Langfitt v. Pierce Cnty.

• Decision Date: 31 August 2021
• Docket Number: C21-5122 BHS
• Citation: Langfitt v. Pierce Cnty., C21-5122 BHS (W.D. Wash. Aug 31, 2021)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: WILLIAM V. LANGFITT, III, individually and as executor of the Estate of WILLIAM V. LANGFITT, IV, and PATRICIA E. LANGFITT, individually, Plaintiffs, v. PIERCE COUNTY, COLBY EDWARDS, and “JANE DOE” EDWARDS, Defendants.

WILLIAM V. LANGFITT, III, individually and as executor of the Estate of WILLIAM V. LANGFITT, IV, and PATRICIA E. LANGFITT, individually, Plaintiffs, v. PIERCE COUNTY, COLBY EDWARDS, and “JANE DOE” EDWARDS, Defendants.

No. C21-5122 BHS

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma

August 31, 2021

ORDER

BENJAMIN H. SETTLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the following motions Defendants Pierce County and Colby Edwards's Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt. 16, and Plaintiffs William Langfitt, III, individually and as executor of the Estate of William V. Langfitt, IV, and Patricia Langfitt's responsive Motion for Leave to Amend their complaint, Dkt. 30. Also pending are Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' surreply, Dkt. 21, and Defendants' Motion for a Protective Order, Dkt. 24 asking the Court to stay discovery pending resolution of Edwards's claim for qualified immunity. The Court has considered the pleadings and the all the materials filed in support of and opposition to the motions. Its rulings follow.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from the March 16, 2018, shooting death of William V. Langfitt, IV, by Defendant Colby Edwards, a Pierce County Sheriffs Deputy. Plaintiffs allege that Langfitt was distraught following his grandfather's death. Dkt. 1, ¶ 4.3. His friend Naomi Powers called 911 to report he was having a mental health crisis and to obtain assistance transporting him to the hospital. Id. ¶ 4.4. While on the phone, Powers saw that Langfitt was in the street, barefoot, wearing shorts and a T-shirt, and holding nothing but a photo of his grandfather. Id. ¶ 4.6. Edwards arrived on the scene, flung his door open, and immediately drew his firearm. Id. ¶ 4.8. Edwards kept his gun trained on Langfitt and made no attempts to deescalate or negotiate before opening fire. Id. ¶¶ 4.9-4.13. Langfitt made no verbal or physical threats towards Edwards and did not touch him. Id. ¶¶ 4.14-4.15. Edwards shot Langfitt and then rolled his body over and handcuffed him. Id. ¶ 4.16. Langfitt died at the scene. Id.

Plaintiffs (Langfitt's parents, individually, and his father as the executor of his estate) sued Edwards and Pierce County in February 2021, claiming Edwards violated^[1]Langfitt's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, and deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in a familial relationship with their son. Dkt. 1. They assert a Monell claim against Pierce County, and state law claims for negligence, outrage, false arrest, unlawful seizure, and discrimination in violation of Washington's Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW Chapter 49.60, et seq. Id.

Defendants seek judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Dkt. 16. They contend that Plaintiffs' allegations are conclusory and without sufficient factual context to state a plausible claim. They argue Plaintiffs have not plausibly asserted a Monell claim against the County because they have failed to identify a policy, how it was deficient, or how it caused them harm. They argue that Plaintiffs' state law intentional tort claims are barred by the applicable two-year limitations period and that their negligence claim is inconsistent with their other claims. They argue that Plaintiffs' WLAD claim is not plausible because they have alleged no facts supporting the conclusion that Edwards's (or the County's) conduct was discriminatory. Id.

Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs “artfully” pled their claims, to avoid describing the factual context of the shooting, which they argue involved Langfitt's effort to enter Edwards's vehicle. The Complaint does not set forth any factual context for the shooting; it focusses what did not happen, but discloses very little about what did:

4.14 William V. Langfitt, IV did not make any verbal or physical threats towards Defendant Colby Edwards.

4.15 William V. Langfitt, IV never touched Defendant Colby Edwards.

4.16 After shooting William V. Langfitt, IV, sheriff officer [sic] rolled his body over and handcuffed him.

Dkt. 1 at 5.

Defendants argue the bare bones complaint purposefully does not include the facts leading up to the shooting, and that it thus improperly deprives Edwards of his qualified immunity defense. They ask the Court to require Plaintiffs to file a reply to their Answer. Dkt. 15.

Plaintiffs respond that Defendants are asking the Court to draw inferences in Defendants' favor or to construe disputed facts in favor of the Defendants. Dkt. 17. More persuasively, they seek leave to amend or supplement their complaint to address the claimed deficiencies (and to revise their state laws claims) and their motion includes a proposed amended complaint.^[2] Dkts. 30 and 31-1. It is more detailed than the first, and the recitation of facts surrounding the shooting now suggest that Langfitt sought to enter Deputy Edwards's car from the open driver's door, but Plaintiffs blame Edwards for leaving it open.

The proposed amended complaint minimally asserts that the County had a policy of failing to train its officers to interact with mentally distraught persons; it alleges only that “Pierce County failed to adequately train and equip Deputy Edwards with the tools necessary to address issues related to unarmed individuals that were in need of mental health assistance.” Dkt. 31-1 at 8.

The proposed amended complaint barely addresses why the policy was deficient or how it caused the shooting, and Defendants reasonably contend that the allegations are too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint abandons their state law excessive force and unlawful seizure claims, but asserts a negligence claim, wrongful death and survival actions, a claim asserting that Pierce County must indemnify Edwards for any damages awarded against him, an outrage claim, respondeat superior claims against the County, based on both their state law tort claims and their constitutional claims against Edwards, and a WLAD claim which simply quotes the statute. Id. at 16.

Defendants oppose amendment, arguing the effort is too late and prejudicial. They argue that amendment would be futile as to Plaintiffs' Monell claim against Pierce County and that the revised factual context still does not add up to a plausible Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against Edwards. They reiterate that Plaintiffs' negligence claim is irrevocably inconsistent with their assertions that Edwards acted intentionally, that their state law intentional tort claims are barred by the applicable two-year limitations period, and that Plaintiffs' revised WLAD claim is no more plausible than the one asserted in the earlier version.

Plaintiffs filed a surreply, Dkt. 20, in opposition to the Defendants' Rule 12(c) Motion, and Defendants moved to strike that filing as unauthorized, Dkt. 21. Because the Plaintiffs surreply, Dkt. 20, does not affect the resolution of the motion, Defendants' Motion to Strike, Dkt. 21, is DENIED as moot. Finally, Defendants have moved to stay discovery until the Court resolves their motion for judgment on the pleadings and Edwards's claim of qualified immunity. See Dkts. 24, 27, 28.

The substantive motions are addressed in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

1. Standards

A Rule 12(c) motion is “functionally identical” to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054-55 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Dworkin v. Hustler Mag. Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), to a Rule 12(c) motion). The difference is that a Rule 12(c) motion may be filed after the defendant answers, while a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must be filed before the defendant pleads.

Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff's complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A claim has “facial plausibility” when the party seeking relief “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although the court must accept as true the Complaint's well-pled facts, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat an otherwise proper 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Vazquez v. Los Angeles (“LA”) Cnty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnotes omitted). This requires a plaintiff to plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me-accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

On a 12(b)(6) motion, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). However, where the facts are not in dispute, and the sole issue is whether there is...