Langevine v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 25 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-7057,96-7057
• Citation: 106 F.3d 1018,323 U.S.App.D.C. 210
• Parties: Shirley P. LANGEVINE, Appellee, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1018

106 F.3d 1018

323 U.S.App.D.C. 210

Shirley P. LANGEVINE, Appellee, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Appellants.

No. 96-7057.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Dec. 12, 1996.

Decided Feb. 25, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 91cv01026).

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause, Washington, DC, for appellants. Charles F.C. Ruff, Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Edward E. Schwab, Washington, DC, Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on the briefs.

James C. Duda, Springfield, MA, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Jerry S. Fowler, Jr. and Arthur B. Spitzer, Washington, DC, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge:

This case arose out of Shirley P. Langevine's arrest for disorderly conduct by two Metropolitan Police Department officers who had stopped Langevine for speeding. Langevine sued the officers and the District of Columbia ("defendants") for common-law false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery, and, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), for violation of her Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. A jury found in favor of Langevine on the false arrest, false imprisonment, and § 1983 claims and awarded her $201,500 in damages. The trial judge did not enter judgment on the verdict, however, and instead granted defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law.

On the first appeal in this case, the court reversed the grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants and "ORDERED that the case be remanded to the District Court for entry of judgment according to the jury verdict except with respect to the § 1983 claim against the District of Columbia, as to which the jury verdict is vacated, and for consideration of such post-judgment motions as the parties may make." Langevine v. District of Columbia, No. 93-7124, 1994 WL 609454 (Oct. 24, 1994) (mem.), reprinted at Appendix I ("App.") 53.

On remand, defendants moved for a new trial. The trial judge denied the motion as untimely, then reconsidered and granted the motion on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the damages were excessive. Prior to the new trial, however, the judge's health declined, and the case was reassigned to another District Court judge. The new judge granted Langevine's motion for reconsideration of the new trial decision, vacated the new trial order, and entered judgment in favor of Langevine. Defendants now appeal, arguing that the trial judge's second order granting a new trial was "the law of the case," and, therefore, the District Court judge to whom the case was reassigned had no power to reconsider the new trial order.

The grant of a new trial motion is an interlocutory order that is not subject to the law of the case doctrine. Thus, the District Court judge to whom this case was reassigned had full authority to reconsider the previous new trial ruling. Finding no abuse of discretion in the District Court's ultimate denial of defendants' motion for a new trial, we affirm the District Court's order entering judgment in favor of Langevine.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 6, 1990, a car driven by appellee Langevine was stopped by Officers Johnson and Kelsey of the Metropolitan Police Department for speeding on a District of Columbia street. While the officers were preparing a traffic ticket, they arrested Langevine for disorderly conduct. Langevine brought this action against the officers and the District of Columbia for common-law false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery, and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of her rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.

At trial, Langevine's testimony about the events surrounding her arrest was as follows:

On May 6, 1990, Langevine was driving her car south on 13th Street, N.W., in the District of Columbia. Her two daughters, Tracy and Denise, then ages fourteen and sixteen, were with her. She was stopped by Officer John Kelsey and Officer Katherina Johnson near the intersection of 13th Street and Colorado Avenue. Transcript ("Tr.") 5-7, reprinted in Appendix II. Officer Johnson had set up a radar unit to catch speeders at this location. Tr. 458-59, 479-80.

Officer Kelsey approached her car and asked for her driver's license and registration, which she gave to him. Tr. 7-8. Langevine asked Officer Kelsey if something was wrong and was told that she had been speeding. She replied, "Where or when?" and was told, "Right here just now driving your car." She asserted that she could not have been speeding since she had been going with the flow of the traffic. Tr. 8. Kelsey commented on Langevine's accent and asked which island she was from. She replied, "Sir, what does that have to do with the question I asked you? I asked you why did you stop me." Tr. 8. According to Langevine, Officer Kelsey responded that, "I see you have a [expletive] mouth." She replied, "I do not have to put up with your profanity. All I did was ask you a question why did you stop me?" Officer Kelsey then told her that because of her "[expletive] mouth" he was going to give her a ticket. Tr. 8-9.

Officer Kelsey took Langevine's license and registration back to his police car. Langevine remained in her car and, after about ten minutes, "started feeling very uncomfortable, hot, and of course, you know, wondering what's going on." However, she testified that she was "not angry." Tr. 9. Langevine got out of her car and "paced a little bit." She then started walking toward the police car, and was instructed by Officer Kelsey to, "Go sit in your car." She replied, "Sir, I would like to know what is going on. Could you give me an answer? I really do not understand what is going on." Officer Kelsey repeated the instruction to sit in her car. Tr. 9-10. Langevine replied, "Am I in violation of the law?" She was again instructed to go to her car and responded, "Sir, I am seeking clarity. What is going on?" Tr. 10. She stated that she approached the officers less than eight or nine times to ask them what was going on. Tr. 59.

Officer Johnson came over and said, "Can I help you?" Langevine indicated that she had been speaking to Officer Kelsey, to which Officer Johnson responded, "Well, I am the one that will give you a ticket." Langevine then said, "Well, then you can tell me why would you give me a ticket?" Officer Johnson replied that Langevine should go and sit in her car. Tr. 10. Langevine again said, "I am seeking clarity here. I would like to know what is going on." Tr. 10.

At that point, Langevine heard Officer Johnson say, "Let's arrest her." Johnson then told Langevine to lean on the hood of the car. Before she could do so, the two police officers pulled her arms behind her in a painful manner, led her to the police car, and pushed her against the hood of the car in a manner that caused her head to strike it. The impact caused a bruise and broke her glasses but did not break the skin. Langevine was handcuffed, pushed into the back seat of the police car in an awkward manner, and taken to the police station. Tr. 11-12.

Officers Kelsey and Johnson also testified at trial. Although their account was substantially similar to Langevine's, according to the officers, Langevine was loud and belligerent, used obscene language, and disrupted the neighborhood until her arrest. Tr. 409-11, 465.

Langevine's version of the arrest was corroborated by the testimony of two non-party witnesses. First, Langevine's daughter Denise, now a scholarship student at Princeton University, Tr. 73, testified that she was sitting in her mother's car with the windows open throughout the arrest. Denise testified that she did not hear any yelling or profanity prior to her mother's arrest. Tr. 75-77. Second, Carolyn Andrews, who was sitting on the porch of her home at 13th and Madison Streets, N.W., at the time of the arrest, testified that she did not hear any swearing or yelling prior to Langevine's arrest, that she did not believe Langevine was disturbing the neighborhood, and that, as far as she could see, Langevine was not a threat to anyone. Tr. 120-21, 142-43.

Both sides also offered expert testimony on the proper enforcement of disorderly conduct laws. Although the experts disagreed on the significance of the fact that the District of Columbia's rate of disorderly conduct arrests has consistently been two to five times greater than the national average, both experts agreed that, if Langevine's account of her arrest were credited, her arrest was not proper. Tr. 193-94, 345.

On June 17, 1993, at the end of the four-day trial, the jury returned a verdict for Langevine on the false arrest, false imprisonment, and § 1983 claims; it decided in favor of the defendants on the assault and battery claim and denied punitive damages. App. 38-40, 42-43. However, judgment was not entered on the verdict, and the following day the trial judge, visiting District Judge Henry A. Mentz, Jr., granted the defendants' motion, made at the close of the evidence, for judgment as a matter of law. Langevine v. District of Columbia, No. 91-1026 (D.D.C. June 18, 1993) (order), reprinted at App. 52. In doing so, Judge Mentz stated his belief that, "[e]ven though the plaintiff denies having used foul language there is substantial evidence that she nevertheless engaged in disorderly conduct. The overwhelming evidence is that while the officers were attempting to process tickets to people who had been stopped earlier the plaintiff repeatedly confronted the officers in a loud aggressive, obstreperous and agitated manner that was inappropriate and disruptive and breached the peace of the neighborhood." App. 47-48. ...