adequately performing his job as Head of Acquisitions and caused plaintiff tremendous emotional distress, resulting in the need for additional medical leave in September 2006. When plaintiff returned from this second period of leave in October 2006, plaintiff claims that defendants again failed to provide reasonable accommodations in the workplace. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Siggins continued his emotional harassment and intimidation of plaintiff. On November 16, 2006, defendants terminated plaintiffs employment with GW.

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges the following claims against GW only: FMLA retaliation and discrimination (Count I), breach of contract (Count IV), and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count V). As to defendant Siggins only, plaintiff alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII) and intentional interference with employment relationship and/or business relations (Count VIII). Plaintiff also alleges that both defendants are liable for DCFMLA discrimination and retaliation (Count II), DCHRA discrimination and retaliation (Count III), and promissory estoppel (Count VI).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002). A complaint must present "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," and "above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 1074, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Court will accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, and give the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be drawn from the facts alleged. See id. at 1965; Atchinson v. Dist. of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 422 (D.C.Cir.1996).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendant Siggins has moved to dismiss Count VII (intentional infliction of emotional distress) and Count VIII (intentional interference with employment relationship and/or business relations) of the Complaint.

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

In Count VII of his Complaint, plaintiff asserts a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendant Siggins, claiming that Siggins' conduct toward him was extreme and outrageous. Siggins argues in his motion to dismiss that none of the conduct alleged is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant engaged in "extreme and outrageous" conduct that was intentional or reckless and that caused severe emotional distress to another. Kerrigan v. Britches of Georgetowne, 705 A.2d 624, 628 (D.C.1997). This "very demanding standard" is "only infrequently met." Dale v. Thomason, 962 F.Supp. 181, 184 (D.D.C.1997). Conduct is considered "extreme and outrageous" when it is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 1075 (D.C.1991) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). "`[M]ere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities" are not sufficient. Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 (D.C.1980) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). Courts are "particularly demanding" when intentional infliction of emotional distress claims are made "in an employment context." Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 307 (D.C. 2000). Employer-employee conflicts generally do not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of outrageous conduct. Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 986 (D.C. 1984). Moreover, the mere discharge of an employee is not considered extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to state an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Tiefenbacher v. AARP, Civil Action No. 05-1802, 2006 WL 1126841, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23629, at *12 (D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2006); Elliott v. Healthcare Corp., 629 A.2d 6, 9 (D.C.1993).

In some circumstances, however, the extreme and outrageous nature of conduct underlying an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim "`may arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity.'" Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1313 (D.C.1994) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965)). Conduct "may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know." Id.; see also Boyle v. Wenk, 378 Mass. 592, 392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1979) ("[T]hough there is no evidence that Wenk knew the precise nature of Mrs. Boyle's physical susceptibility, his knowledge that she had just returned from the hospital put him on notice that she might be more vulnerable to harassment or verbal abuse."). If plaintiffs alleged distress is exaggerated and unreasonable under the circumstances, there is no liability "unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has knowledge." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j.

Plaintiff alleges a series of acts by Siggins over a period of about nine months in 2006. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that Siggins did not engage in the interactive process and work with plaintiff to find suitable accommodations for his disability, tried to encourage plaintiff to voluntarily resign from his position, personally harassed plaintiff by asking him intimidating and inappropriate questions on his first day back from leave, retroactively changed plaintiffs performance review to a lower rating, and made comments to plaintiff indicating that he wanted to fire him, that he doubted plaintiff could meet his expectations, and that plaintiff should just consider,...

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