Langevin v. Travco Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 March 2018
• Docket Number: No. 2016–0639,2016–0639
• Citation: 184 A.3d 80,170 N.H. 660
• Parties: Brian LANGEVIN & a. v. TRAVCO INSURANCE COMPANY
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

170 N.H. 660

184 A.3d 80

Brian LANGEVIN & a.

v.TRAVCO INSURANCE COMPANY

No. 2016–0639

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Argued: September 27, 2017

Opinion Issued: March 30, 2018

Backus, Meyer & Branch, LLP, of Manchester (BJ Branch on the brief and orally), for the plaintiffs.

Primmer Piper Eggleston & Cramer PC, of Manchester (Doreen F. Connor on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

Douglas, Leonard & Garvey, P.C., of Concord (Megan Douglass on the brief), for the New Hampshire Association for Justice, as amicus curiae.

BASSETT, J.

The plaintiffs, Brian and Nancy Langevin, appeal an order of the Superior Court (Brown, J.) denying their motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to the defendant, Travco Insurance Company (Travco). The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs were not entitled to payment from Travco under their medical payments coverage to pay a lien asserted by the plaintiffs' health insurer because such payment would constitute a "duplicate payment" contrary to the language of both RSA 264:16, IV (2014) and the plaintiffs' automobile insurance policy with Travco. We reverse and remand.

The following relevant facts are derived from the trial court's order or are otherwise undisputed. On October 4, 2014, the plaintiffs were injured in a motor vehicle accident. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs had health insurance coverage through Aetna. They also had an automobile insurance policy with Travco that included medical payments coverage of $25,000 per person. That policy provides:

A. We will pay reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical and funeral services because of "bodily injury":

1. Caused by accident; and

2. Sustained by an "insured."

The policy also includes an endorsement that modifies the medical payments coverage and provides that:

B. No one will be entitled to receive duplicate payments for the same elements of loss under this coverage and a health insurance policy.

Similarly, RSA 264:16, governing medical payments coverage in automobile liability policies, provides:

IV. The insured shall have the exclusive right to submit a claim for medical expenses under either medical payments coverage or a health insurance policy or both, as the insured elects; provided, however, an insured shall not be entitled to duplicate payment from medical payments coverage and a health insurance policy for the same medical expense.

RSA 264:16, IV (emphases added).

Following the accident, the plaintiffs submitted their medical expenses, totaling $6,820.33, to Aetna. Aetna negotiated with the providers and paid $1,861.90 in full satisfaction of the medical expenses. The plaintiffs also submitted a claim to Travco for other medical expenses not covered by Aetna, including co-pays and deductible payments, which Travco paid.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs reached a settlement with the driver responsible for the accident. Aetna then asserted a lien against this settlement for the $1,861.90 payment that it had made for the plaintiffs' medical expenses. The plaintiffs paid Aetna $1,500.00 in partial satisfaction of the lien amount and informed Aetna that they would leave the remaining $361.90 unpaid "until we resolve the issue of whether medical payment coverage can be used to pay the lien." The plaintiffs, in turn, submitted a claim to Travco under their medical payments coverage, requesting the entire lien amount of $1,861.90. Travco denied the claim, asserting that it was neither contractually nor statutorily obligated to pay the lien.

The plaintiffs filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that they are entitled to payment from Travco in the amount of Aetna's lien. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court ruled in Travco's favor. It concluded that, because the plaintiffs "have submitted to and received payment from Aetna for [the] medical expenses, it is axiomatic that requiring Travco to pay for a lien based upon those same exact medical expenses constitutes a duplicate payment" under RSA 264:16, IV and the Travco policy language. The trial court further stated that "Aetna's ability to assert rights on a certain settlement ... is wholly inapposite to whether payment for medical expenses was made in the first instance." The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider, and this appeal followed.

In reviewing a trial court's rulings on cross-motions for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to each party in its capacity as the non-moving party and, if no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Russell v. NGM Insurance Company, 170 N.H. ––––, ––––, 176 A.3d 196, 199–200 (2017). If our review of that evidence discloses no genuine issue of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, then we will affirm the grant of summary judgment. Id. We review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it concluded that the plaintiffs' receipt of payment from Travco for Aetna's lien would constitute a prohibited duplicate payment under both RSA 264:16, IV and the policy. Because "a provision which conflicts with the Financial Responsibility Law [RSA chapter 264] cannot be a valid part of [a] contract of insurance," Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 134 N.H. 315, 318, 592 A.2d 515 (1991), we first interpret RSA 264:16, IV, and then construe the policy in light of our interpretation of the statute.

We review the trial court's interpretation of a statute de novo. Wells Fargo Bank v. Schultz, 164 N.H. 608, 610, 62 A.3d 893 (2013). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. Petition of Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721, 82 A.3d 917 (2013). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. Moreover, we do not consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Id. This enables us to better discern the legislature's intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. Absent an ambiguity, we will not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent. segTEL v. City of Nashua, 170 N.H. 118, 120, 166 A.3d 213 (2017).

The plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred when it ruled that the plaintiffs' receipt of payment from Travco to satisfy Aetna's lien would constitute a "duplicate payment" in violation of RSA 264:16, IV. The plaintiffs argue that "payment" as used in paragraph IV means only those payments made directly to the insured by the health insurer or the automobile insurer. Travco counters that "payment" embodies a broader concept, including "payment ... made on [the insureds'] behalf."

The plaintiffs respond that, even if Travco is correct as to the meaning of "payment," they prevail because Travco's payment of the lien on their behalf would not be a "duplicate" payment. Assuming, without deciding, that Travco's more expansive interpretation of "payment" is correct, we agree with the plaintiffs that Travco's payment of Aetna's lien would not constitute a "duplicate payment" that violates RSA 264:16, IV.

The plaintiffs assert that Travco's payment of Aetna's lien—directly to them or on their behalf—would not be a duplicate payment. They argue that, although Aetna initially paid the healthcare providers on their behalf, the effect of that payment was negated by Aetna's subsequent lien, and, therefore, they have not received the benefit of a payment from either Aetna or Travco for the medical expenses. Travco responds that its payment of the lien on the plaintiffs' behalf would constitute an improper "duplicate payment" because it would result in the plaintiffs' "enrich[ment]" from both insurers for the same medical expense. It asserts that its payment of the lien would result in the plaintiffs being enriched by both insurers because Aetna has already paid the same underlying medical expenses on the plaintiffs' behalf. Thus, the parties appear to agree that "duplicate payment" occurs when an insured receives the benefit of payment, either directly or on his or her behalf, from both insurers for the same medical expense. However, they disagree about whether Travco's payment of the Aetna lien in this case would result in a prohibited "duplicate payment" to the plaintiffs. We agree with the plaintiffs that it would not.

Aetna paid the plaintiffs' healthcare providers $1,861.90 for certain medical expenses. There is no evidence in the record that it has made any direct payments to the plaintiffs. In fact, the plaintiffs have personally paid Aetna $1,500.00, and are obligated to pay Aetna the remainder of the lien. Nor have the plaintiffs received the benefit of a payment on their behalf. The plaintiffs initially received the benefit of a payment of $1,861.90 on their behalf from Aetna to the healthcare providers. However, both Travco and the trial court overlook the critical importance of an additional fact: that Aetna later asserted a lien against the plaintiffs' settlement with the tortfeasor in the amount of the medical expenses that Aetna had paid. That lien negated the effect of Aetna's prior payment of medical expenses on the plaintiffs' behalf because the plaintiffs are now obligated to reimburse Aetna. Put differently: the plaintiffs initially received the benefit of a...